|
Thai
policies towards Islamic Religious Schools (pondoks) in
Southern Thailand: Continuity rather than Change
Thailand’s southern Muslims have
always had their pondoks, or religious schools, as an
integral part of their life. On the other hand, various
Thai governments have continued to change the education
in the south, leading to much friction between the two
sides. With no room to compromise, this future of the
south contains only more tension.
Jiesheng Li
Introduction
Islamic religious schools are widespread over the Muslim
world, and include the Pesantren (or religious
boarding schools) in Indonesia and its rough equivalent
in Malaysia and Thailand, called the Pondok. [1]
Pondoks have been a symbol of Malay-Muslim
identity for many years in Southern Thailand, despite
numerous attempts of assimilation and control by the
Thai Government. Muslim nationalism has been on the rise
for many years and pondoks and their students
have been linked to many nationalistic and
terrorists-like activities. This article will trace the
teachings in pondok schools, Thai policies
towards the pondoks, showing the generally
consistent policies of the various Thai governments,
before outlining the prospects for these schools.
History of the pondoks and Thai policies towards them
Pondoks
served the local villages of the Southern Islamic
community in Thailand for years. The Tok Gurus
(religious teachers), were the supreme heads of the
schools. Students at these schools learnt to recite the
Quran and basic Arabic Language. They also studied areas
such as Fiqh (how to fast, pray), Usuluddin
(about God) and Tasawwuf (how to get closer to God).[2]
At the same time, the Kingdom of Thailand was moving
towards a centralized governing system and introducing
nationalist policies to strengthen the control over its
provinces. The traditional Malay rulers were bypassed,
thus resulting in the non-cooperation of the rajas
towards Thai policies. Examples of this centralization
include the Compulsory Primary Education Act in 1921 [3]
the National Education System and National Education
plan in 1932 and 1936 respectively,[4] all of which
instructed all Malay Muslim children to be sent to Thai
primary schools. However, to move away from pondoks
would mean a degrading or destruction of their cultural
and religious identity. To place children in Thai
schools where secular education was taught would remove
their religious grounding and the religious elites would
lose their control over the community.
Thus Malay-Muslim resistance increased and pondoks
became the breeding ground of pan-Malay Nationalism and
Islamic revivalism.[5] By 1945, a new leader, a Malay
intellectual named Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin
Mohammed el Patani emerged. He proposed that Malay and
Thai be the official languages in southern Thailand and
Malay be the language of instruction in primary schools.
[6] However, his imprisonment sparked off massive
protests by the tok gurus.
In 1959, there was direct control and reform of the
pondok system. Pondoks which did not register
with the government faced the prospect of being closed
down. Classes were reorganized and examinations were
introduced, which were totally alien concepts to the
conservative tok gurus. The most controversial
move was the introduction of Buddhism into the
curriculum. Almost immediately, the Muslim community
came to resent the loss of control over the pondoks
and by June 1971, 109 pondoks closed down in
protest. With the growing dissent, the first main
opposition to this education control was the formation
of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) by a tok guru
named Ustaz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan from the
Narathiwat’s Ruso district. This group was initially
peaceful and had its focus on Malay Nationalism and
called for solidarity with the Malays in other countries
of the region. [7] It continued to draw its support from
the pondoks but aligned itself with the Communist
Party of Malaysia, making it unpopular.
Secondly, with the sudden reduction in the number of
religious schools and teachers, students instead headed
for schools in the Middle East and brought back varying
ideas of Islam. In fact, most of the Malay Muslim
students received financial assistance from abroad and
established strong bonds with other Islamic
intellectuals and organizations. These students were
soon part of the activists who made up the Patani United
Liberation Organisation (PULO), another armed resistance
group.
In this educational reform, we witness the
uncompromising ideas of both sides. The Thais saw reform
as a movement to control the Muslims and integrate them
into Thai society, decreasing the appearance of
nationalist or resistance groups. For the Malays, the
pondoks education system had always been their way
of life and this encroachment of their system was seen
as an attack on their own identity. Furthermore, the
conservative nature of the local elites also influenced
the resistance to secular education. This however, was
not the end of the resistance arising from the
pondoks.
By 1973, the military government of Thailand had fallen
and a democratic government had risen. By 1988, the
College of Islamic Studies was established at the Prince
of Songkla University, a gateway to modern education
with Islamic teaching. While the traditional rulers and
tok gurus’ basis of self determination was Islam
and cultural differences, the students now based their
struggle on that of equality and freedom; that is,
having the same rights as that of the rest of the Thais.
As Carol Kersten has noted, however, the establishment
of this college was designed to curb the movement of
students heading overseas to other Islamic educational
centres. [8]
By 1987, the education of the Malay-Muslims was under
threat again as the Thai government extended compulsory
education from six to nine years. While this was aimed
at improving Thai education throughout the nation, it
also forced Malay children to spend more time under
government supervision before they could transfer to
other institutions to study in an Islamic environment.
This showed the continued conflict between the desire to
preserve culture and tradition and the desire for reform
and control. [9]
Thus what has been seen so far is a pattern of
assimilation policies introduced by the various Thai
governments, whether that of a monarchy, military
government or democracy, showing more continuity than
change. The southern Muslims, on the other hand, are
also unwilling to change and modernize. The pondok
issue would re-emerge again in the 21st
century, amidst the background of Islamic
fundamentalism.
Aftermath of 9/11: The resurgence of violence, the Thai
clamp down on religious schools and the external factor
In the post September 11 world, Muslim solidarity and
opposition against American intervention in the Middle
East has increased. In Thailand there was the suspicion
of a rise in Islamic extremism in the south following
the events of September 11, and especially since
Thailand committed troops to Iraq.
In April 2004, a pondok teacher named Ustaz Soh
launched a violent attack on various security
checkpoints in Thailand, leading a large number of
students with him.[10] Since then, the Thai authorities
have been searching and clamping down on pondoks,
arresting teachers and students indiscriminately. This
has been met with much anger and retaliation. The cycle
of violence reached its peak with more than seventy
youths and students suffocated to death in the village
of Tak Bai while under Thai custody. [11]
To what extent are the pondok teachers and
students behind the resurgence of violence in the south?
It has been cited by Thai authorities in the
investigations that some of the religious teachers may
be involved. [12] However, it is impossible to state
that all pondoks are now the breeding ground of
Islamic militants.
Even so, there was a rise of new Islamic thought in the
south ever since the establishment of the Yala Islamic
College in 1998. [13] This privately run school is
funded by the Saudi based International Islamic Relief
Organisation (IIRO) and teaches the ideas of the Wahhabi
school of thought. [14] These teachings are suspected to
reflect jihad influences and the college has spread its
influence to many pondoks which are yet to be
registered with the government. However, one must note
that there is yet to be any concrete evidence that
“jihad” is central to the resistance in the south. In
fact, the targeting of Thai public schools and Buddhist
monks—symbols of Thai integration policies, shows the
local resistance to anything that is Thai.
There is also the issue of terrorist organizations
linking up with the pondok students and tok
gurus. This could be the case, as foreigners linked
to the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) were part of the April 2004
attacks. Furthermore, a manual titled “Berjihad di
Pattani” (Holy Struggle for Pattani) [15] was found on
one the body of a dead militant. [16] However, most of
the JI efforts in Thailand have been between other
groups like the Gerakan Mujahideen Islamiya Pattani (GMIP)
and minimal at most. In addition, the manual found is
not along the same lines as those of the Al-Queda or JI
extremists. The new resistance in the south can
therefore be seen as nothing new but the continuation of
the struggle to retain Muslim identity.
Future prospects for pondoks
The targeting of pondoks and the reforming of
these schools is just part of a long history of Thai
assimilation policies in the south. What is needed is
reform that can promote development.
On the Thai government’s side, the approach has been
different to that of the policies of the 1960s. As of
March 2005, they have targeted three different
pondoks and provided grants up to 5 million baht to
create “model pondoks”. Computer courses
will also be available for the teachers and they will be
sent to Malaysia to learn how to teach formal and
vocational classes. [17]
However, other such schools which have registered with
the government, like the Klonghin Islam Witya School,
still lack the necessary aid and infrastructure. [18] As
Rahman Abdul Samad, head of the Narthiwat Islamic
Council said, “I’ve been asking, waiting for money from
the government for 20 years…So now I have gone abroad to
get the money. I have accepted a generous offer from
Kuwait.” [19] Outside aid seems to be the only way given
the pondok’s meagre aid and their opposition to
reform.
Another alternative is to move away from the pondok-style
of teaching and move towards the modern madrasah
style. In fact, because of the educational reforms in
the 1960s, some Muslim leaders saw the need to transform
the old pondok system to that of the madrasah
system, which covers a wider range of subjects. The
textbooks are mainly drawn from Saudi Arabia and cover
subjects like Islamic history and Arabic Literature.
These schools, such as the Ma’had al Ulum Pondok Jerang
Batu in Patani carried certificates for the first time,
which were recognized by other higher learning
institutions in other Muslim countries, especially Saudi
Arabia. [20] However, it is doubtful that the Thai
authorities would use a national curriculum as a basis
for any pondok improvement programme, given the
absence of any Thai syllabus currently. It should also
be noted that these are just a few pondoks which
have attempted to move towards “modern” education.
Again, the situation demonstrates the reluctance of the
southern Muslims to modernize and the government’s lack
of understanding of the religious and cultural identity.
Conclusion
The pondoks are an integral part of the Muslim
community in the south. The Thais have always sought to
impart Thai culture and policies on the Malays, without
much regard for Muslim ways and values. The teachers and
students of the pondoks have always resisted the
changes forced upon the pondoks despite their
rudimentary teachings. With increased awareness of
Islamic extremism and terrorism, pondoks, like
many other Islamic schools across the world, have been
suspected of imparting jihadist ideas or training
militants. This has increased the desire to reform them,
which would also improve the social conditions of the
community. However, as long as the Thai continue to be
oppressive and the Muslims unwilling to change, there is
little hope for reaching common ground.
References
[1]Angel
Rabasa, September 2005, Islamic Education in Southeast
Asia, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol.2, 12
[2] Islam
from Institusi Pondok, Azahidi
http://www.e-bacaan.com/artikeli_pondok.htm
[accessed 31st June 2006]
[3] Syed
Serajul Islam, 2005, The Politics of Islamic Identity in
Southeast Asia, Chapter 5, pg. 83
[4],
International Crisis Group Asia Report N98, 18 May 2005,
Southern Thailand: Insurgency, not Jihad, p. 3,
[5]Daniel
J. Pojar, Jr., March 2005, Lesson not learned: The
rekindling of Thailand’s Pattani Problem, Naval
Postgraduate School
[6]
International Crisis Group Asia Report N98, 18 May 2005,
op.cit., pg 5
[7] S P
Harish, February 2006 Changing Conflict identities: The
case of Southern Thailand discord, Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, Signapore, pg. 9
[8] Kersten, Carol, The Predicament of Thailand’s
Southern Muslims, American Journal of Islamic Studies,
Vol 21, Fall 2004, No.4
[9]
Hasan Madmarn, 2002, The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani,
Penerbit Universiti Kebangsann Malaysia, pg 75
[10]
MARWAAN MACAN-MARKAR, 2006 Schools in the line of fire,
Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher
Education
http://www2.siu.no/vev.nsf/o/SIUs+publications-Global+Knowledge-Schools+in+the+Line+of+Fire
[Accessed 31st June 2006]
[11]
Macan-Markar, 2006, Ibid
[12]
Aeusrivongse,
Nidhi, March 2005, Understanding the Situation in the
South as a “Millenarian Revolt”
http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue5/article_380.html
[Accessed 31st June 2006]
[13] S P
Harish, 2006, op-cit, p 16
[14] John
R. Bradley, 27 May 2004, Waking Up to the Terror threat
in Thailand, The Straits Times,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3985
[Accessed 31st June 2006]
[15] Liow, Joseph Chinyong, July 2006, International
Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an
Alternative Interpretation, Asia Policy, p.92
[16]
Nopporn Wong-Anan, Jun 15, 2004, Bangkok in difficulties
over southern region, Reuters, Bangkok,
[17]Darwish Moawad, 2006, Southernmost Thailand
Violence: Illiteracy, Poverty, Politics, Illicit Drugs
Trafficking, Smuggling and Nationalist Separatists - not
Religions and Cultures- the Issue. , pg 9
http://www.cis.psu.ac.th/mis/article/wp-content/uploads/2006/07/article3.pdf
[accessed 31st June 2006]
[18]
Grace Cantal-Albasin, A land left behind, Southeast Asia
Press Alliance
http://www.seapabkk.org/newdesign/fellowshipsdetail.php?No=240v
[19]
Parker, Benjamin, Winter 2005/2006 Thailand: A fire This
Time, World Policy Journal
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj06-1/Pauker.pdf
[accessed 31st June 2006]
[20]Hasan
Madmarn, 2002, op cit, pg 80-90
|
