Though there are vast differences between Germany in 1939 and Iran in 2010, a historical pattern is still emerging. Unpredictable autocratic leaders of a historically frustrated former regional power have defined a clear geopolitical enemy (perhaps a future target) and are making immense efforts to gain the technological ability to undertake independent action on the international sphere, under relatively passive observation by world powers.
It is hard to prove that Iran is trying to construct nuclear weapons, but Hitler’s ambitious plans were hard to prove as well. However, Iran’s backtracking on the deal to enrich uranium outside its borders and rejection of IAEA inspectors speaks for it self. The last thing Teheran desires is transparency, openness and some form of control over its nuclear ambitions. That is why its leaders proudly celebrated the Russian fuelling of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iran’s first power-generating nuclear plant. And that is why it is sensible to believe that their ambitions are not as pure and harmless as presented.
If the international community remains passive, one of two alarming scenarios will most likely unfold. If Iran indeed constructs the nuke - the worst possible scenario – the geopolitical reality in the region will be dramatically altered. Deterrence theories are based on a few premises, one of which is existence of credibility and clear communication between the actors. However, this precondition does not exist in Iran’s case. There are numerous arguments and predictions about Iran’s motivations, but the only thing most of them agree upon is that Teheran’s actions are rather unpredictable. Iran’s emergence as a nuclear power will therefore have a significant destabilizing effect, even if they never use the bomb. First of all, this will be a massive success for the most radical fractions in the theocracy, which will stabilize and even strengthen their positions in the leading circles of the country, which would naturally lead to more radical and unreadable domestic and foreign politics. Secondly, the nuke will offer Iran increased independence in the formulation of their foreign policy, which is likely to materialise in aggressive bullying – in worse case annexing – of small, rich states in the region. At last and most worryingly, considering the number of Iran’s existing and potential militant proxies, this would probably mean the end of the concept of non-proliferation. If Iran’s action and motivations are practically unpredictable, those of its proxies are absolutely so.
The second alternative, which is according to Jeffrey Goldberg’s brilliant article more likely, is Israel’s unilateral pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Israelis have already some experience with similar endeavours - the most famous one was destruction of the Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. Moreover, Netanyahu’s government has been eagerly improving Israel’s air force capabilities. This scenario is just slightly less cataclysmic than the first one. This unilateral action will cause a series of turbulent eruptions in the fragile Middle-East. There would surely be a harsh retaliation from Iran or –more likely – some of its proxies, which might lead to an all-around conflict. US-Israel relations might take a hit and Iranian population would be highly radicalized. Oil markets will become extremely turbulent and countries in the region would be even more negative against Israel even more than they are today. Worst of all, it would just delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Teheran would possibly restart the whole process in much greater secrecy with backing from much more loyal and radical population. What should be done in order to prevent the two bleak scenarios described above? There is no single answer for this question. This problem is so complex, that the best we can hope for is a series of suggestions, which could possibly prevent the most destructive alternatives. Unanimous pressure from all world powers would definitely help. If Russia – and every one else with the technology - refused to help with the Bushehr reactor, Iran would have much more difficulties on their way towards nuclear future. However, this is not likely to happen and the solution therefore lies in the hands of two countries, which have the most at stake and the military capabilities to deal with the issue – Israel and the US.
Firstly, the Iranian question needs to be de-coupled from the Palestinian problem. In order to do so, Israel needs to start serious dialogue with Palestinian authorities. The recently re-launched Mideast peace negotiations seem to be taking place in an untraditionally ‘open-minded’ atmosphere, but the problems are yet about to come with the promised end of settlement building slowdown by the end of the month. However, this initiative has to be regarded as a positive move, as any thawing of Israel-Palestine tensions steals momentum from Iran’s leaders, who gain support for their nuclear programme also by portraying Israel as the regional oppressor. Israel desperately needs to be more appealing for moderates of the Middle East.
Secondly, Washington should publicly backup Israel in this confrontation. Despite a significant loss of reputation, the United States is still are the most powerful and influential country in the globe. If anyone can possibly deter Iranian leadership, it is the US. The current establishment should give up its ambivalent language and clearly state, that Iran with a bomb is unacceptable and US would support Israeli pre-emptive action. This would hardly change Iranian ambitions, but it could definitely bring them to the table and gain some more time. Time is a highly valuable commodity in this confrontation, as the most estimates predict that Iran will be able to construct a nuke in one to three years. By then, it could be too late.
Posted on September 9, 2010
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