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Kosovo: The View from Belgrade
Serbia’s approach to Kosovo’s future
With Kosovo seemingly inexorably marching towards
independence, Belgrade seeks to reiterate its arguments
in defence of continuing Serbian influence in the
province. Its statements, however, appear to be falling
on deaf ears in the international community. Might
Moscow or international law save Belgrade’s faltering
position?
By Ksenija Nikolic and Nicholas Comrie
The issue of Kosovo is an immensely complicated one,
rooted as it is in political, ethnic and historical
tensions. However, it is an issue that the
international community is convinced should be resolved
with all expediency. The yawning divide remains between
Serbian and Albanian visions of Kosovo’s future, and yet
the international community continues to press for the
resolution of its status, despite being unable to table
a solution acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina.
For Belgrade, Kosovan independence is unacceptable.
Belgrade is willing to offer concessions to the
Albanian-dominated Serbian province: limited autonomy
that falls some way short of full independence. Pristina
meanwhile will accept nothing short of full
independence. The international community and U.N.
Special Envoy Mr. Ahtisaari, have the unenviable task of
brokering a solution that both sides may find
unpalatable. However, the timing and details of the
current international ‘solution’ are regarded by
Belgrade as far from acceptable.
Constitutional defence, historical defiance
Under international law Kosovo remains a province of
Serbia. From this legal footing Serbian Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica has sought to defend the Serbian
position. The problem is that, due to Serb aggression
during the 1990s, the international community is willing
to accept the violation of Serbian rights regarding
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to grant the
province independence. The international community has
marked Serbia out as a ‘special case’ and as such the
Serbian legal argument has largely been ignored. This
situation then raises the question: where does one
‘special case’ end, and, if there are exceptions, then
what is the value of international law?
Kosovo holds a unique historical and cultural place in
the heart of the Serb nation. Its significance continues
to resonate today and is rooted in a history of
defiance, expressed in the continuing Serbian
commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo Field in 1389
after which Serbia fell under Ottoman domination for
five centuries; and in Kosovo’s significance as the
historical seat of the Serbian Orthodox church. During
the 1980s-1990s this ideological significance was not
lost on the nemesis of the Kosovo Albanians: Slobodan
Milosevic. It was not insignificant that Milosevic was
to give one of his most famous speeches in Kosovo Polje
in 1987 during which he stated, ‘you should stay here
for your ancestors and your descendents’, referring to
the Serbian minority’s need to defend their position in
Kosovo. Milosevic’s statements regarding the issue and
his true concern for the plight of the Serbian minority
in the province were key elements of the political
success that propelled him to the top of Yugoslav
politics. Even today, statements by moderate,
pro-European president, Boris Tadic continue to echo
Milosevic’s sentiments. The concerns that drew Milosevic
to Kosovo in 1987 remain today, with Serbian communities
under attack and Serbs unable to defend their territory
against an aggressive neighbour due to the repressive
political methods of the Milosevic era and Belgrade’s
inability to rehabilitate itself since.
What Serbs must admit is that before 1999 Albanians
within Kosovo were repressed by Belgrade. However, since
the arrival of UN troops, the repression has shifted
from the Albanians to the Serbian minority: the
international presence and the absence of Serbian troops
in the territory ensure only the security of the
Albanian majority.
Under the noses of the UN, Kosovo Albanians have
attacked Serbian communities and cultural monuments with
relative impunity, forcing between 80-200,000 Serbs to
flee the province. The flight of Serbs has further
strengthened the demographic element of Pristina’s
ongoing calls for independence. Belgrade feels powerless
to help Serbs still living there and can see no way of
overcoming the strength of the Albanian demographic
position. Their concerns are further justified by this
campaign of low intensity ethnic cleansing against the
Serbian minority that has continued since 1999, with
NATO and the international community essentially
providing unwitting protection for the repressors.
Belgrade can therefore feel somewhat justified in
claiming that the international community does not
understand or wish to address Serbian concerns. This, we
argue, is the case: the international community is
simplifying an extremely complicated case by demonising
the Serbs, in an effort expediently to resolve another
Yugoslav Gordian Knot.
Serbia’s offer
The key issue surrounding Serbia’s offer to Kosovo is
that the word ‘independence’ remains an unacceptable
part of their negotiating vocabulary. Other more
flexible analogies such as ‘essential autonomy’ are more
in line with the view from Belgrade, but Serbs have been
largely unsuccessful in convincing the international
community of the merits of such a solution for years.
Serbia has unsuccessfully sought a sympathetic ear from
the EU for its more flexible approach, instead facing
mounting pressure from Brussels and the UN to accept the
unacceptable: independence for Kosovo. These modern
concerns, coupled with Kosovo’s historical significance
to Serbia, influence Belgrade’s calls for essential
autonomy. But what exactly does this autonomy entail?
According to Belgrade’s offer, Pristina would gain
legislative, judicial and executive power, with some
exceptions to the latter. Belgrade would retain control
of foreign affairs, defence (with a demilitarized
Kosovo), finance, customs, and the protection of Serbian
cultural heritage and the Serb minority. [1]
This is the offer that Belgrade hopes the international
community will accept and then impose upon Pristina. The
chances of such a move however, appear slim, and the
Ahtisaari plan continues to be touted as the plan
to resolve the future status of Kosovo. The
international climate suggests that Belgrade will
probably have to accept the plan that would see them
relinquishing more than they are at present willing to
give up. Belgrade does however have an important player
on its side: Russia, with its Security Council veto.
Russia: Slavic saviour?
Russia continues to be the only significant member of
the international community backing Serbian opposition
to the Ahtisaari plan. Moscow’s fears of Chechen, Ingush
and Tartar separatism means they are sympathetic towards
Belgrade’s position and they have said so at the United
Nations. Russia’s Security Council veto grants Moscow
the opportunity to be the potential wrecker of any UN
resolution concerning the province, and as such all
interested parties have been keen to court the Kremlin.
Moscow might well be regarded by some in Serbia as their
saviour, but Putin is a shrewd operator who recognises
the power he now holds and is intent upon extracting
maximum geopolitical mileage from it. The Kremlin will
hope to utilize negotiations regarding Kosovo to gain
leverage in yet more sensitive issues, such as America’s
missile defence shield and the ongoing nuclear
bargaining with Iran and North Korea.[2]
Despite Kosovo representing a relatively insignificant
pawn in Moscow’s geopolitical chess-game, however,
Belgrade continues to place considerable faith in Russia
continuing to block any resolution that would see
independence for the province. This may well be because
the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaliy
Churkin, has stated that ‘the Kosovo issue is unique in
the world’ [3] and Russia has made promises behind
closed doors; but Moscow may well be making such
statements to strengthen their position.
Why now? Why so fast?
The Kremlin claims that there is a ‘necessity to
continue negotiations’.[4] This bolsters Serbia’s
rejection of Ahtisaari’s plan, but also strengthens
Russia’s hand in future geopolitical negotiations when
Washington and Brussels appear so desperate for a speedy
resolution to Kosovo. Serbia must be careful not to
place too much faith in their Slavic brothers, however,
as sympathy might well have to give way to necessity;
and the evidently pressing desire of the international
community to solve the status of Kosovo might well mean
that necessity may arrive sooner than Belgrade
anticipates.
From Belgrade, the international community appears to be
pressing ahead with break-neck speed to resolve the
issue of Kosovo. The Serbian public is left wondering
why. Is it the desire to resolve the issue before the
tenth anniversary of the establishment of the UN
protectorate in Kosovo, Bush’s desire to sweep away
Clinton’s mess, the ongoing cost of peacekeeping,
pressure from the Albanian lobby in the United States or
simply the desire of the international community to
achieve peace in the Balkans? Probably due to a
combination of all these factors, Washington seems
determined to forge ahead in its support of Kosovan
independence within months, and Belgrade must respond to
this determination either with new proposals or by
conceding a defeat unacceptable to Serbian parties of
all stripes.
Belgrade: ‘Try looking through our end of the
binoculars’.
The question that one will hear on the streets of
Belgrade when talking about Kosovo is a simple one -
‘Would the U.S. accept New Mexico becoming Mexican
simply because of demographics?’ Everyone knows the
answer and the argument might well be sound, but such
talk is likely to change little. Belgrade continues to
negotiate from a position of weakness. New proposals
are unlikely to find receptive ears and the
international community appears determined to resolve
swiftly the status of the province. The best that
Belgrade can hope for is further delays to enable Russia
or international law, which defends the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state in all but the most
exceptional circumstances, to derail the process.
The problem for Belgrade is that Kosovo might just
fulfil this notion of exceptionality. The international
community’s decision to regard Kosovo as a ‘special
case’, coupled with the fact that Russia will one day
inevitably remove its support, means Belgrade’s hopes
for the future of the province appear doomed to fail.
The best that Belgrade can hope to achieve is
concessions on EU entry, particularly concerning the
capture of Ratko Mladic, and an easing of visa
restrictions; but in exchange Belgrade will have to
accept grudgingly what appears to be the inevitable loss
of Kosovo.
References
[1] M. Milosevic, Dosli, Videli, Otisli, Vreme,
May 3 2007, p.10
[2] B. Jaksic, Compromise Without the Veto, CorD
Magazine, Belgrade, 2007, p.6
[3] RTS Dnevnik, May 11 2007
[4] The US and EU have drafted a proposal for UN
Kosovo resolution, Belgrade Times, May 10 2007, p.3 |
