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To What Extent was the United States Really Involved in the
Creation of Al-Qa’ida?
American intervention in the Soviet-Afghan war did not
assist in the physical creation of al-Qa’ida and the CIA
had little to do with the Arab militants, a topic much
misunderstood in contemporary debates on jihadi
terrorism. Rather, the fundamental element that can be
attributed to the creation of al-Qa’ida is Arab Muslim
financiers; including Usama bin Laden’s personal wealth.
By Adam Stahl
To date, there is no evidence pointing to American
governmental assistance in the physical establishment of
al-Qa’ida, whether financially, operationally, or
logistically. Rather, according to the US State
Department, Arab militants[1] involved in the
Soviet-Afghan War “functioned independently and had
their own sources of funding.” [2] The cornerstone of
the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) involvement in
the war was carried out by a decade-long, covert
relationship with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
Agency (ISI), and the Saudi General Intelligence
Directorate (GID). [3] The covert relationship was
initiated to assist the indigenous Afghan Mujahideen,
not the Arab militants, in defeating the Soviets on
what would be the last hot battlefield of the Cold War.
When the Arab militants began creating al-Qa’ida
in Pakistan, it was diminutive and disjointed. Further,
the group was of little consequence to the larger actors
in Afghanistan’s theatre of war. Additionally, the Arab
militants were receiving vast amounts of capital from
numerous foreign Arab Muslim sponsors. As such, there
was no reason to suspect that the CIA would support, let
alone benefit from, such an embryonic and disorganized
group.
Limiting the expansion of communism was always a
priority for the US government though other factors
caused the CIA to become involved in the Soviet-Afghan
War. Ultimately, these misunderstandings helped lead to
calamitous events. Yet, the most formidable consequence
to rise from the ashes of war was the formation al-Qa’ida.
CIA Intervention
Shortly after the Soviets crossed the border into
Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979, a plan was devised
that allowed US aid to be transferred to Pakistan’s ISI
and from there funneled to the Afghan Mujahideen. This
covert relationship became the primary mechanism by
which Americans funded the Afghan resistance. In the
beginning, the amount of aid was petty ($500,000) when
compared with the increase in aid within a 5-year
period; further, the aid was wholly indirect.[4] The CIA
preferred it this way, giving the agency “plausible
deniability”. The CIA eventually became directly
involved with the Afghans by the mid-1980s.[5] Though
direct contact was limited, given the CIA’s crucial
relationship with Pakistani intelligence, it was a
relationship the Americans could not afford to
jeopardize. Pakistan’s General Zia ul Haq demanded that
all American assistance be channeled through the Afghan
Bureau of the ISI.[6] The methods devised by the
Pakistanis ensured that the only destination for
American aid was the Afghan Mujahideen. According to
Burke, “It is often said that bin Laden was funded by
the CIA. This is not true and, indeed, would have been
impossible given the structure of funding that General
Zia ul-Haq, who had taken power in 1979, had set up.”[7]
In the beginning, US President Jimmy Carter agreed to
CIA covert action in an attempt to “harass” the Soviets,
not to cause a military withdrawal. Harassment was taken
to a new level under Reagan with the introduction of the
National Security Directive (NSD) 166. NSD 166
introduced, inter alia, “long-range sniper
rifles, wire-guided antitank missiles” and the US-made
Stinger anti-aircraft in 1986.[8] As former ISI-Afghan
Bureau Brigadier Yousaf noted, “… nothing moves, in
peace and war, without money. The Mujahideen could
achieve nothing without financial support … cash to arm,
train, and move my forces.”[9] The structure of
contributors and the destination of capital have been
illustrated by Yousaf; his “Money Flow” shows no capital
going towards Arab militants.[10]
The Arab Militants
Concurrent to CIA covert action for the Mujahideen was
the influx of the Arab militants, including Usama bin
Laden. Aside from religion, the key commonality between
Arabs and the Afghan Mujahideen was the desire to oust
the invading Soviets. The Afghan Mujahideen were the
main fighters, numbering approximately 150,000 to
200,000. They were physically trained by the ISI and
funded by the CIA and Saudi government, as well as
non-governmental sources. The Saudi GID would eventually
match the CIA for every dollar it spent on the war.
According to Cole, the Mujahideen often complained that
the Arabs were a hindrance, poor fighters, and showboats
that came for the glory of jihad and promises of
paradise. Moreover, there were only a few hundred Arab
militants fighting in the jihad at any given point and
participation in military operations was “negligible”.
In fact, Anas has stated that in 1984 there were only
“thirteen Arab Mujahideen”. That number increased to
around 3,000 to 5,000 by 1989 but only 10% were on the
battlefields.[11] Moreover, when al-Qa’ida was
formed on 10 September 1988, there were only 15
“brothers”.[12] Their financing came from mosques,
non-governmental organizations, charities, and private
sponsors from overseas.[13]
It should be noted that the CIA was aware of the growth
of the Arab jihadists and even “looked favorably” on the
ongoing recruitment, given that the goal was one in the
same: to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. According
to one State Department official, the Americans should
not “see them as the enemy.”[14] Aside from this
favorable view, the CIA did not partake in any
operations with the Arab militants. Concomitantly, the
CIA and the ISI did not hinder their recruitment
activities either. As such, Pakistan was excellent
peripheral territory for the Arab militants to freely
organize. It was on Pakistani territory that the seeds
of al-Qa’ida were planted. Dr Abdullah Azzam, one
of bin Laden’s mentors, founded the “Brigades of
Strangers”, a small band of Arabs that made their new
home close to the Khyber Pass.[15] By 1984 this brigade
was molded by Azzam, bin Laden, and Anas into the
Makhtab al-Khidmat (MAK or The Office of Services).
It was structured to be a type of Da’wa center
and not a militant organization.[16] The goal of the
organization was to provide aid and faith for the
Mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan and to coordinate the
Arab volunteers coming to participate in the jihad.
According to Azzam, “We came to serve these people,
that’s why it’s called the Office of Services.”[17]
Financing the Arab Militants
By 1986, foreign Arab sponsors were sending exorbitant
amounts of capital into Arab organizations in Pakistan
for Arab fighters.
According to Bearden, the overseas donations totaled up
to $25 million per month ($300 million per year).[18]
The money derived from private Saudi and other Arab
sponsors. According to Coll and Burke, the Saudi Red
Crescent, the International Islamic Relief Organization
the Muslim World League, and the Kuwaiti Red Crescent,
all set up offices in Peshawar and financially supported
the Arabs.[19] Additionally, one FBI report “describes
bin Laden’s use of ‘the Golden Chain’, an informal
financial network of prominent Saudi and Gulf
individuals originally. US officials state that this
network collected funds and funneled them to Arab
fighters in Afghanistan.”[20] According to the 9/11
Commission Report, “Donations flowed through charities
or other NGOs. Bin Ladin and the ‘Afghan Arabs’ drew
largely on funds raised by this network, whose agents
roamed world markets to buy arms and supplies for the
mujahideen …”[21] Further, according to one 2002 CFR
report, “Saudi nationals and charities were previously
the most important sources of funds for the mujahideen
…”[22]
Azzam was successful in raising large sums of money
overseas and bin Laden had his own personal wealth
estimated to be around $20 million.[23] According
to Ismail, bin Laden was “one of the main financers of
the Services Office”.[24] Bin Laden was able to not only
finance the MAK but he was also able to utilize his
family’s construction company, the Saudi Binladen Group,
to import bulldozers and other machinery to aid Saudi
and Pakistani intelligence in building up infrastructure
that could withstand the Soviet Special Forces,
Spetsnaz. Bin Laden would also use the machinery to
assist in building his first base and his own personal
capital to fund new recruits. Cole states, “Azzam
announced that bin Laden would pay the expenses-about
$300 per month-of any Arab who wanted to fight on
Afghanistan’s battlefields.”[25] Additionally, Azzam
traveled to the United States in a bid to raise funds
for the jihad. This became an annual trip, most likely
due to its success. “The efforts made by Azzam … were
also paying off. Branches of the MAK had even been
opened in Brooklyn, New York.”[26] Azzam also traveled
from “Kansas City, St. Louis, Dallas, all over the
heartland and the major cities as well looking for money
and recruits …”[27]
An ideological split between Azzam and bin Laden began
to form once bin Laden’s idea of the MAK expanded. Bin
Laden disagreed and shortly thereafter opened up his
first training camp, the “Lion’s Den”, in the Afghan
border town of Jaji.[28] It was in Jaji that bin Laden
received his holy warrior status, though only being
wounded in the foot. As Bergen notes, this is when bin
Laden went from “donor to holy warrior”.[29] He would
cease his personal aid to the MAK. Within a year, 15 men
formed al-Qa’ida with money received from overseas
donors and sponsors, not from the CIA covert operations.
By the war’s end, the CIA spent approximately $2 billion
in cash and weaponry in order to assist the Afghan
mujahideen in driving out Soviet forces.[30] No American
assistance was spent on Arab militants. According to
Sageman, “They had their own sources of money and …
contacts with the Pakistanis, official Saudis, and other
Muslim supporters” and, in any fact, they “did not
participate in any significant fighting."[31] The
creation of al-Qa’ida was made possible by Muslim
and Arab donations. According to al-Suri, “It is a big
lie that Afghan Arabs were formed with the backing of
the CIA ...”[32] Additionally, al-Zawahiri, has stated
“The truth that everyone should learn is that the United
States did not give one penny in aid to the [Arab]
Mujahideen.”[33]
This is not to purport that American action did not
indirectly influence al-Qa'ida's post-war
organizational and ideological abilities; in fact, it
did influence the organization. Insofar as American
assistance in creating al-Qa’ida, there is no evidence
to show that CIA funds were designated for anything
other than the Afghan Mujahideen. As Sageman expresses,
“The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Arab backing for
the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ and bin Laden's own decisions
‘created’ Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, not the United
States.”[34]
References
[1]“Afghan Arabs” and “Arab militant” will be used
interchangeably.
[2] “Did the United States ‘Create’ Osama Bin Laden?” US
Department of State. International Information Programs.
14 January 2005. <http://usinfo.state.gov/media/Archive/2005/Jan/24-318760.html>
[3]The 9/11 Commission Report. Staff Statement. 2004
[4]Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars. 2004
[5]Coll, Steve. ‘Anatomy of a Victory’. Washington Post
Archives, 1989.
[6]Burke, Jason The True Story of Radical Islam. 2004
[7]Ibid
[8]Coll, Steve. ‘Anatomy of a Victory’. Washington Post
Archives, 1989.
[9]Yousaf, Mohammad and Adkin Mark. The Bear Trap. 1992
[10]Ibid
[11]Bergen, Peter. The Osama Bin Laden I know: An Oral
History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. 2006.
[12]Ibid.
[13]“CRS Report for Congress: Saudi Arabia: Terrorist
Financing Issues.” 14 September 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32499.pdf
[14]Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars. 2004
[15]Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower. 2006
[16]It should be noted that Azzam was one of many
important influences in bin Laden’s life. Others include
Muhammad Qutb, brother of the radical Egyptian Islamist
Sayyid Qutb. Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri would play a much
greater role in bin Laden’s life by 1989, after al-Qa’ida
was formed.
[17]Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars. 2004
[18]Ibid
[19]Ibid
[20]Congressional Research Service “CRS Report for
Congress: Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues.” 14
September 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32499.pdf
[21]9/11 Commission Report. Chapter 2. 2004
[22]Congressional Research Service. “CRS Report for
Congress: Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues.” 14
September 2007. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32499.pdf
[23]Bergen, Peter. The Osama Bin Laden I know: An Oral
History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. 2006.
[24]Ibid
[25]Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars. 2004
[26]Burke, Jason The True Story of Radical Islam. 2004
[27]Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower. 2006
[28]Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars. 2004
[29]Bergen, Peter. The Osama Bin Laden I know: An Oral
History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. 2006.
[30]Coll, Steve. ‘Anatomy of a Victory’. Washington Post
Archives, 1989.
[31]Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Network. 2004
[32]Bergen, Peter. The Osama Bin Laden I know: An Oral
History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. 2006.
[33]Al-Zawahiri in Bergen, Peter. The Osama Bin Laden I
know: An Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. 2006.
[34]Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Network. 2004
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