Faced with American insistence that the IRI was not to be trusted with enriching uranium due to the possibility that this could be used to build nuclear weapons, and the general climate internationally considering the Bush doctrine and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, there were genuine concerns that a major regional incident would unfold including a possible preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The EU-3 process failed to reach a conclusive deal, though it did have some success in stalling the Iranian programme.
The highly publicised promise to ‘reach out a hand’ to the IRI by President Obama, brought America into direct involvement in the successor P-5+1 negotiations which included the original EU-3, plus China, Russia and America. This was a landmark in itself considering that there have been no direct official negotiations between America and Iran for almost 30 years. Despite this, no deal with any realistic chance of long term success looks likely to be made. Why? The international order as we have come to know it, and the IRI, are incompatible.
The IRI owes its existence to its identity as a reaction to the Western way of life and of doing business. To come to a conciliation with the international community, spearheaded by the American insistence that Iran must not ever have full mastery of the nuclear cycle is in essence dismantling the foundations and the pride of the Regime. From its inception it was a lone actor, surviving in spite of the uproar within the international community over the 1979 hostage crisis and a gruelling war with Iraq, which it did not start. In short, it has a siege mentality soldered into its psyche.
In another respect, Iran has always been a nation that despite different manifestations in its internal shape and character has aspired to a greater stature internationally - or at the very least regional predominance. The shah of Iran whose rule was brought to an end by the 1979 Revolution that created the IRI, had grand designs for Iran as the premier nation of the Middle East. This vision was shared by successive American administrations, particularly the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations which generously armed Iran with advanced weaponry and aircraft throughout the 1970’s at levels dwarfing its regional peers. The current regime is in this sense, no different to the shah, with the significant caveat that the regional and global role Iran was to play under the shah was largely in line with western desires, while the role the IRI envision is perceived as deeply antagonistic at best. Put simply, the IRI views itself as an ambassador for a non-western way of life, free of a perceived American global hegemony.
At a time when Iran is internally politically volatile - particularly after the contested Iranian elections of 2009, it would be political suicide for the Regime to take a 'deal' over an issue with as much primacy as its nuclear program. The possibility of moderation and/or reform of the IRI died a decisive death when Ahmadinejad retained his Presidency in 2009 and received full backing from the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, The Iranian people are often said to be at odds with the Regime, favouring a more liberal, or 'westernised' way of life. Perversely, the internal desire for a changing Iran is likely to have the opposite effect with respect to international politics as the Regime seeks to quieten its domestic problems with a show of strength abroad over the nuclear program. For now, the Regime most certainly has enough momentum to survive at least in the near term.
The Western negotiators should therefore stop attempting to negotiate with the Iran they would like to see and accept reality. This may mean that future talks may have to be significantly altered, perhaps abandoned, and the international community may have to accept that they cannot control or influence the IRI directly. All attempts to do so will only provoke more animosity from the IRI and embolden it further.
Deadlock has characterised Iran's role in international relations since 1979, and deadlock will almost certainly continue to characterise it in the near future as long as Iran remains the IRI. Hence, as the old saying goes; the more things change the more they stay the same.
Posted on July 8, 2010
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