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In or out? The UK and the EU
Following the recent Reform Treaty agreed in Lisbon,
some have argued that the UK should be given a special
status within the EU. Should the UK really leave the EU
(or be asked to leave), or should we consider the
concept of a Core Europe?
By Dexter Thillien
Calls
for the UK to leave the EU, or to gain a special status
within it, are usually made by the British eurosceptic
press once a new EU Treaty is agreed. However, after the
latest Reform Treaty, some personalities such as Valery
Giscard d’Estaing jumped on the same bandwagon, arguing
that the UK had shown it did not want more integration
by opting out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
the articles dealing with criminal justice (the famous
British government’s red lines) and called for Britain
to be given a particular status within the union. [1]
So is it the time for the UK finally to make its mind
and choose whether it wants to be in or out? To answer
this question, this article will first look at the
complex relationship between the UK and the EU, what
exactly does Britain want out of its membership, and
finally if the idea of a “Core Europe” might not be a
solution for the future of the EU as well as the role of
the UK within it.
A complex relationship
The UK and Europe have always had a complex
relationship, encompassed by the newspaper headline “Fog
over Channel, Continent isolated”. After the Second
World War, and despite Winston Churchill’s plea for a
united Europe in his 1946 speech in Zurich where he
argued for a “kind of United States of Europe” [2], the
UK was always sceptical about European integration. In
the 1950s the Labour government of Clement Attlee did
not join the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as
the Community’s principles went against its manifesto of
nationalisations, leading Labour Minister Herbert
Morrison to say that the Durham miners wouldn’t wear it.
The UK did participate in the Messina conference in
1955, but chose not to sign the Treaty of Rome and join
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, focusing
instead on a looser free trade agreement which would
become the European Free Trade Association in 1960.
However, a year later, the lack of progress of the
organisation would lead Prime Minister MacMillan to ask
for membership of the EEC, but he would fall upon a
stumbling block called General Charles de Gaulle. The
French President wasn’t keen on the British joining the
Union as it believed them to be a Trojan horse for US
interests, and that too many concessions would have to
be given, especially in relation to agriculture; of
course it can also be argued that De Gaulle wasn’t keen
to see French leadership in Europe challenged.
The UK thus failed on both its attempts to join the
common market in the 1960s due to de Gaulle’s
intransigence. It was only when Georges Pompidou
succeeded him that the UK finally had a chance of
accession. The new French president believed that the
British position on intergovernmentalism – the belief
that, put simply, states should drive the EU, not vice
versa – was closer to his than the Germans’ more
federalist view.
In, but uncomfortable
Britain officially became a member of the EEC in 1973.
It is worth noting that it was during the 1970s that the
British public voted directly on a European issue,
voting yes with a two-thirds majority to remain in the
Common Market in 1975; it remains the only time to date.
1979 marked a new watershed in the British relationship
with the EU, with Margaret Thatcher becoming Prime
Minister. The ambivalence over being a key or a
part-time member of the EU returned. On the one hand,
Thatcher asked for her money back in a long debate about
the British rebate (which lasted almost 5 years) and
also made her famous Bruges speech where she said
Britain had not successfully rolled back the frontiers
of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a
European level, with a European super¬state exercising a
new dominance from Brussels.
On the other hand, she was more than happy to back the
Single European Act as it followed her economically
liberal instincts; this ambivalence is still with us
now.
In the 1990s, Britain ratified the Maastricht Treaty –
but stayed out of the Euro, the Schengen agreement, and,
at first, the social chapter (until Tony Blair ratified
it in 1997).
The last stage of this ambivalence is exemplified in
debate over the recent Reform Treaty, where the UK has
opted out the Charter of Fundamental Rights and articles
relating to criminal justice – the UK Government’s ‘red
lines’.
So we see in the history between the UK and the EU
ambivalence over whether or not to support the project,
with Britain following its national interests on each
occasion. This has meant supporting enlargement and
anything to do with economics and the market, but
tending to refuse any political or social integration.
So what does the UK want from European integration?
What the UK wants from its membership
Britain has always used its membership to further its
national interests. This is why Britain has always been
a proponent of enlargement, with the concomitant
expansion of the single market, and any strategies
putting the market first, such as the Single European
Act or the Lisbon Agenda.
However, any policies dealing with further political or
social integration have always been regarded with some
scepticism, the latest obviously being the refusal to
sign the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the recent
Lisbon Treaty.
This has caused some anger in the rest of Europe,
especially in France where most commentators agree that
the EU is already British. For instance, French
commentator Nicolas Baverez argues that the EU is more
British than French as intergovernmentalism,
enlargement, the primacy of economics and the market,
and the lack of common policies have been the paradigm
in recent years [3]. And to that must also be added the
different policies the UK has opted out of, such as the
Euro or Schengen.
Furthermore, two recent speeches by French President
Nicolas Sarkozy [4] and British Foreign Secretary David
Miliband [5] have highlighted the divergence in the
visions of the long-term future of Europe. In the
short-term, both agree on the need for a European
defence force and the leading role the EU has to play in
the fight against climate change.
However, Sarkozy sees the EU as a political project and
an ideal that must be given moral values. Miliband, on
the other hand, argues for the EU as a “Model Power”
based on the four pillars of openness, the power of
shared institutions, the EU being the external champion
of international law and human rights, and the idea of
an Environmental Union, as well (and perhaps more
importantly) as the creation of a free trade area at the
periphery of the EU admitting Russia, the Middle East
and Africa. As the Europe analyst Jolyon Howorth pointed
out, it is a battle between a political project and a
global technocratic one. [6]
Double visions of the European project
However, could it be argued that the emphasis put on
economic success means the UK is practical rather than
idealistic? It can be argued that the choice of economic
primacy is because it has proven to work in the past. As
the British can be considered more pragmatic than some
of their ideological European counterparts, this may be
a proof that a workable political union is what is
needed. This is similar to the early years of the EEC
when the British government at first dismissed the
union, arguing it would never work, before asking to
join.
The UK is thus seeing the EU as purely economic, to
enhance free trade in the world as well as other liberal
political values such as human rights. But it doesn’t
believe in the need for more politics inside the EU (as
seen by the refusal of more Qualified Majority Voting
for instance). But as other nations (such as France)
explicitly disagree with such a vision, isn’t it time to
start seriously talking about the idea of a “Core
Europe”, which could be a solution to the two opposite
views?
Could a “Core Europe” be a solution?
The concept of a ‘Core Europe’ has been around for a
while, though under some different names like flexible,
two-speed, or multi-level. They all represent the same
thing, that is that some of the EU members (but not all)
would join together in a number of areas, with the
others being given the option to join the core at a
later date, or to stay out altogether. The new Reform
Treaty allows it under the name “enhanced co-operation”
with a minimum of nine members needed.
However, it has usually meant something negative, as in
there would be a two-class Europe where the ones not
joining at first would be left behind. A recent speech
by Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker
reinforced that view when he mentioned the idea of
part-time membership [7].
Nevertheless, I argue it is time to make the concept a
positive one.
It is not a matter of countries being left behind, but
of countries going forward in some areas. It might not
always work but isn’t it better for some to try and fail
than for everybody to wander and do nothing? It has
always been the way the EU has worked, with first six
nations getting together, then nine, then 10, 12, 15, 25
and now 27 in tow, so Europe has always been a core
historically.
Moreover, doesn’t the current EU already show a Core
Europe? Not everyone has joined the Euro, not everyone
has joined the Schengen agreement, the UK and Poland
have both opted out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
in the latest Reform Treaty (still to be fully
ratified), and only four members have so far joined the
European Defence Initiative.
The EU has always been a core, and is still a core
Europe now, so it is time for European nations to move
forward and finally accept the current reality, as
unanimity with 27 members is going to be remote on a
growing number of issues.
Conclusion
The UK is a part of the EU, and it has been for almost
35 years. Even though it has sometimes only grudgingly
(or even not at all) accepted some of the policies, it
remains one of the three biggest members (with France
and Germany) with influence over other nations.
So the idea of Britain having a particular status (as
argued by former French president Valery Giscard
d’Estaing) on the back of recent opt outs in the Reform
Treaty would be more a knee-jerk reaction than anything.
A core Europe is a solution in my view, but what the UK
shouldn’t do is refuse any forward movement, because
then it could find itself in a minority of one.
References
[1] Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Interview with France
Inter (29 June 2007).
[2] Winston Churchill, Speech in Zurich: Tragedy of
Europe (19 September 1946.
[3] Nicolas Baverez, Nouveau Monde, Vieille France
(Paris, Librairie Academique Perrin, Collection
Tempus, 2006), p. 320.
[4] Nicolas Sarkozy, Discours devant le Parlement
Europeen (13 November 2007),http://www.elysee.fr/documents/index.php?mode=cview&press_id=655&cat_id=7&lang=fr
[5] David Miliband, Europe 2030: Model Power not
Superpower (15 November 2007),http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a
=KArticle&aid=1194715986447
[6] Jolyon Howorth, France, Britain and the Future of
Europe: The Gathering Storm? (24 November 2007),
http://www.telos-eu.com/en/article/france_britain_and_the_future_of_europe_the_gath
[7] Peter Sain Iey Berry, Part EU Membership: A
recipe for an untidy rabble. (9 November 2007),
http://euobserver.com/9/25113/?rk=1
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