After Bucharest

Photography by Sabrina Tang

Can NATO achieve its global agenda with member countries from Europe and North America only? Many questions have been raised since the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the largest in its history, regarding a new wave of NATO expansion. Most regard the global role of NATO in relation to the limited geographic scope of its membership, especially after the shift in focus of the organization following its new Strategic Concept in 1999 and changed American security policies after 9/11. Partnership relations with new allies are not enough to clear NATO's image as an illegitimate world policeman or to satisfy the needs of NATO's troops in the field. The newest NATO members, who consist of mostly Eastern European countries, are not strategically important, and so a new “outward-looking strategy” is being developed to build stronger global strategic alliances. Without this, NATO could end up out of business.

NATO's Legend

NATO is now functioning operationally in three continents and about 60,000 soldiers are deployed under its command. Its diverse activities are being conducted in a large area, stretching east to west from Kosovo to Afghanistan, and north to south from the Mediterranean and Iraq to Darfur. At the recent Bucharest summit there was progress towards confirming a long-term commitment to NATO's most important operation - Afghanistan - as well as proof that NATO is part of wider international community and cannot work alone1. Today, NATO has 26 members, with 2 new invitees, prospective membership for others, and over 20 partners in Europe and Eurasia, seven in the Mediterranean, four in the Persian Gulf, and others from around the world 2

NATO has been, and still is, the only multilateral institution in which the allies have confidence or trust in the organisation. This is because of the organisation’s capability, strength and effectiveness. NATO's old motto, “to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans involved in Europe,” has become obsolete. It is clear now that NATO’s new motto should be “to keep America out of Europe, the Russians down, and the alliance involved in the greater (or wider) Middle East” - pertaining to the Arab world, Iran, and marginal countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Still, the main purpose of NATO is to create a safer world for the West.

NATO has been a symbol of the prestigious US position worldwide as well as the main vehicle of US influence on the European continent. It is the only organisation that brings US and European allies together to discuss security and now political affairs. The alliance has become one of choice, rather than of necessity.

NATO continues to be the key forum for the discussion of international security issues. It is without doubt the most influential and important security organization in the world. Being so, the alliance seems to have a magnetic power to attract its partners and push them to increase their efforts to develop their policies in such a way that serves the interests of the alliance 3.

Fifteen years ago, NATO was an alliance which had not yet engaged in operations anywhere, even though it was prepared to do so. Today, it is both a larger alliance, and one taking action to meet security challenges around the whole world 4.

Changes in NATO’s profile

NATO's agenda is no longer limited to European affairs or the East-West relationship. It deals with terrorism and biological, chemical and nuclear warfare in addition to facing challenges in the Middle East and the Gulf. Functionally, terrorism has become one of the main concerns of the alliance and has almost become synonymous with other Middle Eastern issues. NATO's security policy is now based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability.

According to the Declaration of the Riga Summit, which took place in November 2006, NATO "will upgrade substantially the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean dialogue". This means the alliance has assumed a diplomatic role, or duties, after transforming itself from a military body concerned with defense-related issues to a military-political and security organization that has a comprehensive competence and jurisdiction.

This radical change is illustrated by the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which consists of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever it is needed, as decided by the council. NRF reached its full operational capability with about 21,000 troops. With this change, the alliance is no longer defensive in nature or restricted to taking precautionary measures within Europe. It is offensive wherever necessary, prepared to deal with terrorism and any states sponsoring or harbouring terrorists groups. Furthermore, it will not be unduly restrained by considerations of international legitimacy: defense decisions will be taken "as decided by the [North Atlantic] Council", not by authorization of the United NationSecurity Council. According to the new American strategy for national security this defense may even be in "anticipation" by launching pre-emptive strikes against perceived sources of threat. This marks a major development for NATO.

This self-given mandate means only one thing: Today's NATO is completely different from that which existed before. It has internationalized its purposes, aims and tasks but kept the council Westernized. For example, the importance given to international law and the role of the United Nations has been decreased significantly since NATO’s operations in Kosovo. In the Kosovo case, the North Atlantic Council authorized Activation Orders for air strikes against Yugoslavia on October 13, 1998, tying its directive to UN Security CouncilResolution 1199Resolution 1199.  Legally speaking, there is no authorization of force through Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 (as Russia and China directly opposed force and would have vetoed any such resolution) and thus the bombardment was not under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which allows for the protection of international peace by regional organizations. In the resolution, the Security Council only went as far as to express deep concern about the excessive force being used by Serbian security forces, to declare the situation a threat to the peace and security in the region, and to resolve to consider further action to maintain peace.6 Disregarding the previous need for United Nations authorization has been the trend of NATO's actions, and has been reinforced by the policies of the United States since the events of 9/11 7.

As it was said at the Bucharest Summit Declaration in April 2008, 8 “We have done much to transform our forces and capabilities in line with NATO political objectives, in particular the priorities laid out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, and NATO operational experience” 9. NATO forces must be able to conduct, upon decision by the Council, collective defense and crisis response operations on and beyond the alliance’s territory, on its periphery, and at a strategic distance, with little or no host-nation support. 

Moreover, the American plan to install ten long-range, ground-based missile defense interceptors in Polandand a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic was approved at the Bucharest Summit, the aim being to strengthen transatlantic security, to counter the evolving Middle Eastern ballistic missile threat, and to allow the United States to extend its own security umbrella to that of its European allies. The US communiqué after the summit specifically notes the alliance's "deep concern" over the nuclear proliferation activities of both Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 10.

The alliance has added other new dimensions to its counter-terrorism strategy using diplomatic, political and military means. An example is the extension of NATO's maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean which, to all intents and purposes, violates the sovereignty of some costal states as there is no international authorization for such monitoring or intervention, especially as the southern countries of the Mediterranean are not NATO members. Another example is given in Paragraph 10 of theBucharest Summit Declaration when it "welcomes the progress made in enhancing NATO's strategic communications capability, as demonstrated by the rapid response Media Operations Centre. The council also welcomes the launching at NATO Summit of a new NATO TV channel on the internet which will include regular news updates and video reports, in particular from the various regions of Afghanistan. The council underscores our commitment to support further improvement of NATO strategic communications by the time of our 2009 Summit". 

It is evident that the increasing scarcity of natural resources, the outbreak of ethnic, religious and tribal violence, the exacerbation of international economic and social situations and the proliferation of weapons mean that security matters are of global interest, requiring world cooperation. The interfacebetween civilian and military instruments of power is a critical element of today's new security environment and may ultimately determine the alliance's success or failure in Afghanistan and elsewhere11. It has become clear that the success of NATO's activities depends on the global partnership: working closely with other inter-governmental organizations most significantly the United Nations, the G8, the European Union, and with non-governmental organisations, especially in post-conflict resolution consolidation.

The nature of membership in NATO has also changed: It is clear now, especially after the cyber attack that Estonia has been exposed to and prospective problems between the new candidates such as Georgia, and Russia, that there is no space to apply the Article 5 "Collective defense" commitment to fight for the sake of the new members. Indeed, the collective defense obligation has degenerated in relation to new members, and tends towards irrelevance in the security environment of post-Cold War Europe  This is either because it is not clear where the enemy is or because no Western European country is prepared to launch its army to defend an eastern territory 12. Furthermore, Western Europe countries’ strategic relationships with Russia are more important than those with small Easter European countries. Western Europe countries are less keen on American involvement in Europe Security Affairs, especially with the existence of the European Union Security Instrument. This aspect of the alliance is in fact now irrelevant to the security environment of post-Cold War Europe.

Outward-looking strategy

NATO’s outward strategy started almost a decade ago. In response to the challenges of the period at the end of the Cold War NATO adopted an “outward-looking strategy” and incorporated a principle of conducting “out of area operations”. Had it not done this it would be out of business 13.

According to NATO, any European country in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty (the fundamental North Atlantic Alliance Treaty) and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the alliance at the invitation of the North Atlantic Council. The current debate about expanding NATO concentrates on ending Stalin's artificial division between Eastern and Western Europe, a partition which is still perceived by some despite the fall of the Berlin wall.However, there is no significant military benefit to be gained from admitting small European applicant countries. Furthermore, the process of enlargement might itself, for some, have negative repercussions, especially on the effectiveness of the organization. Thus the argument for eliminating the division in Europe is unconvincing, especially for potential accession countries from outside Europe who serve the alliance more than these new members.

There is a stronger case for increased cooperation with countries in the Middle East. This region has undoubtedly become NATO’s top priority, but field operations are not possible without the cooperation of regional allies (not the members of the alliance). Until NATO resolves this paradox it risks being perceived by the global public as a symbol of Western supremacy; an authoritarian cowboy organization playing an illegitimate role of global policeman over far away regions.

Consequently, a number of steps have been taken to build cooperation between NATO and countries in the Middle East. At the Istanbul summit in June 2004 it was declared that a new stage of the relationship between NATO and the Middle East had begun. NATO has accepted to allow partners to increase their contribution to NATO-led operations and participation, and to some extent, in the decision-making process. Eighteen nations outside NATO contribute forces and provide support to NATO's operations and missions and Ukraine, Egypt, Israel and others have expressed interests in working more closely with NATO like the Gulf region.The result has been the maximization of NATO's strength, enlargement of its scope and globalization of its new role.

Afterwards, at the Bucharest summit, there was a renewal of the commitments to engage the partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including by strengthening liaison arrangements in these regions, and continuing dialogue with Central Asian partners regarding the situation in Afghanistan. 14 On the other side of the world, there has been also significant progress in the Mediterranean dialogue by reaching Individual Cooperation Programmes with Egypt and Israel which are designed to help establish long-term, structured and effective cooperation with those countries. In addition, NATO has launched the first ever Mediterranean Dialogue Trust Fund project to assist Jordan with the disposal of unexploded ordnance and ammunitions, and the launching of the feasibility study for the Trust Fund project to assist Mauritania with the disposal of ammunitions. 

Regarding the Gulf Region, four countries have accepted NATO's offer of cooperation within the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). It is clearly stated [15 in the declaration of the Bucharest summit that NATO “very much appreciate[s] the support provided by the ICI partners to alliance operations and missions” and that “the alliance is willingness to further develop existing, and openness to new, individual relationships, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council, and at a pace that respects mutual interests in so doing”.

The significance of the Great Middle East Region to NATO was further emphasised in the Bucharest declaration when the Summit tasked the Council in Permanent Session to prepare a consolidated report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for the consideration at the 2009 Summit 16. It is clear that when the talk is about energy the talk is also about the Middle East.

The future of NATO

The Bucharest summit declaration describes the accession of new members as "the process to strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and bring NATO closer to its goal of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace" (Para 2). In the meantime, the invitation of Albania and Croatia was considered a reward for hard work and historic achievement and their “solid commitment to the basic principles set out in the Washington Treaty as well as their ability, and readiness, to protect freedom and NATO's shared values by contributing to the alliance's collective defense and full range of missions 17” Also, welcoming Ukraine and Georgia's aspirations for joining NATO was based on their “valuable contributions to Alliance operations” 18. It is clear that the new global focus of NATO requires greater troop requirements, thus leading to the inclusion of new Eastern European countries despite their lack of strategic importance and doubts about their democratic performance. With all the difficulties caused by them joining NATO, one can suspect that behind the current wave of expansion is the aim for NATO to hire mercenary forces from the new (or prospective) members to fill its commitments after expanding its scope of operations and as a result of the hesitation (or refusal) of the 'western' European countries.

The global agenda for NATO made it important to acquire new members. A geographic criterion for choosing new NATO new members has been, until now, the main focus of NATO. In the meantime, NATO's slogan, which focuses on achieving democratic reforms in the new members, has proven to be flexible, as is shown in the discrepancy between NATO's membership criteria for democratic reform and those required for accession to the EU. A vivid example is Turkey, which was democratic enough to join NATO a long time ago but is still not qualified to take even candidate-country status in the EU because of a lack of democracy. Democracy is vague concept that each organization can define according to its particular interests. Turkey's majority Muslim population is, according to most scholars, the main reason for 'delaying' the Turkish EU candidature. This factor did not inhibit Turkish NATO membership and is not now obstructing the progress of a new candidate member, Albania, which also has a Muslim majority. This indicates a willingness of NATO to accept more Muslim countries within the alliance as long as these countries follow secular systems. They only hinder now is the non-European criteria.

The expansion of the area of interest or geographical focus beyond NATO's traditional territory made the change in NATO membership a necessity. NATO operates in three continents with 60,000 soldiers deployed over a wide geographic region that stretches from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq and Darfur. It is no longer a purely defensive alliance. Nowadays, security matters are inseparable from political economical and global issues. The organisation will never attain its goals outside of its territory unless there is a sense of ownership from its strategic partners. Therefore, NATO must offer them an open door policy regardless of geographical location, and it must extend its membership to any democratic state that can play a role in fulfilling its new duties to be a truly global alliance. 5 15


  1. Mohammed Moustafa Orfy, The new NATO its survival and resilience, )UK: AuthorHouse, 2007), pp 45-46.  

  2. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, The Bucharest Summit and the Way Forward for NATO, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe (Washington, DC: US Department of State,April 23, 2008), retrieved from http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/103935.htm.  

  3. Loc. Cit  

  4. Mohammed Moustafa Orfy, The new NATO its survival and resilience, )UK: AuthorHouse, 2007), pp 10-12.  

  5. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, The Bucharest Summit and the Way Forward for NATO, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe (Washington, DC: US Department of State,April 23, 2008), retrieved from http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/103935.htm  

  6. Humanitarian Intervention And Regional Organizations, retrieved from http://faculty.virginia.edu/setear/students/bellkoso/WarsKosovo.html  

  7. Mohammed Moustafa Orfy, Op.cit, pp 20-40.  

  8. Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html, (Para 44)  

  9. Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html  

  10. Sally McNamaraSally McNamaraSally McNamara,NATO Backs Washington's Missile Defense Plans: A Victory for U.S. Diplomacy, (The Heritage Foundation, April 4, 2008) retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1884.cfm  

  11. Sally McNamaraSally McNamaraSally McNamara, The Bucharest Summit: Time to Revitalize the NATO Alliance, (The Heritage Foundation, March 26, 2008) retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/Europe/bg2119.cfm  

  12. Anatol Lieven, Three Faces of Infantilism: NATO’s Bucharest Summit, The National Interest, retrieved from http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17298  

  13. Mohammed Moustafa Orfy, Op. cit, pp 60-75.  

  14. Bucharest Summit Declaration Op.cit, (Para 32).  

  15. Bucharest Summit Declaration Op.cit, (Para 34 and 35)  

  16. Bucharest Summit Declaration Op.cit , (Para 48)  

  17. Bucharest Summit Declaration Op.cit , (Para 21)  

  18. Bucharest Summit Declaration Op.cit , (Para 23)  

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