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Malaysian Foreign Policy in the post 9/11 era: Moderate
Islam as a base with pragmatism
Malaysia has always placed Islam at the centre of its
foreign policy. In the post September 11 era, its
foreign policy focus continued with this line, and was
neither pro- nor-anti American. This article examines
the fine line it took.
By Jiesheng Li
Malaysia is far from a Muslim country. [1] It is a
multi-racial and -religious society. 60pc of the
population is Muslim or Malay indigenous tribes, while
Chinese and Indians make up another 30pc. [2] Yet Islam
has been at the forefront of Malaysian foreign policy
since the 1960s, where in the early days after
independence it was used to foster Malaysian Identity
and countering the threat of Communism. [3]
Even after 9/11, where the Muslim world was viewed from
a different light, Islamic matters were still much of a
major concern in Malaysia. They approached matters such
as Islamic terrorism and extremism with a practical
stance while keeping Islamic ideas in mind.
Malaysian reaction to the Global War on Terror
In
the early aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
Malaysia seemed to be toeing the US line. In the UN
General Assembly session of 2 October 2001, Malaysia
stated that it “condemn[ed] terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations.” [4] It also ratified the
International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings. [5]
However, it was pursuing its own security rather than
being an unquestioning US ally. Internally and
externally, it faced the threat of radical groups such
as the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), which desired to
overthrow the government and create an Islamic state.
[6]
Others radicals like ex-army Captain Yazid Sufaat and
Colonel Abdul Manaf Kasmuri were arrested to prevent
terrorist attacks and the igniting of racial tensions.
[7] Such actions would be mirrored in neighbouring ASEAN
countries, all to curb the threat of Islamic
fundamentalism.
Another area in which Malaysia seemed to be supporting
the ‘war against terror’ was the joint decision with
Singapore and Indonesia to increase patrolling of the
Malacca Straits. [8] A closer look showed that Malaysia
opposed the inclusion of US forces as then proposed by
Admiral Fargo and Singapore initially. [9]
The Islamic factor can be seen here as the entry of
western forces would infuriate radical Muslims and the
dominant Muslim population in the region. Malaysia
understood this not just for the issue of sovereignty
but also because of the expected Muslim reaction,
especially after the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq,
which the US did not deeply identify. [10]
Malaysia also strongly condemned the neo-conservative
ideology of “regime change”, seeing the Iraq invasion
(and to a lesser extent Afghanistan) as an encroachment
on Muslim sovereignty and identity. [11] Malaysia’s
view, however harsh, was based on pragmatism. To support
the US overly strongly was to invite more radical
Islamic groups; at the same time, international events
pulled the foreign policy another way.
The reality: Islamic threats and the foreign policy
focus
As
noted earlier, Islamic extremists were a major concern
to Malaysian government, even before September 11.
Regionally, Malaysia was a concern with ethnic strife
between the Thai government and the Muslims in Southern
Thailand. [12]
While the conflict was largely a local nationalist-like
one, Malaysia was concerned with groups like the Gerakan
Mujahideen Islam Pattani. GMIP is linked to the KMM and
another Malaysian political party, Parti Islam Se
Malaysia (PAS), which would increase the spread of
Islamic extremism through the country. [13]
At
the same time, Malaysia was concerned with the treatment
of Thai Muslims by the Thai army. In 2004, Malaysia
launched the Joint Development Strategy, providing
economic aid to the Muslims, thus reflecting concern for
fellow Muslims. [14] Simultaneously, this plan and
others hoped to stabilise the situation and prevent
growth of Islamic fundamentalism.
Watching the Philippines
A
second country that Malaysian foreign policy was focused
on was the Philippines, where again conflict was between
Muslims and the government. Just like in Thailand,
Malaysia was concerned with Muslims who had been
oppressed by government policies since World War Two.
[15]
An
even greater concern was the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group, which, like the
KMM, plans for a greater Islamic state in South East
Asia. [16] Malaysia has responded by acting as the
mediator between the Philippine government and the MILF,
again aiming not to support the ‘war on terror’, but to
aid fellow Muslims and push the threat of Islamic
fundamentalism way from its borders.
Malaysia continued to increase its anti-terrorism
efforts with the detention of suspect B.S.A. Tahir and
the creation of the South East Asia Regional Centre for
Counter-Terrorism in 2003. [17] Its efforts in the
Philippines and counter-terrorism were thus praised by
then US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. [18]
However, it should be noted that Malaysia was combating
Islamic terrorism from a different perspective, by
addressing its own concerns and that of Muslim world.
This would also be seen in its relations with the
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and other
Muslim countries.
Malaysia, the OIC and other Muslim countries
Malaysia was a founding member of the OIC and held the
Chair for three years from 2003. [19] During this
period, Malaysia attempted to improve the image of the
Muslim world, especially given the negative perceptions
after September 11.
On
the educational front, Malaysia has continued to support
the private institution The International Islamic
University of Malaysia which aims to promote “the
University as a centre of higher education which
provides integrated and comprehensive education for the
Muslim Ummah.” [20]
Far
from being a school like a Madrasah, this institute was
created to bolster the level of education through out
the Muslim world. Malaysia’s commitment to fostering
Islamic unity worldwide came through the formation of
the International Institute of Muslim Unity within the
University. [21] This was furthered by Malaysia’s
commitment in hosting an OIC anti-corruption summit in
2006 and proposing the creation of an OIC Tourism and
Cultural Centre.
Malaysia the moderator
Malaysia’s actions were to change the international
perception of Muslims worldwide and indirectly help to
steer Muslims away from joining extremists or terrorist
groups. Prime Minister Abdullah Bandai once noted that
“the
OIC must also address, in a concerted manner, the
increasing prejudice against Muslims world-wide and the
growing schism between the Muslim and the western
world”. [22] Malaysia’s efforts in the post September 11
era were to mend the rift between these two groups so as
to prevent further fuel for terrorist groups.
Ties between Malaysia and other Muslim states remain
strong due to the common flag of Islam. Just like its
efforts within the OIC, Malaysia has helped other
countries economically, such as Yemen by improving its
vocational institutions. [23]
On
the political front, it has stood with many other Muslim
countries by recognising the Palestinian Authority in
1981 and hosting a UN-sponsored Conference on Palestine
in 1983. [24] In 2005, Prime Minister Badawi called for
an increase in aid to Palestine, but later stated that
the aid was for the Palestinian people and not the Hamas
group. [25]
This again shows Malaysia’s concern for other Islamic
populations and its stance against the support and
growth of Islamic militancy. Malaysian foreign policy
with regards to terrorism was looking at the problem at
another, deeper level: at the “root”, as former Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad placed it, unlike the actions
of the Bush Administration, and to a lesser extent,
other western nations.[26]
However, has there been any change in the policy with
his successor? It is to this we now turn.
From Mahathir to Badawi: Islam in Malaysia’s foreign
policy
The two Malaysian leaders in the aftermath of September
11 attacks were Tun Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad and Dato’
Seri Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi. Mahathir had long
entrenched Islam in the country’s foreign policy, having
played an active role in the resolution to the Iran-Iraq
war and sanctioning a “Palestine Week” in 1987. [27]
He
is also more in line with an anti-western stance as
indicated in his policies and speeches. He directly
noted that that terrorism was an “[act] of violence
consciously committed against civilians by any actor,
including states”, branding Israel as one such actor and
thus causing opposition from the US. [28] In a more
vehement tone, he criticised the US invasion of Iraq and
called British pilots “murderers”, causing a British
envoy to walk out. [29]
Even with his fiery tone, Mahathir recognised one of the
key factors in addressing the threat of Al-Qaeda lay in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which
contributes to the “bitterness and anger” which Al-Qaeda
exploits.[30] It was also his administration that made
the efforts to strengthen the Muslim World and root out
Islamic extremism. Mahathir had thus set the base of a
realistic Islamic-oriented foreign policy.
New style, same substance
His successor’s character is vastly different. Abdullah
Badawi is a graduate of Islamic studies and considered
to be a moderate by many. [31] With regards to foreign
relations, he has not mentioned or shown any
anti-western policies. On the contrary, he has forged
closer links with the US and once promised to send a
team to help rebuild Iraq, a decision never made by his
predecessor. [32]
Yet their differing styles and character showed little
change in their foreign policy. Badawi continued to
follow the same line as Mahathir. As Baker noted, there
is the continued criticism and cooperation between
Malaysia and the US, except without the edge that was
evident during Mahathir’s watch. [33]
While expressing stronger relations with major players
like the US, Badawi has continued an independent
Malaysian foreign policy and has even frequently called
the US to listen to Malaysia, the OIC, and the
Non-Aligned Movement on Iraq and Palestine. [34] As
Badawi remarked, “There
is a
difference in the way that Dr. Mahathir and I say
something…but
the substance is the same.., such as [on] Iraq and
Palestine”. [35]
Badawi has in fact set the idea of Islam Hadhari, or
“Civilizational Islam” for Malaysia and the wider Muslim
world, which encompasses eight major tenets that propose
the fundamentals of Islamic faith. [36] Yet it is a
modern progressive idea that emphasises “the
importance of progress —with an Islamic perspective — in
the economic, social, and political fields”, especially
including points such as diversity and tolerance. [37]
Having proposed the idea internationally, Islam Hadhari can be said
to be another effort to steer the Muslim mindset back on
track. The concept, just like Malaysia’s anti-terror
efforts, was praised by US Under-Secretary of State
Karen Hughes as an example for other Muslim nations to
follow. [38]
Islam Hadhari however is considered to be highly political and
polarised, and has been said to be less influential in
other Muslim countries and communities. [39] More
importantly, it is an effort to curb the external
influence of Islamic extremists and the support of
parties such as KMM and PAS. [40] Malaysian foreign
policy, whether under Mahathir or Badawi, would always
continue to be Islam oriented, not espousing
conservative views, but having a moderate and realistic
base.
Turning back the tide of extremism
Malaysia in the post September 11 era was hardly totally
pro- or anti-American. Malaysia was fighting terrorism,
not to gain any favour, but to turn back a wave of
Islamic extremism. As it took anti-terrorist measures
regionally and internationally, its foreign policy was
pragmatic, taking into account the mindsets of Muslims.
It also sought to improve Muslims and the image of Muslims, not by
promoting conservative ideologies, but progressive and
beneficial means, indirectly pushing back the tide of
Islamic extremism. Malaysian foreign policy will
definitely continue to place Islam as a forefront of its
foreign policy, and should continue to take a moderate
stance.
References
[1]
See Nesadurai, Helen E.S., Malaysia and the United
States Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement, S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, December
2004, pp 6-7
[2] See Section on Ethic Groups, the World Factbook,
Central Intelligence Agency, 16 August 2007
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html#People
[accessed 04 September 2007]
[3] Liow, Joseph, Personality, Exigencies and
Contingencies: Determinants of Malaysia’s Foreign Policy
in the Mahathir Administration in Ho, Kai Leong (et al)
Mahathir's Administration: Performance and Crisis in
Governance, Times Academic Press, Singapore (Mar 2002),
pp 123-124.
[4] United Nations General Assembly Fifty Sixth Session,
14th Plenary Meeting, Measures to eliminate
International Terrorism, October 2001,
http://www.un.org/spanish/
aboutun/organs/ga/56/verbatim/a56pv14.pdf.
[accessed 15 July 2007]
[5] Patterns of Global Terrorism, East Asia overview,
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, United
States State Department, 30 April 2003
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19983.htm
[accessed 15 July 2007]
[6] Mak, JN, Malaysian Defence and Security Cooperation:
Coming out in Out of the Closet in See Seng Tan and
Amitav Acharya (eds), Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation,
National Interests and Regional Order, 2004, New York
and London, ME. Sharpe, pp 127-153
[7] Abuza, Zacary, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,
NBR analysis, Volume 4, number 5, December 2003
http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol14no5.pdf
[accessed 15 July 2007]
[8] See Maritime Security in the Malacca Straits,
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/apr/30apr04_nr.html
See also Launch of Eyes in the Sky (EiS) Initiative
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/sep/13sep05_nr.html,
Singapore Ministry of Defence
[accessed 15 July 2007]
[9] Fargo, Thomas, Admiral, Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, 31 March 2004 http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml
See also Nesadurai, 2004, op cit, p. 19
[10] Ross, Marc Howard, The Political Psychology of
Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond, Social
Science Research Council/ After Sept. 11
http://ssrc.org/sept11/essays/ross.htm
[accessed 18 February 2007]
[11] Nesadurai, 2004, op cit, p. 18
[12] James Wong Wing On, Malaysia’s trouble from the
North, Malaysiakini.com, 5 May 2004
[13] Peter Chalk, The Indigenous Nature of the Thai
Insurgency, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4 Issue 1, 12
January 2006
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369865
[Accessed 15 July 2007]
See also Daniel J. Pojar, Jr., Lesson not learned: The
rekindling of Thailand’s Pattani Problem, Naval
Postgraduate School, March 2005
[14] Thailand, Malaysia plan action to curb unrest in
border areas, Asia Economic News, August 9 2004 http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2004_August_9/ai_n6269471
[Accessed 15 July 2007]
[15] Syed Serajul Islam, The Politics of Islamic
Identity in Southeast Asia, Thomson Learning Asia; 1
edition, 2004, pg 32
[16] See group profile, Abu Sayyaf Group, MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge base, May 17 2007
http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=204
[accessed 08 September 2007]
[17] Nesadurai, 2004, op cit, p. 20
[18] Syed Hamid Albar, Speech at the official launching
of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for
Counter-Terrorism, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 1 July 2003 in
Nesadurai, 2004, ibid
[19] Nesadurai, 2004, op cit, p. 6
[20] Vision, International Islamic University Malaysia
http://www.iium.edu.my/about/mission.shtml
[Accessed 15 July 2007]
[21] See section on Mission, International Islamic
University of Malaysia
http://www.iiu.edu.my/iimu/mission.php
[Accessed 15 July 2007]
[22] Dato' Seri Abdullah Bin Haji Ahmad Badawi,
Malaysian Foreign Policy In The Era Of Globalisation,
Conference Of Malaysian Heads Of Mission
At The Putrajaya Convention Centre,5 July 2004
http://www.pmo.gov.my/WebNotesApp/PMMain.nsf/hv_PMKiniSemasaNew
/01DF0D8D2BBC883C48256EC80033E387
[Accessed 15 July 2007]
[23] Yemen, Malaysia hold talks on technical &
vocational education, Organisation of Asia-Pacific News
Agencies, 21 May 2006
[24] Liow, Joseph, 2001 in Ho, Kai Leong (et al), op
cit, p. 136
[25] Abdullah Badawi, Chairman of NAM, Speech On The
Occasion of the Commemoration of The International Day
Of The International Day Of Solidarity With the
Palestinian People, , 29 November 2005, http://www.kln.gov.my/?m_id=25&vid=98
[accessed 04 September 2007]
See also 'Aid is for Palestinian folk, not the
Government', New Sunday Times, 28 May 2006
[26] See Dr Mahathir's interview in Beijing, Business
Week Online, 16 November 2004.
http://www.malaysia-today.net/Blog-e/2004/11/dr-mahathirs-interview-in-beijing.htm
[accessed 04 September 2007]
[27] Liow, Joseph in Ho, Kai Leong (et al), op cit, p.
145
[28] Mahathir Mohamad, Speech to Extraordinary Session
of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on
Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, 1 April 2002 in Nesadurai,
2004, op cit, p. 17
[29] Nesadurai, 2004, op cit, p 18. and Envoy's anger
over Iraq slur, Daily Mail, London, 10 September 2005
[30] Mahathir, 2002, op cit
[31] See Profile: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, BBC News, 21
October 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2064535.stm
[accessed 08 September 2007]
[32] President Bush Welcomes Malaysian Prime Minister to
White House, White House News
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040719-10.html#
[accessed 08 September 2007]
[33] Baker, Richard W., US-Southeast Asia Relations:
Pausing for Politics, Comparative Connections 6 (2),
2004 pp.67-77 in Nesadurai, 2004, op cit, p.1
[34] Dengar kata NAM, OIC (Listen to NAM, OIC), Berita
Harian, 4 November 2004 in Nesadurai, op cit, p.25
[35] Padmanabhan, Mukund, Malaysia keen on projecting
moderate face of Islam, The Hindu, 23 July 2004
http://www.hindu.com/2004/07/23/stories/2004072308621100.htm
[accessed 04 September 2007]
[36] Dato’ Seri Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi, Islam Hadhari
and Good governance, Victoria University, New Zealand 31
March 2005
http://www.pmo.gov.my/WebNotesApp/PMMain.nsf/
0/d33361f0890dd06548256fe700190019?OpenDocument
[accessed 08 September 2007]
[37] Mohamed Sharif Bashir, Islam Hadhari: Concept and
Prospect, IslamOnline.net, 03 March 2005
http://www.islam.gov.my/islamhadhari/concept.html
[accessed 08 September 2007]
[38] Lau, Leslie, Malaysia the way to go for Iraq, says
US image czar, Straits Times, 26 October 2005
[39] Gatsiounis, Ioannis, Islam Hadhari in Malaysia,
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol.3. 16 February
2006
http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.43/pub_detail.asp
[accessed 18 September 2007]
[40] ibid
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