First, let me offer a few caveats. People are right on the money when they say that our invasion of Afghanistan has alienated us throughout the Middle East. More importantly, our heavy-handed strategy has not eliminated the Taliban, rather, policies such as indiscriminate air strikes in areas of concentrated populations, the forcible eradication of poppy fields, the use of warlords as proxy forces and poor detainment policies (as our good friend Jon has written about) have all contributed to the resurgence of neo-Taliban forces. In fact, there are pretty good odds that if, after the elections in 2005 (which were seen largely as a success without significant American interference), we had simply packed up our forces and left trainers for the Afghan National Army, the Taliban would not have been the force that we are reckoning with today.
But here is where the ignorance part rapidly emerges. The assumption is that our guiding doctrine has remained largely unchanged, when, in reality, nothing could be further than the truth. There is now, and has been for the last year or so, something guiding coalition policy in Afghanistan called FM 3-24. FM 3-24, the counterinsurgency field manual now in use, “acknowledges that sometimes the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be”: manpower is now replacing firepower. We are working in better conjunction with civilian programs and keeping with an underlying population-centric ideal. The differences can already be seen. Similar to the Sunni Awakening in Iraq, which helped make the surge there the success that it was, tribal leaders have begun to form militias against the Taliban, standing in direct opposition to its threats (although let the comparison end there.) In other words, we are dramatically altering the momentum of the war, and the increase of troops can only help this as long as we follow a policy that puts Afghan lives and rights first.
Another popular argument I saw was: “Well, the Taliban aren’t the threat, al-Qaeda is, and they are pretty much gone.” This was true in 2001, and is not true in 2009. The neo-Taliban is not the Taliban of the past; it is no longer “al-Qaeda lite.” It is now, or segments of it are, especially in South Waziristan and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, significantly radical. One of the things that most stuck with me from David Rohde’s account of his time in captivity under the Taliban is that the Taliban are now using areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as their very own country. Where checkpoints in Pakistan were once manned by the army, they are now manned by the Taliban. The Taliban, Rohde wrote, is no longer a local faction. They wish, just like al-Qaeda, to impose Islam on the rest of the world and to carry out attacks on U.S. soil. Believe me, I have no Islam anxiety, but leaving the Taliban to its own devices at this point would be unacceptable.
It is also important to understand the multilateral dynamics of the region when we consider our troop increases. The ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, has historically supported the Taliban when they rose to power in the mid 1990’s. In fact, they backed the most radical elements of the Taliban because they found them the easiest to control, and they still do to this day. The issue is that they have a vested interest in supporting the Taliban because they have a vested interest in their own regional stability. Of course, it is quickly becoming apparent that their very own Frankenstein is on its way to killing its creator, but it is important to note that the ISI is a wily bunch. They will do what is best for their country in the long term, and, if we signal that we are in it for the long term and will stay until the Taliban are no longer the dominating force in the region, they will bet on the winning horse.
It seems that whenever anyone wishes to use history in their arguments against staying in Afghanistan, they invoke the hoary comparison of our involvement with Vietnam, an argument often used during the pre-surge periods of Iraq (something I am guilty of as well, and Nick was correct on). I can’t help but stop listening when people start conjuring up Vietnam; it was a war that happened in a totally different period in a country thousands of miles away from Afghanistan with a completely population. Please, let’s retire the argument that a specific case can be used as a general rule, and acknowledge the existing differences.
Also, can we please toss out the window the assertion that Obama has somehow abandoned the people that have voted for him by continuing our involvement in Afghanistan? He has not even committed the egregious crime of changing his mind. Time and time again during his campaign Obama acknowledged that Afghanistan was a “war of necessity”, and that he was simply not going to advocate for a timetable or an immediate troop withdrawal. Don’t even get me started on the military-industrial complex accusations.
The options that exist as alternatives to staying in the country are few, and really don’t pass as legitimate options. Nick Kristof, everyone’s favorite celebrity columnist, wrote that we should just use the money that we were going to use on troops and use it to build schools and the like. It is a poor idea. The problem is that the Taliban enjoy blowing things up, and without regional stability provided by a troop increase, civilian programs will fail time and time again without the security to help them. In the same manner, we can’t leave trainers in place in Afghanistan to train the ANA and call it a day. They need stability first in order to succeed.
Posted on December 6, 2009
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