|
Serbian
Politics: Parties and Coalitions
Little changed following recent parliamentary elections
in Serbia, and the future make-up of the country’s
government is undecided. The outcome will depend upon
party fortunes and coalition-building and will determine
the pace of Serbia’s bid for European integration.
Nicholas Comrie and Ksenija Nikolic
Serbs went to the polls on 14th January 2007
to decide on a new government. Like in the country’s
previous parliamentary elections in December 2003
however, no clear winner emerged. Instead, what is being
thrashed out now, and may coalesce in the not too
distant future, will be a government of coalition. But
Serbia’s political establishment has stubbornly failed
to come up with a government after months of wrangling.
Fresh elections could yet follow. The problem is that
Serbia has had a coalition government for the last four
years which many perceive as having been unsuccessful
and fractious. What were deemed to be ‘crucial’
elections appear to have changed little in the political
landscape. The political balance has shifted somewhat,
but what persists is a situation in which a coalition of
democratically orientated parties will form a government
with little, or no, unifying political programme except
their commitment to democracy.
The Erstwhile Opposition: Radicals and Democrats
The largest party remains the strongly nationalist
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) with 28% of the vote. Voter
sympathies changed little from prior elections when the
SRS gained 27% of the vote, emerged as the largest
party, and yet were denied a place in government. [1]
The Radicals continue to be frustrated in their efforts
to enter a government, being unable to find willing
partners amongst the democratic bloc. Their electoral
campaign ’50 percent + your vote’ was indicative of
these frustrations: unless they can gain a majority of
votes their chances of inclusion in a coalition
government are slim, denying them an active role in the
executive, despite their popularity.
Ex-President Slobodan Milosevic’s former party, the
Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), managed to remain in the
political arena with a five percent share of the vote, a
loss of two percent of support. [2] This was despite
predictions that it might not make the five percent
threshold as its predominantly elderly support base died
out. Their election slogan ‘Heads Up’ sought to
re-awaken waning support, even beating other, more
fancied centrist parties. They, too, are unlikely to
enter any coalition; shunned by the democratic centre
the best they could expect is an insignificant role in
government.
The greatest electoral success was achieved by the
liberal, pro-European Democratic Party (DS) led by
Serbian President Boris Tadic. DS’s campaign presented
an image rather than policies, including utilising
quotes from assassinated former Prime Minister Zoran
Djindijic. They increased their share of the vote from
twelve percent to 22 percent and are in a strong
position in future negotiations. [3] If they are
successful in establishing a coalition led by their
candidate for Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic, DS will
hold both the prime ministership and the presidency.
This could help to kick-start the Serbian executive,
which seems to have been stultified in recent years by
cross-party in-fighting.
DS’ success was achieved despite a loss of voters that
resulted from a split within the party. This produced
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which attracted five
percent of the vote. [4] The LDP’s programme, which
emphasized the need for more rapid reforms and European
integration, was popular amongst Serbia’s youth and
liberals. Their dynamic, youthful campaign sought to
awaken voters with their call ‘It Depends on Us’. Formed
only months before the election, the professionalism of
their campaign enabled LDP to score a major success. It
is also an indication that alongside DS, the
pro-European and liberal bloc is gaining ground,
potentially leading to a polarisation of Serbian
politics.
The Outgoing Democrats
The major losers of the election were the members of the
outgoing government coalition. The largest of these
parties, although not the biggest loser in the
elections, was the nationalist-democratic Democratic
Party of Serbia (DSS), led by outgoing Prime Minister
Vojilslav Kostunica. They had formed the basis for the
previous government but secured only 16 percent of
votes, down from 18 percent in 2003. [5] Theirs was a
lacklustre campaign which treated the electorate to an
uninspired party song and slogan ‘Long live Serbia’.
G17+, one of their initial coalition partners, performed
worse than in previous elections, garnering seven
percent of the vote, down from eleven percent in 2003.
[6] These losses were incurred despite G17+ leaving the
government six months before the elections. The G17+
campaign sought to focus upon economic rather than
political issues, using a crossed out snail in their
campaign to refer to the slow pace of economic reform.
The final party of the outgoing coalition, the
monarchist-democratic Serbian Movement for Renewal (SPO),
performed the worst. They failed even to surpass the
threshold to enter parliament, down from seven percent
last time round. [7] It is evident that these three
parties suffered due to their role in what was widely
seen as an ineffective government. Their losses directly
contributed to the major gains made by the democratic
opposition.
Polarisation
What the election results suggest is a polarisation of
Serbian politics. At one pole are the radical parties of
the SRS and SPS, with around a third of electoral
support. Coalescing around the second pole are the
liberal democratic opposition parties, the DS and LDP,
with just under a third of voter support. The centre
ground meanwhile seems to be slipping away. This is the
ground held by the three members of the outgoing
coalition and their recent losses are indicative of the
increasingly sharp divisions within the political scene,
as much as voter dissatisfaction with the government.
Polarisation will force the parties of the centre (DSS,
G17+ and SPO) into a choice between radicalism and
liberal democracy. The formation of a future
government, which continues to be hammered out, will
have a considerable bearing on what occurs, in terms of
potential polarisation, party orientation and voter
choice. Coalition choices and bargaining following these
elections will therefore determine not just the course
that Serbia will take for the next four years but the
entire political landscape.
What may lie ahead
January’s elections were indecisive, plunging Serbia
into another round of negotiations. Belgrade has faced
the dilemmas of coalition-forming before, but has never
satisfactorily solved the cross-party squabbles and
mud-slinging that seems to be endemic in Serbian
politics. This time around, little appears to have
changed. There are three possibilities for Serbia’s
future executive.
The first possible route is a democratic coalition, but
this has the immediate difficulty of the democrats’
disunity. Despite, or perhaps because, they share the
middle ground, the infighting amongst the democratic
parties has been intense. And yet, paradoxically, it is
their similarities that suggest they could make the most
likely partners. They have similar views concerning EU
entry, economic reform and social development and even
the Kosovo issue, currently a highly prominent issue.
However, political and personal point-scoring may
undermine such a prospective coalition.
The width of the potential coalition (which could
include, from left to right-wing: LDP, DS, G17+ and DSS)
also makes it unwieldy: LDP for example have stated
categorically that they would not enter a government
with the DSS. President Boris Tadic is hoping for a
‘grand coalition’ consisting of all democratic parties.
His party is negotiating over key posts in the potential
government, including landing the job of Prime Minister
for its candidate, Djelic. The problem is that DSS is
unwilling to surrender the premiership and other key
ministries such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the Ministry of Defence. Prime Minister Kostunica is
certainly guilty of foot-dragging over the issue,
recognising that his party is the coalition ‘bride’: DS
might want, and be able, to enter government with the
other, smaller democratic parties but it would never
secure the 51 percent necessary to form a stable
executive. DSS could take them over the threshold and
Kostunica and his party know it. This democratic
government is therefore only likely to become a reality
if DS, DSS and the other lesser parties can agree upon
the allocation of posts.
The second, more dangerous alternative would be the
marriage of DSS to SRS, both with nationalist-leanings.
This possibility would be anathema to most democrats,
and so it is unclear if DSS might be using it as a
threat to squeeze concessions out of DS, or if they are
seriously considering the option. Kostunica might hope
to hold onto the post of Prime Minister and other key
ministries, but due to the success of SRS they would be
a junior partner. SRS have stated that they are not
concerned with securing posts within the executive, but
even with this apparent carrot, it still seems unlikely
that DSS will opt for a lurch into the nationalist camp.
[8]
New Elections
What remains a distinct possibility is the calling of
fresh elections. All parties are stubbornly sticking to
their demands. A DS-DSS alliance remains the expected
outcome, but some have predicted that the situation may
not be resolved until as late as May. The issue of
Kosovo is regularly cited as the cause of delay in
negotiations, despite it being an issue that cries out
for government forming and executive action. If
‘Kosovo-delay’ and party wrangling continues, new
elections may well result. If this is the case, the
political landscape is unlikely to change; the most
likely outcome being increasing voter apathy,
accompanied by yet more tit-for-tat negotiations.
References
[1] CESID website,
http://www.cesid.org/ and
http://www.cesid.org/rezultati/sr_dec_2003/index.jsp
[2] – [7] Ibid.
[8] Politika, Vucic: Mandate or Resignation,
(Tanjug 29/01/2007), p.6 |
