As Afghanistan deteriorates, and an American report reveals that we have failed in the 'civilian' effort in the country, a simple question remains: why doesn't basic development work accompany the very start of any counter-insurgency operation?
Imagine if the Afghanistan strategy that was strongly advocated by President Obama of intense infrastructure building took place at the beginning of ANY counter-insurgency campaign. Simple repair work to damaged buildings, re-paving local roads, building a working sewer and garbage system. These are development solutions that are not all that expensive and require only some cooperation between the necessary technical bodies that could run such a project. It requires an empathetic viewpoint from politicians directing these campaigns towards the populations they affect.
This is not to say that an intense security aspect is not essential. Of course it is. But the bigger bang for the buck in counter-insurgency will come from setting up regional and local infrastructures that can cater to the basic living needs of those affected by war. In modern counter-insurgency efforts, the funding for these programs is often tiny compared to that spent on the war effort, and results often show that a lot of that money can be heavily wasted.
As President Obama weighs his options, he may have to pay closer attention to Vice President Biden as he advocates for 'a lighter footprint'. But for future counter-insurgency efforts, the lesson to be learned from Afghanistan is not necessarily a cautionary one, but anthropological. It is that the political and military leadership must have a basic concept of how to provide basic human needs in tandem with security operations to populations finding themselves powerless to control their own fates.
Posted on October 15, 2009
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