Challenges to Wendt’s Identity Formation

Theorists contest the emphasis that Wendt puts on the importance of state-identity formation in understanding international relations. Here I will explore some major disagreements between Wendt’s Social Constructivism and his critics from opposite ends of the theory spectrum. To illustrate my argument I will extensively rely on Zehfuss’s Post-Modernist and Copeland’s orthodox Realist criticism.¹The article will show that although some of the objections are relevant, there are major questions that are not addressed. Most importantly I will begin to uncover unexpected similarities between Post-Modern and Realist approaches to IR in relation to their criticism of Wendt’s theory. ²

The ‘I’ in ‘anarchy’

Wendt bases his approach to understanding international relations on the notion of identities ³. While he doesn’t deny that states are the main actors in an anarchical system he claims that there are different types of anarchy, which depend on states’ identities. Those identities are formed primarily through interaction and “social learning” ⁴, but Wendt also acknowledges a formation of identities at the domestic level.

Wendt defines three types of state identities: Corporate, Role, and Collective. Parts of Corporate identity are the basic elements an organization needs in order to be called a State. He claims Corporate identity consists of “the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities” and consequently it is “constitutionally exogenous to Otherness” ⁵. The Role identity increasingly relies on interaction with others, and finally the Collective identity “takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification” ⁶. Here the Other is included in the perception of Self and thus it is highly constitutive for the Self.

Identities are also related to three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In the Hobbesian culture actors perceive themselves as enemies and act driven by fear of death. In the Lockean culture the immediate threat of death is removed and states can interact as rivals rather than enemies. Kantian culture is the next logical progression, where actors perceive the others as friends. Thus each actor’s interest is also a part of the other’s interest. The constitutive effect of culture on identity is crucial here. To illustrate it Wendt introduces three levels of internalisation of identity: coercive, interest-driven, and normative. On the first level, internalisation is based on fear of punishment. On the second level the actors realise their interest in complying with the norm. Here the lack of the immediate threat of death begins to create shared identity. Finally, on the third level of internalisation, actors believe in the norm and it becomes a part of them. Most importantly the relationship between identity and cultures of anarchy is not only constitutive but also causal: culture depends on identities, while identity is only possible in a systemic context.

Stuck in the middle with I

Both Realists and Post-Modernists argue that the formation of identity domestically points to the lack of a constitutive relationship between actors in the international system and that the idea of identity playing a role on a systemic level is problematic.

Post-Modernists challenge Wendt’s theory of identity formation and claim “Wendt’s argument comes apart because of its own assumptions” ⁷ regarding the “given-ness of identity” ⁸: identity must be constructed for Wendt’s argument to be plausible. However, Wendt presents his theory as “scientific”, so identity should be given.⁹ Because of these seemingly contradictory assumptions Zehfuss argues that the Constructivist approach cannot encompass the complexity of the notion of identity. Zehfuss as well as Campbell ¹⁰ claim that if an identity can be constructed it can also be deconstructed all the way down. Furthermore, the vagueness in identity formation makes it impossible to differentiate identity change from interest-driven behaviour. This difficulty has been a prominent issue among Wendt’s critics.

Realists from the other side of the IR spectrum challenge identity formation on the same principle: its domestic formation. The criticism however takes a slightly different direction to that of Zehfuss’s argument. Copeland’s objection to Wendt’s theory represents a mainstream Realist criticism. It suggests that if formation of Corporate identity is exogenous to other actors, then it cannot be ensured that future states’ intentions won’t change. In other words even if Ego can be positive about present security-seeking intentions of Alter “it must worry that Alter might become pathologically hostile later on” ¹¹.

Moreover, the assumption that interaction between actors is capable of bringing about structural changes through social learning is a problematic one. The question of “impression management” ¹² is left open in Wendt’s theory, leaving the possibility of manipulating perceptions and therefore identities. If Wendt is right about shared knowledge being in the core of identity formation ¹³ then logically Copeland’s orthodox Realist criticism is mainly concerned with the possibility of conscious deception also.

Parallels between Zehfuss’s and Copeland’s criticisms can also be drawn when it comes to differences between identities and behaviour. Copeland, however, focuses less on the structural similarities of behaviour and identity, and attacks identity’s ability to explain international relations more accurately than behaviour.

In defence of Wendt

As I showed above, not identity per se, but its formation as described by Wendt, is problematic. Zehfuss questions the existence of essential elements in identity and claims that it should be entirely constructed. What she misses is that identity not only can be, but should both be constructed and given. Wendt makes a conscious effort to explain the necessity of given identity by discussing the essential state, which serves as a basis to build upon. ¹⁴ Theorising about the international system requires accepting the world as it is at least to a certain extent. The Post-Modern criticism risks falling into the trap of deconstructing everything, without an option for constructing it back. Of course one may always argue that a medieval empire is fundamentally different from a contemporary sovereign state, and therefore reject any essentialist endeavour. However, similarities remain: both empire and modern state are main actors on an international stage, which presupposes basic needs and interests, which defines a type of behaviour and therefore perpetuates an understanding of state. The question that Post-Modernists will probably find most challenging is the lack of an essential state: how can one theorise about something without having a basic understanding of what this something is? This ontology is even more problematic because it doesn’t provide a base for building a state and therefore nothing can be explained nor predicted. Along these lines Wendt’s essential state fills a gap, which allows him to further theorise.

Rejecting the essentialism of a state’s identity leads to denial of the existence of the entire Wendtian classification of identities. Consequently Post-Modernists fail to differentiate between identity and behaviour, demonstrated in Zehfuss’ example of the Federal Republic of Germany. ¹⁵The case of GermanyAccording to Wendt the basic need to survive is essential for each state and is a part of its corporate identity, formed exogenously of interaction with other actors on the systemic level. In the case of Germany it translates into a commitment to peace. However the problem that Zehfuss points to is related to Germany’s engagement in military operations between 1992 and 1995. For Zehfuss it should be either a change in the Corporate identity or a behavioural change. She rejects the former because its formation is “exogenously given” ¹⁶ and the latter because it conflicts with the Corporate identity, which she rightfully assumes to be peaceful. Hence a difference between behaviour and identity doesn’t exist.

Zehfuss fails to understand the multiple levels of identity. Germany’s change is not behavioural: it has occurred on the social level of identity (Role). Consistent with Wendt, this change has occurred through interaction and is firmly related to Germany’s Corporate identity: while the internal peace commitment remains firmly rooted to the way Germany’s Corporate identity is translated to other actors, so it becomes shared knowledge, knowledge attained through interaction, and reflects the state’s Role identity. The Lockean culture presupposes internalisation driven by interest. In achieving the interest of “never again war…never again dictatorship” ¹⁷, which shows Germany’s peaceful Corporate identity, Germany has to engage in interaction with other states and organisations. If world peace is a prerequisite for peace in Germany then amending the law regarding the use of armed forces hasn’t changed the Corporate identity of Germany. What has changed is its Role identity.

Real problems for Wendt?Identity formation and identity impact on the state and the international system are important issues for the Realist critics as well.

Copeland emphasizes that it is impossible to base a plausible systemic-level explanation on identities on Wendt’s process of constructing identities ¹⁸. Although Copeland too challenges the domestic formation of identity he is primarily concerned with the inevitable insecurity. The notion that identity is even partially created exogenous of interaction with other actors actually strengthens the Realists’ fundamental concern about uncertainty ¹⁹. Even though seemingly plausible, this criticism neglects the idea that identity is not entirely domestic but shaped by international interaction as well. Wendt gives a logical response to this accusation, claiming that by drawing on both idealism and realism he opens up a space for a plausible understanding of international relations: on the one hand he embraces the idealist’s view that “the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and structure of social consciousness”. ²⁰On the other he doesn’t negate the Realists’ idea that it is likely that states exhibit egoistic behaviour in their initial stage of interaction. By doing so Wendt makes it clear that the uncertainty emphasised by Realists is possible and likely to occur. However he explains that there are other possibilities that must not be neglected. Wendt wins out

Along these lines Wendt’s response to both Zehfuss and Copeland’s claim, that the domestic factor in forming identities only confuses the explanation, is plausible and logical. It is crucial that if states were merely a product of interaction there would be nothing for interaction to have its effects on. Therefore the Post-Modern suggestion that state essentialism is destructive for Wendt’s approach is irrelevant, and forming state identity on a domestic level is not a strong argument for uncertainty as Copeland understands it to be.

Furthermore, Copeland and Zehfuss come from different ends of the IR spectrum, yet they both misinterpret the possibility of sending interest-driven signals that don’t reflect the true identity of actors. Even though it is theoretically possible successfully to deceive other states and not be perceived as deceptive, according to Wendt’s view this cannot be a long-term strategy and eventually a deceptive state will be recognised as such. Consequently no state consciously aims at being perceived as deceptive and uncooperative. Wendt argues, “impression management” ²¹ eventually results in negative consequences for both the state itself and the international system.  

Along these same lines, Copeland challenges the interpretation of behaviour. His claim that an actor understands signals through his own biases is relevant. Wendt doesn’t give a plausible explanation of how one is to proceed if the signals one sends are misunderstood in the process of interaction ²² however he clarifies that it is essential for actors to try to achieve shared understanding.

All of this criticism leads us to a more important issue, which neither Copeland nor Zehfuss discuss. Copeland’s criticism logically leads to the conclusion that if cultures are described by internalisation of norms and identities, and that the more internalised a norm the more essential a part of one’s identity it becomes, then moving from one culture to another is problematic. Copeland doesn’t go this far, but his claim that it is not possible for identities to explain cultural transitions as well as perpetuate culture is fairly accurate. Wendt doesn’t account for the process of transition from Hobbesian to Lockean culture ²³, nor does he elaborate on how a transition to Kantian culture will occur. In his approach the linkage between identity and culture allows the argument that identity is more likely to perpetuate culture rather than change it.

A way between, a way forward

Neither Zehfuss nor Copeland reach the logical extension of their arguments: the question of whether it is necessary to move from one culture to another. Kantian culture presupposes a deep internalization of the norms in the collective identity of a State, which means internalization of the Other in the Self to an extent where the Other and the Self are one ²⁴. This can seriously threaten to undermine the State itself and creates a problem for forming Corporate identity and make the essential state, which serves as a basis for creating identity unnecessary.

Although this contradiction in Wendt’s approach exists in the Kantian culture only it remains the logical continuum of both Realist and Post-Modern criticism. It also leads to an interesting theoretical challenge: namely the unexpected similarities between Post-Modern and Realist interpretation of a Constructivist approach.

Common wisdom considers the Post-Modern and Realist ontology to be at the very opposite sides of the theoretical spectrum. However the criticism of Wendt’s process of identity formation shows different. The similar challenges that both approaches pose to Wendt are crucial for the field of IR. They may serve as a base for adopting a new and unusual interpretation of international relations and thus provide more thorough answers to existing questions and pose other pressing enquiries ²⁵.

Dale C. Copeland; Review: The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay; International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Autumn, 2000), pp.187-212

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