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Economic Globalisation and Political Change in Russia
and China
This article looks at the link between economic
globalisation and democratic transition, with respect to
contemporary Russia and China. Despite the assumption
that economic liberalisation leads to democratisation,
neither Russia nor China have made the transition to
successful liberal democracy. The experience of both
states suggests that there is no definite or direct link
between economic liberalisation and democratisation.
By Nick Calla
Introduction
Globalisation processes have
significant implications for domestic economic and
political transformation. An analysis of
globalisation’s impact on certain states may serve to
predict changes for other states that are similar
politically, culturally, or geographically. Russia and
China are two such nations. Since they share important
elements – both are geographically large nations that have made the transition
from predominantly centrally-planned
to largely
capitalist economies – it is instructive to
compare them, as both face the present uncertainties and
future prospects of globalisation.
Despite an assumption among political theorists that
economic liberalisation leads to democratisation,
neither Russia nor China have made the transition to
liberal democracy.
If
economic globalisation involves little more than the
integration of the world capitalist economy, democracy
cannot be viewed as its definite or assured outcome.
The experience of Russia and China suggests that there
is no definite or direct link between economic
liberalisation and liberal democracy. An examination of
Russia and China’s political culture and level of
modernisation demonstrates that the presence of
intervening variables must be considered also.
I. Economic Liberalisation
Economic Reform in Russia
The process of economic globalisation was facilitated by
the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989. The collapse of
communism created the
opportunity for the movement of capital, labour and
goods across national borders while increasing
international economic competition.[1] In accordance
with the neo-liberal policies of the Washington
Consensus, a set of economic policy measures designed
for market economies, post-communist countries were
pressured by the West to quickly liberalise their
economies, privatise state assets, and introduce drastic
financial austerity measures.[2] This rapid transition
process, in countries possessing neither a democratic
nor capitalist infrastructure, raised the dangerous
possibility of the transition economies emerging
somewhere between two economic systems.
Russia’s economic reforms resulted in significant
consequences. Economic changes were reflected not only
in changes to the system of production but also in
labour markets, which exhibited a rise in unemployment
and a fall in real wages.[3] Steep recession occurred
as Russia entered a phase of high inflation, and, most
significantly, the population’s living standards
decreased dramatically. Russia’s government was
successful at suppressing inflation and stimulating
economic growth in a healthy manner. However, many
aspects of Russia’s economy currently suggest that it is
moving towards a corporatist market, characterised by
corruption and driven by a class of oligarchs whose
primary goal is to increase their personal wealth.[4]
The influence of economic globalisation forces has not
created an open free market in Russia; instead, it has
consolidated a corrupt class of elites that was largely
in place under the former Soviet system.[5]
Economic Reform in China
China originally modelled its political and economic
structures on those of the Soviet Union.[6]
The Soviet model of development and its emphasis on
heavy industry, collectivised agriculture, and central
planning of production prevailed in China from 1949
until 1978. Following Mao’s death, however, a reform
agenda initiated by Deng Xiaoping significantly altered
the course of Chinese politics. Deng’s reforms had the
primary objectives of economic development and the
reintegration of China into the global economy.[7]
Although the concept of globalisation had not yet
developed, Deng’s reform agenda nonetheless manifested a
global vision: to aid China’s modernisation process
through economic benefits gained from expanding global
exchange and trade.[8] The initial phases of Deng’s
reforms involved maintaining state control of the
economy while simultaneously allowing market elements to
develop in agriculture and retail distribution, as well
as preserving central-planning in major industries while
allowing smaller enterprises to openly sell anything
produced beyond state-imposed targets.[9] The final
stages of Deng’s economic reforms during the 1990s
involved a greater degree of separation of government
and economy. The market system in China became firmly
anchored and the Chinese economy began to more closely
resemble a market economy.[10]
China’s economic reforms have proven largely
successful. Its impressive accomplishments are further
highlighted when contrasted against the post-communist
difficulties experienced by Russia. Not only has China
developed a successful market economy, but the shift to
market principles has in turn propelled state reforms
and led to improvements in many areas of public
life.[11] In addition to having relieved the shortage
of public goods that had been common under Communist
rule, market provisions now allow for choice, quality
and efficiency. Due to the success of its
economic re-structuring and the opening of its markets
to foreign investors, China is now a major global actor
capable of affecting international political and
economic stability.[12]
II. Political Reform
In addition to economic consequences, globalisation
affects political outcomes also. A primary focus of
globalisation is the manner in which economic
development, arising from the interconnectedness of
global markets, is expected to lead to identifiable
changes in domestic political structures.[13] The
commonly held assumption is that economic liberalisation
will lead to political liberalisation and subsequently
democracy. Despite the transition to market economies,
however, neither Russia nor China have made the
transition to liberal democracy.
Political Reform in Russia
Since 1991, Russia has actively reproduced structures
and institutions characteristic of Western democracies
in response to globalisation.[14] The growing number of
freely held elections is often cited as the most notable
of these. Free elections have been successfully held
within the Russian Federation since 1993, and, with
minor exceptions have reputedly been fair. The
completion of a country’s first competitive elections
generally signals the end of a democratic
transition.[15]
Russia’s political system, however, is not
representative of liberal democracy. While it is agreed
that some form of democracy did emerge in Russia
following the demise of communism, the current political
system displays elements only of an electoral
democracy.[16] Pluralist institutions in Russia are
currently weak, and interest groups are restricted in
their freedom of expression. The political institutions
capable of addressing these issues – a strong
parliament, an effective party system, and an
independent judiciary, do not exist.[17] Only certain
elements of Western liberal democracy have been
successfully adopted by successive Russian governments
following the end of communist rule, primarily the
elections of representative bodies to parliament.[18]
The elements that constitute the basis of liberalism,
however – freedom of association, freedom of expression,
political accountability, and rule of law – have eroded
since the end of Gorbachev’s rule in 1991.[19]
Political Reform in China
Interest in democratic reform in China has existed since
the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in
1978.[20] The most significant change under Deng’s
leadership has been the retreat from revolutionary
totalitarian rule.[21] To achieve long-term stability
and industrial modernisation, Deng transformed the
Chinese Communist Party into a legally-regulated regime
that promised a more liberal political system.[22]
Among the political reforms implemented by Deng are the
holding of competitive elections at the local level. In
1979, the Communist Party first allowed citizens to
directly elect delegates to local congresses.[23] Under
Deng’s policy of promoting democracy and political
liberalisation, the government also relaxed its control
over the media, and has recently taken steps to
accommodate international appeal for improvement of its
domestic human rights situation.[24]
Despite these political reforms, however, China today is
by no means a liberal democracy. Although the term
‘democracy’ has been used by recent Chinese leaders, the
Chinese Communist Party does not intend to introduce a
representative government that is “constituted through
free and competitive elections under the rule of law”, a
fundamental element of Western liberal democracy.[25]
Both direct and competitive elections at the district
levels have been widely practiced; however these
elections are not competitive and are reportedly
manipulated by the Communist Party.[26] In 1982, the
regime promised a more liberal political system;
however, emphasis has shifted from promoting political
democracy to liberalising the socialist economy.
III. Theories of Democratic Transition
Many question why Russia and China have not fared better
as a result of economic liberalisation and why the
transition to capitalism has failed to create a stable
liberal democracy. Such political changes, however, are
not the result of a single variable, but of the
interaction of external and domestic factors.
Understanding democratic transition thus requires
examining how external and domestic variables interact.
Both culturalist and modernisation theorists view
democratic transition as a function of internal, rather
than exclusively external, factors.
Culturalist Theory of Democratic Transition
Researchers Almond and Verba argue that basic structures
of democracy are influenced by the political culture of
a country’s population.[27] Cultural theorists argue
that the Russian people are “predisposed to
paternalistic, authoritarian rule” and lack the civic
culture that could properly support a democratic
regime.[28] Analyst Mikhail Molchanov argues that the
majority of Russian people do not consider the
post-communist tradition to be something ‘normal’ either
in its design or outcome. Instead, Russian citizens
consider their lives disrupted by an
externally-generated economic shock.[29] In a country
where the state has been largely dismantled over two
decades of economic liberalisation, the building of a
functioning democracy may appear to citizens as less of
a priority than regaining the stability and economic
security they were accustomed to under communist rule.
From this perspective, Russia’s inability to
institutionalise a liberal democracy over the previous
two decades demonstrates continuity with both its
communist legacy and authoritarian political culture.
Cultural theorists similarly argue that political
culture is significant in explaining the absence of
democracy in China. In a strong democratic culture, the
public is more likely to believe in and support
democratic norms and forces. China’s Confucian society,
however, is largely undemocratic. Confucian culture
“sets up a strictly hierarchical structure for the
society, which translates into rule by moral example
rather than rule of law.”[30] In a Confucian society
such as China, there is no equivalent to the notion of
human rights that is predominant in liberal
democracies. Although Chinese culture has evolved
throughout history, group consciousness in China remains
strong as does the emphasis on hierarchical structure.
Given China’s geographic size and large population, the
Confucian social order may be more significant than
other factors in impeding the transition to liberal
democracy.
Modernisation Theory
Modernisation theory attributes the absence of democracy
in developing nations to a lack of industrialisation.
In explaining the absence of liberal democracy in
Russia, modernisation theorists argue that Russia has
not yet developed sufficiently to either create or fully
sustain a democratic society. Such analysts argue that
the high levels of average income and industrialisation
necessary to facilitate democratic consolidation were
absent both in the former Soviet Union and in
present-day Russia.[31] Modernisation theorists contend
that the transition to capitalism and democracy must
occur in sequence: the transition to a functioning
market economy must occur first, followed by democratic
transition, in order to ensure the success of both.[32]
In the absence of a fully-modernised economy, society,
or industry, analysts speculate that political rule in
Russia will gravitate towards authoritarianism.
Similarly, China’s political culture, social order and
history have each affected its level of development and
modernisation, both of which are considered factors in
democratisation. Although China has performed well
economically, the population remains relatively
poor.[33] China’s uneven economic development has
benefited urban centres while leaving rural areas
largely disadvantaged. Consequently, there has been a
turn in rural areas against economic
liberalisation.[34] Other, smaller Confucian societies
such as Taiwan and South Korea have successfully made
the transition to democracy. However, China’s
geographic size, population and rising disparity in
wealth make it unlikely that China will soon be able to
achieve the level of modernisation required to make the
transition to liberal democracy.
Conclusion
The experiences of Russia and China indicate that there
is no direct or definite link between economic
liberalisation and transition to liberal democracy. For
Russia, globalisation has not brought universal
prosperity or ready access to world markets, but
economic hardship and a growing sense of disillusionment
among the populace. Although the Soviet Union
lacked traditional liberal freedoms, it did provide a
high degree of social equity. When communist rule
ended, however, neither liberal democracy nor a
successful market economy emerged in its place.
Economic liberalisation also failed to result in the
creation of a strong middle class to press for liberal
freedoms. Instead, the relationship between the state
and society had been altered, and any sense of equality
or national pride was lost in Russia’s sudden transition
to capitalism. As such, the likely outcome for Russia
in the near future is neither a liberal democracy nor an
authoritarian dictatorship, but a regime somewhere in
between.
In contrast, globalisation has had a more positive
effect on China. Theorists indicate that few in China
would elect to return to a command economy, with its
perennial shortages of social goods. The likelihood of
any democratic transition in China,
however, is minimal. Among other factors, China simply
does not have a social order in place to facilitate or
encourage democratiation. It is possible that a social
order more conducive to facilitating democracy may
result both from further economic development and from
cultural change arising from China’s increased global
openness. Such influences, however, may take many years
to have effect. Although it is true among
already-established democracies that a high average
income contributes to political stability, the growing
number of affluent authoritarian states strongly
suggests that economic growth alone is not sufficient to
lead to democracy.
No one factor or analysis can explain why Russia and
China have not followed a path towards democratisation
similar to that of Western Europe and North America.
Russia and China share unique characteristics that led
each to adopt communism; those same characteristics,
subsequently, have impeded the transition of each
country towards a functioning liberal democracy.
References
[1]
Jeff Haynes, “Tracing Connections between Comparative
Politics and Globalisation,” Third World Quarterly 24,
no. 6 (2003), p. 1041.
[2] Alexander Nekipelov, “The Washington Consensus and
Russian Economic Policy,” International Social Science
Journal 52, no. 166 (December 2000), p. 467.
[3] Haynes, p. 1041.
[4] Grigory Yavlinsky, “Russia’s Phony Capitalism,”
Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 (1998), p. 69.
[5] ibid.
[6] Mikhail A. Molchanov, “Russia and Globalisation,”
Perspectives on Global Development & Technology 4, no.
3/4 (2005), p. 420.
[7] Linda Wong, “Market Reforms, Globalisation and
Social Justice in China,” Journal of Contemporary China
13, no. 38 (2004): 154.
[8] ibid.
[9] Molchanov, p. 421.
[10] Wong, p. 155.
[11] ibid., p. 159.
[12] Jae Ho Chung, “China’s Reforms at Twenty-five:
Challenges for the New Leadership,” China: An
International Journal 1, no. 1 (2003), p. 120.
[13] Haynes, p. 1039.
[14] V. Lapkin and V. Pantin, “Assimilation of
Democratic Institutions and Values by the Ukrainian and
Russian Masses: Preliminary Results,” Russian Social
Science Review 47, no. 3 (2006), p. 12.
[15] Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratisation,”
in SFU Custom Courseware, POL-231 Fall 2006, ed. Sandra
MacLean (Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, 2006), p.
275.
[16] Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, “Russian
Democracy Under Putin,” Problems of Post-Communism 50,
no. 4 (2003), p. 12.
[17] Michael McFaul, “Lessons from Russia’s Protracted
Transition from Communist Rule,” Political Science
Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1999), p. 104.
[18] A.V. Lukin, “The Transitional Period in Russia,”
Russian Social Science Review 41, no. 4 (July/August
2004), http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/.
[19] ibid.
[20] John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Democratising China,”
Journal of Asian & African Studies 38, no. 4/5 (2003),
p. 378.
[21] Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, “Political Liberation in the
People’s Republic of China,” East Asia: An International
Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1999), http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/.
[22] ibid.
[23] ibid.
[24] ibid.
[25] ibid.
[26] Hsieh, p. 378
[27] Mikhail V. Beliaev, “Presidential Power and
Consolidation of New Post-Communist Democracies,”
Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 3 (2006), p. 388.
[28] McFaul, p. 111.
[29] Molchanov, p. 404.
[30] Hsieh, p. 381.
[31] Beliaev, p. 388.
[32] Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, p. 12.
[33]. Hsieh, p. 385.
[34] Wong, p. 168.
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