|
Conflict or Cooperation: The future of the West's
relations with Iran
Three months after 15 captive British military
service personnel were released, relations between the
West and Iran show no signs of easing. This episode and
the violence in Iraq and Lebanon show Iran is quite
capable – and more than willing – to assert its power in
the Middle East. However, difficult though they will be,
diplomatic negotiations offer the only hope of a
peaceful settlement.
By Antonis Koutsoumbos
It
has been three months since fifteen British naval
personnel, taken hostage by Iranian naval troops whilst
patrolling the Persian Gulf, were freed. The episode
took place against a background of international
consternation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, its
alleged military and financial support for insurgents in
Iraq and its sponsorship of terrorist groups such as
Hezbollah.
Since then, Iran has declared its membership of the
nuclear club and its firebrand president has maintained
his defiant and assertive demeanour in the face of
international pressure with the United States refusing
to rule out military action.
Yet both sides have made it clear they are willing to
talk to each other. The EU3 of Britain, France and
Germany have been negotiating with Iran over their
nuclear programme since 2003 whilst the United States
has just sat down to official negotiations with the
Islamic Republic for the first time in 30 years,
although only the subject of stability in Iraq is up for
discussion.[1] This follows at least part of the advice
of the Iraq Study Group, led by former U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker[2] and thereby recognises Iran’s
pre-eminence within the Middle East, in order to bring
much needed stability to the region.
So
what does the future of the West’s relations with Iran
look like? Will Iran follow in the footsteps of Libya
and agree to disarm completely in return for lucrative
economic and political benefits [3] or will
brinksmanship over Iran’s nuclear programme escalate to
military action?
This will depend on several factors: the compatibility
of national interests, the balance of power in the
Middle East, and the influence of the international
community. The argument put forward here is that
conflict between the West, characterised as the alliance
of the United States and its coalition partners with the
EU3, and the Islamic Republic is unlikely. The only way
both sides will be able to secure their interests is
through multilateral diplomacy, engaging the region’s
major powers whose own interests are tied up in the
state of relations between the West and Iran.
Incompatible goals?
For a Libya-style deal to satisfy the West, according to
Ephraim Kam of the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs,
Iran would have to give up its nuclear programme, end
its involvement in terrorism, cease its disruption of
the Arab-Israeli peace process and, add the Europeans,
better respect human rights in Iran. The Iranians want
guarantees for their security, large-scale technological
assistance, and greater influence in the region.[4]
The compatibility of these goals will depend on each
side’s estimations of their capacity to achieve them
relative to their adversary’s capacity to achieve their
own goals.
Iran will note that the West, led by the United States,
boasts the most technologically advanced military in the
world, armed with sophisticated nuclear weapons as well
as military bases throughout the Middle East. They will
also note that the U.S and the EU are the world’s two
biggest economic superpowers upon whom Iran depends
heavily for trade. Furthermore, they will recognise that
there exists in the current United States administration
the political will to go to war regardless of
international opinion, if perceived to be in the United
States’ interest. They will also be acutely aware of the
fact that in the U.S led coalition’s occupations of
these countries and in the West’s closest ally in the
Middle East, Israel, they are effectively surrounded.
The West on the other hand will see that Iran possesses
a weapon potentially just as devastating as the nuclear
bombs they are accused of developing: oil. More to the
point, it has the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf,
the Iranian waters through which, it is estimated, over
16m barrels of oil are exported every day. [5] Professor
Jean Francois Seznec of Georgetown believes that
blocking the straits would quickly increase the price of
oil by $100 a barrel. [6]
In
addition, Iran is not your typical adversary in the
military sense either. Its available arsenal doesn’t
simply include conventional weapons. They also include
insurgent forces in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
There is also the nuclear programme and possibility that
Iran might one day be able to add nuclear weapons to its
arsenal.
To
gain a better impression of with whom the balance of
power lies, it is important to look at the existing
cases in which the two have clashed, albeit indirectly:
Iraq and Lebanon.
In
the shadow of Iraq
In
2003, the ‘coalition of the willing’, led by the United
States, successfully invaded Iraq, motivated by alleged
development of weapons of mass destruction; a point
surely not lost on the Iranians now. [7] This had the
effect of putting Iran under extreme pressure with one
nuclear power on their doorstep, America, and another
just next door, Israel. [8] In addition to this
demonstration of western military might, American
neo-conservatives hoped that just the successful
installation of a democratic government in Iraq would be
enough to undermine fatally the Grand Ayatollah’s
regime. [9]
However, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq proved to benefit
Iran more than was ever anticipated. The Americans
succeeded merely in eliminating or subduing Iran’s two
greatest foes in the form of Saddam Hussein and the
Taliban whilst empowering the Shi-ite south of Iraq at
the expense of a weak central government.
Indeed, if any country was being infiltrated and
re-modelled from the inside, it was Iraq. The Supreme
Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) that
had swept the board in Iraq’s first federal and
provincial elections was created by Ayatollah Khomeini
in 1982. In fact, amongst its ranks back then were Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim, the current leader of SCIRI, and Ibrahim
al-Jaafari, the Iraqi Prime Minister following the 2005
elections. [10]
Iran’s
second front
Iran’s influence over order in Iraq, combined with its
nuclear programme, has made it powerful. It has used
this power not just to undermine America’s strength in
the region, but also Israel’s. In the summer of 2006,
Israel attacked Lebanon in a bid to secure the release
of two Israeli soldiers captured by the separatist group
Hezbollah. [11] A major aim of the military action was
to wipe out Hezbollah, who were armed with five hundred
medium-range Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets and a few dozen
long-range Zelzal rockets and more than twelve thousand
shorter-range rockets. [12]
As
an extension of Iran’s military arsenal in the Middle
East and the natural basis of any Iranian attack on
Israel, the 2006 assault was seen by the likes of
journalist Seymour Hersh as something of a rehearsal
should Israel and/or the United States decide to launch
an attack on the Iran. [13] This is supported by Hersh’s
description of the use of ‘bunker-busting’ bombs,
imported from America to hit targets buried deep
underground. [14]
Hezbollah’s claim of victory emboldened Iran to become
more assertive and start flexing its muscles to extract
political concessions. After all, even in the wake of
the Lebanon crisis, the United States and the EU3 had
taken Iran to the UN Security Council where they
succeeded in securing sanctions against them for their
failure to suspend its uranium enrichment process. [15]
At the same time, the United States continued its sabre
rattling by staging war games in the Gulf and
diplomatically isolating Iran. Furthermore, the
Americans had recently captured five Iranians, suspected
of being spies and were refusing to release them.
Picking on Little Satan
Thus, on March 23rd 2007, fifteen British
navy personnel, conducting a regular patrol in the Gulf
for smugglers as had been done for the four years since
the Iraq invasion, were captured at gunpoint by Iranian
troops. [16] They would never have dared arresting
American personnel: the expected retaliation would have
been devastating.
Nevertheless, the British managed to solicit the support
of the European Union and the international community in
demanding the release of the sailors and threatening
consequences if they didn’t. Russia and China were
indifferent but the Americans refused to take the bait,
simply stating that no deal would be done under any
circumstances. [17]
This event highlighted the importance of the
international community in this grand standoff. The
United States may technically be the world’s lone
superpower but it is also a republic whose leaders are
democratically elected. This requires any conflict the
United States enters into to be legitimated to the
people. The decisions and actions of other states and
institutions, such as NATO allies or the UN, can
strongly affect public support for a war and for the
administration that leads them into that war.
On
top of this, allies are required to assist in the
funding of military campaigns and the reconstruction
efforts that follow. In the Middle East, the U.S relies
heavily on its Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia for
bases without which a concerted military campaign would
be impossible. Furthermore, it relies even more heavily
on such states for oil, without which the American
economy would collapse.
Iran too requires friends. It needs customers for its
oil. It requires powerful allies such as UN Security
Council permanent members, Russia and China. In 2004
China and Iran signed a preliminary accord worth
$70-100bn by which China would purchase Iranian oil and
gas and help develop Iran's Yadavaran oil field. In
addition China agreed to buy $20bn in liquefied natural
gas from Iran over a quarter-century. Reports from the
Islamic Republic News Agency in 2004, claimed that trade
had increased by 50pcin 2003 over the previous year.
[18]
Russia, of course has less interest in Iran’s oil,
instead seeking a power broker in the Middle East to
contain American power. As a result, it came as little
surprise that, as the U.S was attempting to prevent Iran
from going nuclear, Russia was giving them all the tools
to achieve just that by building and supplying their
nuclear reactor in Bushehr. [19] The two powers also
give them political cover in the UN Security Council to
ensure that no sanctions are imposed on the Islamic
Republic capable of disarming its oil weapon, agreeing
to support only the mildest of punitive measures.
Forcing the issue
So, what are the prospects of either side using their
most potent weapons to force the other to accede to
their demands? Even if the U.S.’ bunker busters could
find Iran’s deeply buried nuclear plants, this would
most likely reinforce Iran’s determination to equip
itself with weapons that would make the United States
think twice about attacking them. In addition, the
Americans would need to call on their Arab allies for
support in the form of military bases, something
widespread anti-Americanism in the region has made much
harder [20]
Nor would any allied incursion into Iran be able to
count on Israeli support, following their humbling in
Lebanon. Russia and China also would unquestionably
oppose military action and most likely arm Iran to help
it defend itself. As mentioned above, Iran already has
made substantial arms deals with China and Russia is
notorious for arming America’s enemies including
Venezuela and its allies [21] along with Iraq in 2003.
[22]
Those who would pay the biggest price for a U.S.-led
attack on Iran would be American troops still stationed
in Iraq. Sanctions by the European Union, Iran’s biggest
trading partners, would not halt the nuclear programme
and would only drive the Iranians further into the arms
of the Chinese and the Russians and risk collapsing the
fragile Afghan economy, heavily dependent on Iranian
investment.
Iran too has few options. Its ‘oil weapon’ may be
potentially devastating to the U.S, but it would
seriously hamper its own economy too. Any acts of
aggression on a par with the capture of the 15 British
Navy personnel would unite western public opinion and
create uncertainty that would be reflected in the price
of oil, depriving Iran of China’s support. Russia,
whilst having no problem with high oil prices, would not
gamble away the entirety of its political capital with
the West if Iran were deemed guilty by the remainder of
the international community of acting provocatively.
The diplomatic solution
Diplomacy, therefore, has not only greater prospects,
but a proven track record as Britain proved during the
hostage crisis. Similarly, diplomacy allowed for the EU3
to stall Iran’s nuclear programme in 2003 through the
Paris Agreement and for the United States to secure the
sanctions it did in the UN Security Council.
Nevertheless, the diplomacy currently pursued by the
West has its limitations. A recent memo, written by the
staff of EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana,
described how the EU3’s efforts to negotiate a
settlement to the nuclear issue and improve human rights
inside Iran had achieved limited success, concluding
that since 2004:
There is no evidence that these meetings have made much
impact; nor has public criticism…In practice, despite
the suspension of sensitive nuclear activities following
the Paris Agreement, the Iranians have pursued their
programme at their own pace, the limiting factor being
technical difficulties rather than resolutions by the UN
or the IAEA.
[23]
This is because all the issues, around which this
standoff revolves, ranging from nuclear proliferation to
human rights, are intrinsically linked to one another.
The EU has attempted to deal with this problem through
the ‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ which includes regional
matters, nuclear proliferation, human rights, energy,
terrorism and more. [24]
However, the Iranians have been unresponsive to this in
recent years as the most serious threat to their
security and regional interests is posed by the United
States. Therefore, any negotiations that do not include
them and do not yield commitments from them over these
issues are of little value to Iran.
The two sides’ interests and concerns span the whole
region, so it is necessary to ensure any negotiations
include Israel, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria
above all. A start could be a regional disarmament
conference or the opening of dialogues on the subject
between governments, mediated by the United States. This
would appease fears of an arms race whilst reassuring
Iran that it would not be expected to cease nuclear
development until Israel agreed to disarm and the United
States guarantee its security. This start would be the
most likely to secure a peaceful end to ‘the Iran
situation’.
References
[1] BBC News, US and Iran to hold talks on Iran (http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200705/s1914898.htm
2007)
[2] James A. Baker et al, The Iraq Study Group: The
United States Institute of Peace (http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html
2007), P.32
[3] Nigel Morris and Andrew Buncombe, Libya gives up
nuclear and chemical weapons (The Independent
December, 20th 2003)
[4] Ephraim Kam, What if Iran gets the bomb? The
Iranian challenge to the West: Jerusalem Centre for
Public affairs vol. 5 No 5 (www.jcpa.org
2005)
[5] Ivan Watson, U.S. Iran tensions highlight choke
point of Gulf oil: National Public Radio (www.npr.org
May 11th 2007)
[6] Ibid
[7] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The
decision to go to war in Iraq, vol. 1 (House of Commons
3rd July 2003) P.11
[8] BBC News, Israel’s nuclear programme (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3340639.stm
22nd December 2003)
[9] Reuel Marc Gerecht, American Enterprise Institute in
Iran thrives on the neo-con dream by Jim Lobe: Asia
Times (www.atimes.com
August 27th 2005)
[10] Jim Lobe, Iran thrives on the neo-con
dream: Asia Times (www.atimes.com
August 27th 2005)
[11] BBC News, Israel steps us Lebanese strikes (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5178774.stm
July 14th 2006)
[12] Seymour Hersh, Watching Lebanon: Annals of
National Security (The New Yorker, August 21st
2006)
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15] Peter Beaumont and Robert Tait, UN sanctions hit
Iran after call by Bush (The Observer December 24th
2006)
[16] BBC News, UK sailors captured at gunpoint (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6484279.stm
March 23rd 2007)
[17] CNN.com, U.S. rejects exchange of captives with
Iran (http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/03/31/iran.uk.sailors/index.html
March 31st 2007)
[18] Robin Wright, Iran’s new alliance with China
could cost U.S. leverage (The Washington Post November
17th 2004)
[19] BBC News, Russia-Iran nuclear deal signed (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4301889.stm
February 27th 2005)
[20] Ray Takeyk, Time for détente with Iran: Foreign
Affairs (www.foreignaffairs.org
March/April 2007)
[21] Rowan Scarborough, Russian arms sales to Chavez
irks U.S. (The Washington Times February 10th
2005)
[22] Paul Richter and Kim Murphy, Evidence cited of
Russian arms in Iraq (Los Angeles Times January 10th
2004)
[23] Iran Focus, EU pessimistic about stopping Iran
from going nuclear (http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=10172
February 14th 2007)
[24] The European Commission, The EU’s relations with
Iran (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm
December 2005)
|
