Getting Asia Right

This stability bodes well for the region, which has seen little major war but is still vulnerable to potential flash points – the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait to name a few. Low level, inter-state violence could still erupt – as seen in the case of Thailand and Cambodia – but intra-state problems such as insurgency and economic turmoil are likely to dominate as even great powers like China focus on internal development. While Washington does not need to poke its nose into every issue as the world's superpower, its presence, values, interests and capabilities can be mobilized to promote peace and prosperity in a way that is beneficial to both sides of the Pacific.

Contrary to the polarizing voices on both sides of the political spectrum, the Bush administration's legacy in Asia has been neither grand nor miserable. Like most cases, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. Its pragmatic approach on China, diplomatic turnaround on North Korea, and investment in a partnership with India, are all notable successes. At the same time, its ambivalent approach toward Asian institutional-building, the unpopular war in Iraq and a myopic focus on terrorism deserve criticism.

Learning lessons from both the past administration and U.S. foreign policy in general, the next administration needs to adopt a clear-eyed strategy that drives its core interest to promote peace, prosperity and freedom in Asia. This must include pragmatic policies that balance pressuring and cooperating with China, embrace the spirit and substance of Asian multilateralism, strengthen key bilateral alliances, assist nations in trouble or in transition, and deal creatively and practically with rogue regimes.

Coping with China's Rise

The U.S.-China relationship will continue to be Washington's most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century. Thus, it is imperative that the Obama administration get it right from the start. That means not expending valuable political capital and time learning pragmatism on the job like previous presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush³. Debating whether Beijing is a “partner” or “competitor” misses the point. Washington's main objective should be to cooperate with Beijing where it can, encourage improvement in the relationship where it should, and take Beijing to task on its obligations where it must. The ultimate goal, in the words of then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick⁴, is to make China a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community.      

In this regard, the next administration should first continue to encourage bilateral cooperation on several areas including non-proliferation and economic issues. The U.S.-China partnership in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem should be furthered, while the Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson must be deepened through high-level bilateral dialogue to highlight areas of cooperation and disagreement.

But Washington also needs to practice a clear-eyed combination of pressure and recognition when it comes to issues of disagreement – such as Beijing's relationship with rogue regimes or cross-strait relations. That means highlighting incremental Chinese improvements – like the more active role it has played recently in pressuring Khartoum⁵ or its revaluation of the yuan in 2005 – as much as prodding for further progress on China's adherence to international trade regulations⁶ and confidence-building measures with Taipei. Most importantly, Washington should not squander another chance to work with Beijing on important transnational issues such as climate change. Issues like global warming or food security cannot be solved without the collaboration of the world's top two consumers and greenhouse-gas emitters.      

Embracing Asia's Multilateralism

The top grievance among Asian policymakers is that the United States has missed the bus on Asian multilateralism due to its singular focus on 'terrorism' and its distractions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice missed out on several key regional meetings, while Washington decided to sit out the East Asian Summit (EAS). At a recent high-profile conference I attended on Southeast Asia, every single speaker recommended that the next administration should increase its participation in Asia's new institutional architecture⁷. Even U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the top military official, has recognized the over-militarization of foreign policy and called for a greater focus and development of soft power capabilities to complement hard power.⁸

The next administration should start by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a regional non-aggression pact spearheaded by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As President of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, Matthew Daley has noted that doing so would be a symbolic gesture of American respect for regionalism that imposes no real restrictions on US military policy⁹. Besides, Washington remains the only significant outside actor that has not signed on¹⁰. The United States must also consider becoming part of the EAS; the world's superpower should be at the center of regionalism rather than be outside looking in or be left out altogether. The next administration should also look beyond East Asia to foster regionalism. The once enfeebled South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), for example, can be a good starting point for regional economic cooperation.

Improving existing commitments is equally if not more important than making new ones.

For starters, the United States must help reinvigorate organizations which it is already privy to. For instance, former Singapore ambassador to the US Tommy Koh has noted, Washington should be “more proactive in nurturing” the ASEAN Regional Forum's (ARF) development and seeing its own constructive proposals through within the organization, such as greater humanitarian emergency coordination¹¹. Washington's robust and multi-faceted response to the 2004 tsunami was applauded in Southeast Asia for its remarkable success, and efforts to institutionalize this sort of response system should be a priority.

Washington's appointment of Scot Marciel as a U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN was an unquestionable success in the region. But the ambassador should be based in Jakarta with the ASEAN Secretariat instead of Washington, so he will be better immersed in regional developments. Last, but not least, US presence or lack thereof is noticeable. US officials cannot afford to miss multilateral meetings in a region where symbolism is a cornerstone of diplomacy. 

At a forum on U.S.-Southeast Asia relations at the Heritage Foundation in June, Bronson Percival of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) told the audience that Washington's policy in Southeast Asia was “over-militarized”, with the Pacific Command having an overwhelming presence at the expense of other diplomatic and humanitarian arms¹². This complaint is also true of Asia more generally. Thus, the next administration must rediscover the United States' Cold War era success of using soft power diplomacy. This might include creating a more robust public diplomacy structure at the State Department¹³, increasing government funding for international broadcasting, and promoting greater people-to-people in culture and education with Asia.

Solidifying and Revitalizing Alliances and Partnerships

Washington's attention to multilateral processes need not distract it from enhancing its bilateral relations in Asia. The next administration should continue to solidify key alliances and partnerships with nations who share its values and interests such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, India, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore.

First, a new administration must make Washington's pivotal alliance commitments bipartisan in the interest of sustainability. The Indian nuclear deal is a good example of this. The broad support by a Democratic Congress thus far will hopefully continue and lead to greater strides in this partnership with the world's largest democracy, such as Indian support on Iran or backing India’s entry into the G-8 or the UN Security Council as a permanent member¹⁴. However, the future of the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement hangs by a thread due to Democratic opposition to the deal. In cases like these, both parties must realize that scoring domestic political points will only result in deep scars of mistrust and estrangement in critical alliances.

Secondly, Washington must look at revitalizing existing relationships to reflect changing global realities. Since most U.S. partners are democracies, this will partly be conditioned upon domestic political realignments within these countries. One method, therefore, is to seize moments of opportunity to establish sustained and shared principles and strategic interests.  

For example, after eight years of friction, Washington and Seoul have now entered a honeymoon period of sorts with the election of President Lee Myung-bak. Lee is closer to the US position on North Korea than previous administrations and has advocated a stronger bilateral relationship and a "global Korea"¹⁵. The moment is thus ripe for the US to deepen and broaden the alliance which could include cooperation on international peacekeeping, regional economic issues and a host of non-traditional security issues like eradicating pandemic diseases¹⁶.

At the same time, revitalizing alliances and partnerships ought not to be treated like gardening. If Washington waits for the "ripening" of a relationship, that day may never come. Instead, it should be more pragmatic and settle for forging an organizing principle or interest that will lay a solid foundation for each relationship. These can be traditional interests like security or non-traditional issues like climate change. There is still room for the United States to facilitate Japan's rise as a global player through its efforts in African development and climate change. Or to make Singapore the poster child for U.S. economic cooperation in East Asia, having concluded the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and the recent P-5 agreement¹⁷ on trade liberalization. The latter may be the key to quickening the Asia-Pacific-Economic Cooperation (APEC)'s goal of an Asia-Pacific free trade area through a bottom-up approach¹⁸.

Allies and partners may also be useful on particular issues. Australia and Thailand have a good understanding of China which Washington can learn from. And the Philippines and Indonesia represent the best showcases of Washington's untold counter-terrorism success story in Southeast Asia. U.S. training of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ARF) Mindanao against the Abu Sayyaf and assistance to Indonesian police in pursuit of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist outfit were constructive examples of security cooperation that should be continued and emulated.  

Assisting Troubled and Transitional Nations

The United States should pay equal attention to troubled and transitional nations as it does its friends. This means helping Pakistan and Afghanistan navigate through their current political dilemmas, while ushering in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos into the world stage.

Washington cannot solve the terrorism and Al-Qaeda conundrum without addressing its root causes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan tacitly supports terrorism because of legitimate security concerns, such as its asymmetric vulnerability vis-a-vis India and the threat of a two-front war with India and Afghanistan¹⁹. Hence, Islamabad's strategy has been to support Islamic radicalism – be it the Taliban in Afghanistan or the jihadists in Kashmir – to maintain its influence in Afghanistan and wear down India's military. The result has been a country that is over-militarized, under-developed and poorly-regulated, leading to radicalism, instability and insurgency. 

There are a couple of things Washington can do to help address this. First, U.S. aid to Pakistan that is now too focused on counter-terrorism should be expanded to include aid for social affairs such as funding for public schools to draw students away from poorly regulated madrassas [Islamic schools] . Secondly, the United States should urge Pakistan to combine negotiations and socio-economic development with security measures in insurgency-wracked areas. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have the lowest social indicators in the entire country, while nationalist leaders in restive Baluchistan have strong alliances with some of Pakistan's most popular political parties²⁰. Third, in Afghanistan, the United States must regain its winning position and continue to support President Hamid Karzai's stable, sustained Pushtun-led government that is friendly to Islamabad. This will give the Pakistani army a reason to invest in Afghan stability rather than to hedge against a potential adversary through terrorism.

But inter-state problems cannot be solved by national remedies alone. For starters, the United States needs to encourage full Indo-Pakistani normalization in order to begin the process of healing for the two nuclear powers who have fought three wars. According to Ashley Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this can be accomplished by offering a grand bargain to Pakistan which includes a long term security commitment in exchange for ending its conflict with India²¹. Prospects for this have looked reasonable since Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee delivered his “hand of friendship” speech to Pakistan in 2003. Furthermore, both countries have a lot to benefit from normalization, including joint profitability from the South Asian/Central Asian energy trade. They would also be less involved in their perennial tug of war in Afghanistan. 

The world's most fertile breeding ground for terrorism – the Pushtun tribal belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan – has been near ungovernable since the colonial era. A comprehensive solution to the issue will require U.S. assistance as well as Pakistani and Afghan cooperation beyond the military sphere. As notable Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has argued, both Afghanistan and Pakistan must use political engagement and economic development to improve the lives of the Pushtun tribes, curtail the Taliban forces on both sides, and ensure security for civilians²². Simply keeping a terrorist body count will not solve underlying structural problems. Afghanistan must also ultimately recognize the Durand Line, a border between the two nations that it has never acknowledged.

Washington must continue to develop and nurture relations with the emerging countries in Southeast Asia – Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Military-wise, gradualist initiatives like training, exchanges and the scheduled opening of U.S.-Laos defense attaché offices by the end of 2008, should be encouraged²³. More broadly, the strengthening of U.S.-Vietnam relations has been a model for this process of engaging emerging nations. Washington and Hanoi have commenced talks on a bilateral investment treaty, inked a key agreement on education, and fostered cooperation on HIV/AIDS, among other things²⁴. The Cold War is over, and the United States should start interacting with these states as new partners rather than old enemies. 

Handling Rogue Regimes

North Korea and Burma will continue to be sporadic irritants in Washington's foreign policy in Asia. Realistically speaking, handling these rogue regimes will probably be more a matter of damage control in the next administration, where progress is defined as “two steps forward, one step back”. The critical element in dealing with these regimes is coordination.

After a dramatic turnaround, the Bush administration has gone from repudiating its predecessor's penchant for diplomacy in North Korea to being an active and successful proponent of it²⁵. No one would disagree that negotiations and diplomacy via the six-party talks ought to be the first step and best-case scenario to address the issue. Or that the big-picture scenario is getting Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons and improve its human rights record in exchange for aid and greater integration into the international community.

But what happens if North Korea engages in the kind of brinkmanship it is known for once again? Providing incentives risks rewarding bad behavior, but not doing so provides Pyongyang with a chance to walk away from talks. It would be naïve to speculate on the specifics, but the United States must always keep in mind that it should act in concert with its allies as much as possible. North Korea is notorious for seeking to play the six parties off each other. Any initiative – whether it be incentives through aid or punishments via sanctions – would be more effective with greater consensus. Doing so is a tricky balancing act, but adroit diplomacy ought to be expected in this tough and important issue.

Greater cooperation between the six parties is also important in the case of an impending humanitarian crisis. This is not hypothetical musing – some experts have concluded that Pyongyang is on the brink of another famine. If famine does break out, the key will be the coordinated response of North Korea's neighbors and six party members – South Korea, China and Japan – who are capable of delivering supplies quickly given the urgency of the situation²⁶. 

Burma will also persist as a thorn in U.S. foreign policy as well as U.S.-ASEAN relations. Thus, as with North Korea, cooperation and coordination are paramount. The ruling military junta, led by General Than Shwe, continues its iron grip on the country while disenfranchising the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) which won elections held in 1988. The U.S. and Europe have enacted sanctions against the Burmese regime even as some ASEAN members and China continue to engage it – rendering them ineffective. In addition, sanctions have ravaged an already battered economy and merely strengthened the isolation of a deeply paranoid regime bent on survival at all cost²⁷. By any measure, sanctions have been an unmitigated failure in Burma.

If not sanctions, what can the United States do about Burma? As with many international issues, the United States can play a constructive role by taking leadership to mobilize key players to act in concert. This could take the form of a U.S.-led multilateral 'Seven Party Dialogue', akin to the Six Party Talks for North Korea comprising of India, China, United States, EU, Japan, ASEAN and Burma. After relaxing some restrictions on high level contact with the Burmese government and appointing a policy point man on Burma²⁸, the various parties should collaborate and design a grand bargain for Burma in the form of a package deal. This would involve guaranteeing Burma's territorial integrity and providing greater humanitarian aid and international integration in exchange for a joint coalition between the ruling military junta and the opposition NLD and the release of Nobel Laureate Suu Kyi.   

If this does not work, then the United States must not hesitate to advocate a tougher policy to tighten the grip on the junta. This cannot be done through U.S. investment sanctions because they are both destructive and ineffective. But the strengthening and coordination of specific, targeted sanctions among the six parties focused on the assets and investments of particular junta leaders may be a fairer proposition. It would balance the need for punishing the leadership with the corresponding obligation to protect the citizens of Burma. 

Conclusion

If Asia is the world's new gravitational center, then the key for the next administration is to adopt a pragmatic and realistic strategic vision that matches the region's importance. As others have noted, the past two U.S. presidents have shown that breaking entirely with the legacy of one's predecessor is neither practical nor useful²⁹. The next administration must be nimble in forging a balanced and multifaceted approach – weighing pressure and cooperation with China, investing both in bilateral alliances and multilateral diplomacy to address traditional and non-traditional issues, aiding troubled and transition nations, and facing rogue regimes with toughness and sensibility. Only then can the United States balance the levers of its power and influence and continue to serve as the harbinger of stability, freedom and prosperity in Asia.      ^{1 2}

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