Political Change in Russia and China

This article looks at the link between economic globalisation and democratic transition, with respect to contemporary Russia and China. Despite the assumption that economic liberalisation leads to democratisation, neither Russia nor China have made the transition to successful liberal democracy. The experience of both states suggests that there is no definite or direct link between economic liberalisation and democratisation.

Introduction

Globalisation processes have significant implications for domestic economic and political transformation.  An analysis of globalisation’s impact on certain states may serve to predict changes for other states that are similar politically, culturally, or geographically.  Russia and China are two such nations. Since they share important elements – both are geographically large nations that have made the transition from predominantly centrally-plannedto largely capitalist economies – it is instructive to compare them, as both face the present uncertainties and future prospects of globalisation. 

Despite an assumption among political theorists that economic liberalisation leads to democratisation, neither Russia nor China have made the transition to liberal democracy.  If economic globalisation involves little more than the integration of the world capitalist economy, democracy cannot be viewed as its definite or assured outcome.  The experience of Russia and China suggests that there is no definite or direct link between economic liberalisation and liberal democracy.  An examination of Russia and China’s political culture and level of modernisation demonstrates that the presence of intervening variables must be considered also. 

I. Economic Liberalisation

Economic Reform in Russia

The process of economic globalisation was facilitated by the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989.  The collapse of communism created the opportunity for the movement of capital, labour and goods across national borders while increasing international economic competition.¹  In accordance with the neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus, a set of economic policy measures designed for market economies, post-communist countries were pressured by the West to quickly liberalise their economies, privatise state assets, and introduce drastic financial austerity measures.²  This rapid transition process, in countries possessing neither a democratic nor capitalist infrastructure, raised the dangerous possibility of the transition economies emerging somewhere between two economic systems.  

Russia’s economic reforms resulted in significant consequences.  Economic changes were reflected not only in changes to the system of production but also in labour markets, which exhibited a rise in unemployment and a fall in real wages.³  Steep recession occurred as Russia entered a phase of high inflation, and, most significantly, the population’s living standards decreased dramatically.  Russia’s government was successful at suppressing inflation and stimulating economic growth in a healthy manner.  However, many aspects of Russia’s economy currently suggest that it is moving towards a corporatist market, characterised by corruption and driven by a class of oligarchs whose primary goal is to increase their personal wealth.⁴  The influence of economic globalisation forces has not created an open free market in Russia; instead, it has consolidated a corrupt class of elites that was largely in place under the former Soviet system.⁵  

Economic Reform in China

China originally modelled its political and economic structures on those of the Soviet Union.⁶  The Soviet model of development and its emphasis on heavy industry, collectivised agriculture, and central planning of production prevailed in China from 1949 until 1978.  Following Mao’s death, however, a reform agenda initiated by Deng Xiaoping significantly altered the course of Chinese politics.  Deng’s reforms had the primary objectives of economic development and the reintegration of China into the global economy.⁷  Although the concept of globalisation had not yet developed, Deng’s reform agenda nonetheless manifested a global vision: to aid China’s modernisation process through economic benefits gained from expanding global exchange and trade.⁸  The initial phases of Deng’s reforms involved maintaining state control of the economy while simultaneously allowing market elements to develop in agriculture and retail distribution, as well as preserving central-planning in major industries while allowing smaller enterprises to openly sell anything produced beyond state-imposed targets.⁹  The final stages of Deng’s economic reforms during the 1990s involved a greater degree of separation of government and economy.  The market system in China became firmly anchored and the Chinese economy began to more closely resemble a market economy.¹⁰ 

China’s economic reforms have proven largely successful.  Its impressive accomplishments are further highlighted when contrasted against the post-communist difficulties experienced by Russia.  Not only has China developed a successful market economy, but the shift to market principles has in turn propelled state reforms and led to improvements in many areas of public life.¹¹  In addition to having relieved the shortage of public goods that had been common under Communist rule, market provisions now allow for choice, quality and efficiency.  Due to the success of its economic re-structuring and the opening of its markets to foreign investors, China is now a major global actor capable of affecting international political and economic stability.¹² 

II. Political Reform

In addition to economic consequences, globalisation affects political outcomes also.  A primary focus of globalisation is the manner in which economic development, arising from the interconnectedness of global markets, is expected to lead to identifiable changes in domestic political structures.¹³  The commonly held assumption is that economic liberalisation will lead to political liberalisation and subsequently democracy.  Despite the transition to market economies, however, neither Russia nor China have made the transition to liberal democracy. 

Political Reform in Russia

Since 1991, Russia has actively reproduced structures and institutions characteristic of Western democracies in response to globalisation.¹⁴  The growing number of freely held elections is often cited as the most notable of these.  Free elections have been successfully held within the Russian Federation since 1993, and, with minor exceptions have reputedly been fair.  The completion of a country’s first competitive elections generally signals the end of a democratic transition.¹⁵ 

Russia’s political system, however, is not representative of liberal democracy.  While it is agreed that some form of democracy did emerge in Russia following the demise of communism, the current political system displays elements only of an electoral democracy.¹⁶  Pluralist institutions in Russia are currently weak, and interest groups are restricted in their freedom of expression.  The political institutions capable of addressing these issues – a strong parliament, an effective party system, and an independent judiciary, do not exist.¹⁷  Only certain elements of Western liberal democracy have been successfully adopted by successive Russian governments following the end of communist rule, primarily the elections of representative bodies to parliament.¹⁸  The elements that constitute the basis of liberalism, however – freedom of association, freedom of expression, political accountability, and rule of law – have eroded since the end of Gorbachev’s rule in 1991.¹⁹

Political Reform in China

Interest in democratic reform in China has existed since the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978.²⁰  The most significant change under Deng’s leadership has been the retreat from revolutionary totalitarian rule.²¹  To achieve long-term stability and industrial modernisation, Deng transformed the Chinese Communist Party into a legally-regulated regime that promised a more liberal political system.²²  Among the political reforms implemented by Deng are the holding of competitive elections at the local level.  In 1979, the Communist Party first allowed citizens to directly elect delegates to local congresses.²³  Under Deng’s policy of promoting democracy and political liberalisation, the government also relaxed its control over the media, and has recently taken steps to accommodate international appeal for improvement of its domestic human rights situation.²⁴ 

Despite these political reforms, however, China today is by no means a liberal democracy.  Although the term ‘democracy’ has been used by recent Chinese leaders, the Chinese Communist Party does not intend to introduce a representative government that is “constituted through free and competitive elections under the rule of law”, a fundamental element of Western liberal democracy.²⁵  Both direct and competitive elections at the district levels have been widely practiced; however these elections are not competitive and are reportedly manipulated by the Communist Party.²⁶  In 1982, the regime promised a more liberal political system; however, emphasis has shifted from promoting political democracy to liberalising the socialist economy. 

III. Theories of Democratic Transition

Many question why Russia and China have not fared better as a result of economic liberalisation and why the transition to capitalism has failed to create a stable liberal democracy.  Such political changes, however, are not the result of a single variable, but of the interaction of external and domestic factors.  Understanding democratic transition thus requires examining how external and domestic variables interact.  Both culturalist and modernisation theorists view democratic transition as a function of internal, rather than exclusively external, factors. 

Culturalist Theory of Democratic Transition

Researchers Almond and Verba argue that basic structures of democracy are influenced by the political culture of a country’s population.²⁷  Cultural theorists argue that the Russian people are “predisposed to paternalistic, authoritarian rule” and lack the civic culture that could properly support a democratic regime.²⁸ Analyst Mikhail Molchanov argues that the majority of Russian people do not consider the post-communist tradition to be something ‘normal’ either in its design or outcome.  Instead, Russian citizens consider their lives disrupted by an externally-generated economic shock.²⁹  In a country where the state has been largely dismantled over two decades of economic liberalisation, the building of a functioning democracy may appear to citizens as less of a priority than regaining the stability and economic security they were accustomed to under communist rule.  From this perspective, Russia’s inability to institutionalise a liberal democracy over the previous two decades demonstrates continuity with both its communist legacy and authoritarian political culture.

Cultural theorists similarly argue that political culture is significant in explaining the absence of democracy in China.  In a strong democratic culture, the public is more likely to believe in and support democratic norms and forces.  China’s Confucian society, however, is largely undemocratic.  Confucian culture “sets up a strictly hierarchical structure for the society, which translates into rule by moral example rather than rule of law.”³⁰ In a Confucian society such as China, there is no equivalent to the notion of human rights that is predominant in liberal democracies.  Although Chinese culture has evolved throughout history, group consciousness in China remains strong as does the emphasis on hierarchical structure.  Given China’s geographic size and large population, the Confucian social order may be more significant than other factors in impeding the transition to liberal democracy. 

Modernisation Theory

Modernisation theory attributes the absence of democracy in developing nations to a lack of industrialisation.  In explaining the absence of liberal democracy in Russia, modernisation theorists argue that Russia has not yet developed sufficiently to either create or fully sustain a democratic society.  Such analysts argue that the high levels of average income and industrialisation necessary to facilitate democratic consolidation were absent both in the former Soviet Union and in present-day Russia.³¹  Modernisation theorists contend that the transition to capitalism and democracy must occur in sequence: the transition to a functioning market economy must occur first, followed by democratic transition, in order to ensure the success of both.³²  In the absence of a fully-modernised economy, society, or industry, analysts speculate that political rule in Russia will gravitate towards authoritarianism. 

Similarly, China’s political culture, social order and history have each affected its level of development and modernisation, both of which are considered factors in democratisation.  Although China has performed well economically, the population remains relatively poor.³³  China’s uneven economic development has benefited urban centres while leaving rural areas largely disadvantaged.  Consequently, there has been a turn in rural areas against economic liberalisation.³⁴  Other, smaller Confucian societies such as Taiwan and South Korea have successfully made the transition to democracy.  However, China’s geographic size, population and rising disparity in wealth make it unlikely that China will soon be able to achieve the level of modernisation required to make the transition to liberal democracy.

Conclusion

The experiences of Russia and China indicate that there is no direct or definite link between economic liberalisation and transition to liberal democracy.  For Russia, globalisation has not brought universal prosperity or ready access to world markets, but economic hardship and a growing sense of disillusionment among the populace.  Although the Soviet Union lacked traditional liberal freedoms, it did provide a high degree of social equity.  When communist rule ended, however, neither liberal democracy nor a successful market economy emerged in its place.  Economic liberalisation also failed to result in the creation of a strong middle class to press for liberal freedoms.  Instead, the relationship between the state and society had been altered, and any sense of equality or national pride was lost in Russia’s sudden transition to capitalism.  As such, the likely outcome for Russia in the near future is neither a liberal democracy nor an authoritarian dictatorship, but a regime somewhere in between.

In contrast, globalisation has had a more positive effect on China.  Theorists indicate that few in China would elect to return to a command economy, with its perennial shortages of social goods.  The likelihood of any democratic transition in China, however, is minimal.  Among other factors, China simply does not have a social order in place to facilitate or encourage democratiation.  It is possible that a social order more conducive to facilitating democracy may result both from further economic development and from cultural change arising from China’s increased global openness.  Such influences, however, may take many years to have effect.  Although it is true among already-established democracies that a high average income contributes to political stability, the growing number of affluent authoritarian states strongly suggests that economic growth alone is not sufficient to lead to democracy. 

No one factor or analysis can explain why Russia and China have not followed a path towards democratisation similar to that of Western Europe and North America.  Russia and China share unique characteristics that led each to adopt communism; those same characteristics, subsequently, have impeded the transition of each country towards a functioning liberal democracy.

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