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Winning the War, losing the Peace in Iraq
Following the invasion of Iraq, the role of
nation-builder for the United States proved much greater
than initially anticipated. Serious security challenges
emerged. The United States responded with a series of
political measures that had a highly questionable impact
on the overall situation in Iraq.
By Rahul Sharma
In
2003, the United States managed to oust the Saddam
regime with ease. It, then, committed itself to the task
of nation-building, a task for which the world’s only
remaining superpower was ill-prepared for. The United
States abysmally failed in the realm that is most
crucial in nation-building effort – security. Without
security, any reconstruction effort is prone to fail.
Thus, the coalition forces elicited a violent response
from the very start of the occupation
[1]
and by July 2003 the resistance turned into a vicious
guerrilla war.
[2]
The violence has paralyzed the country, bringing it to
the brink of ruin and devastation. Since the start of
the U.S. occupation an estimated 650,000 Iraqis lost
their lives as a result of the war
[3],
while nearly 1.8 million Iraqi fled the country by
November 2006, according to United Nations High
Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR)
[4].
Moreover, the unbridled use of force and the rather
loose rules of engagement have translated into troops
quickly opening fire at checkpoints, roadblocks, and
during house-searches and other kinds of operations.
This is an indictment on the flawed strategy used by the
United States to allay the security situation and is
symptomatic of the mistakes made by the United States in
Iraq.
Missing the post-conflict phase
Experts have attributed the lack of readiness for the
occupation to the obstinacy of the Bush administration,
especially the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
to deploy sufficient number of troops.
[5]
Moreover, the invasion of Iraq was planned without a
strategy for guaranteeing security in the post-conflict
period.
[6].
The dominance of the Department of Defense to the
detriment of the role of the State Department meant that
expertise in dealing with post-conflict reconstruction
was lacking and the Coalition Provisional Authority was
run by Department of Defense.
[7]
Prior to the invasion the State Department had been
engaged for years in hatching plans for stabilising and
reconstructing post-conflict Iraq by involving experts,
Iraqi expatriates and looking at the political, economic
and social component of post-conflict Iraq. Conversely,
the Department of Defense had not been engaged in such
an undertaking since the end of the occupation in
Germany and Japan in 1952.
[8]
The dire security situation would have required much
higher troop levels: between 250,000 to 450,000, rather
than 130,000.
[9]
Nation-building efforts like the one in Iraq are
enterprises that heavily depend on manpower, as at the
outset the local forces may display reticence towards
carrying out public security measures.
[10]
Maintaining security is especially important given that
Iraqi society is so vast, so heavily armed and
internally divided.
[11]
Furthermore, inadequate advance planning for the use of
security forces in constabulary activities meant that
only US and British troops were responsible for ensuring
civil security immediately after the invasion.
The post-conflict situation demands a whole range of
task to be performed such as patrolling the border,
customs regulation, collecting weapons, arresting
members of radical organizations with the help of the of
police.
[12]
Constabulary forces with armoured vehicles and some
heavy weapons normally perform the latter tasks. Nations
such as Germany, France, Spain and Italy have a long
history for having police organizations with
paramilitary capabilities, which can effectively deal
with volatile civil security situations
[13]
as well as performing the aforementioned tasks.
However, these states were not included in the coalition
from the start or eventually decided to abandon – and
British lessons in Northern Ireland were not heeded.
This did little to alleviate the insecurity.
[14]
Failure of Security Sector Reform in Iraq
As
months went by petty crime became more rampant and posed
a grave security problem, overshadowing the entire
reconstruction effort. The Americans were not able to
bring theft, rape and car-jacking in Baghdad and in
other cities under control.
Consequently, the post-conflict security situation in
Iraq would have necessitated having police forces, which
maintain law and order, prevent crime as well as obtain
local intelligence.
[15]
Since the United States severely lacked police forces
for post-conflict situation, it undertook the task of
recruiting and training new Iraqi police forces.
Unfortunately, the Americans only commenced with the
recruitment process months after the invasion. This
enterprise was further marred by the lack of efficiency,
bad planning and unbelievable incompetence.
[16]
The vital resources such as cars, radios, and body
armour were short in supply and frequently meant that
the police faced criminals and terrorists who were
better armed and equipped than they.
[17]
This prevailing sense of lawlessness had a devastating
impact, as Iraqi politicians and coalition civilian
workers lost their lives,
[18]
depriving the nation-building venture of highly
important personnel.
Disbanding logic
The decision by the Americans to disband the Iraqi armed
forces and intelligence service further complicated
matters and sowed the seeds of discontent. Thus, the
Coalition Provisional Authority decided to dissolve the
Iraqi army without paying salaries and pensions and,
thereby, relinquished the chance of having 400,000
Iraqis and their families as possible partners rather
than antagonists.
[19]
For demagogues such as the Shiite cleric the Muqatda al-Sadr
these circumstances were a boon for their cause, as they
sought to recruit followers from a pool of discontented,
unemployed and destitute Iraqis. This ill-conceived
American decision had other profound implications, as
the Iraqi Army could have been used to bring security
and it would have been possible to curtail factionalism
within the Iraq.
[20]
Having disbanded the Iraqi Armed Forces, the United
States was now obliged to remain in the country at least
until an Iraqi security force was in place under the
command of a legitimate, civilian government.[21]
The Civil Mayhem
As
the occupation progressed it became abundantly clear to
the United States that by invading an ethnically diverse
country such as Iraq it had opened a Pandora’s Box.
The invasion violently unleashed sentiments that had
previously been kept in check by the authoritarian
regime of Saddam and set a chain of events in motion
that were beyond the control of the United States.
Iraq’s diverse communities became rigidly divided along
ethnic, religious and tribal lines as the occupation
continued, culminating in an orgy of violence in areas
with a mixed population. The divide between the
Sunni-Shiite became more pronounced and violent. The
sense of political exclusion felt by the Sunni
population made them turn against the occupation and
resort to violent resistance.
[22]
The majority of the bombings on the roadside, the
assassination of contractors and other means of sabotage
were largely carried out by Sunnis.
The attributes of a dirty war were in abundance, as a
small pocket of insurgents was creating sectarian strife
by killing Shiites and some government forces in return
were extracting vengeance from the Sunni community.
[23]
The Sunnis thought that if they targeted Iraqis as well
as the occupiers they might curb the emergence of a
state with the capacity to enforce laws and where the
Shiites would play a dominant role.
[24]
Sunnis still equated Iraqi identity with Sunni
peculiarities, magnified through the ‘lens of
nationalist Baathism.’
[25]
Babies, bathwater and de-Baathificaton
The Sunnis felt especially marginalised by the process
of de-Baathification. The American decision to disband
the regimes’ entire security apparatus meant that they
lost their main guardian for protection in the future.
[26]
From the point of view of Sunnis, the process of de-Baathification
was perceived as the brainchild of the Shiite-dominated
government of driving away the spirits of the past,
which included Saddam’s regime; but since Sunnis as such
became its main targets, it was perceived by many as a
‘de-Sunnification’ process.
[27]
Moreover, during the rule of Saddam’s regime Shiites
resented being dominated and kept weak by the Sunni
minority.
[28]
The assassination of Shiite clerics merely stoked the
misgivings of the Shiite religious elite and further
entrenched the opposition vis-à-vis the Baath regime
even before the invasion in 2003.
[29]
The ideological rift has been further deepened by
personalities like Muqtada Al-Sadr.
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the rising
sectarian tension has coincided with his movement’s
increased involvement in the carnage between Sunnis and
Shiites.
[30]
The attack on the Shiite shrine in Samara in February
2006 was a watershed, as the violence reached horrific
dimensions and the Sadrists, an apprehensive and
power-deprived bunch, indiscriminately sought vengeance
on alleged Baathists and Wahhabis.
[31]
Legitimacy vacuum
The highly questionable circumstances of the
American-led invasion combined with its inability to
maintain security meant the government that was
installed would inevitably be seen as illegitimate.[32]
Moreover, Iraqis had serious fears about the motivation
of the Americans. Many Iraqis asked, didn’t the
superpower invade Iraq for geopolitical reasons and rich
natural resources rather than liberating the Iraqi
people and making the country into a democracy?
In
addition, the Iraqis had particular recollections of
bygone clashes with the West during the heydays of
colonialism, while the posture of the Bush
administration vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict merely broadened the legitimacy gap.
In
order to attempt to close this gap it was crucial that
the United States did press for international
involvement, particularly from France and Germany as
well as the United Nations, in the political
administration of Iraq. This was an undertaking that the
international community as a whole, however, viewed with
reticence, as they feared that any involvement on their
part would sanction a war that was illegal and involved
unwarranted military intervention.
[33]
Democracy-cum-anarchy
Following the invasion, the Coalition Provisional
Authority, a source of profound American influence and
power in Iraq, ensured that legitimate Iraqi leaders
were installed in prominent governance functions.
[34]
Thus, CPA finally created the Iraqi Governing Council on
13 July 2003.
The initial public enthusiasm for the council proved
short-lived and it was increasingly considered to be
nothing more than a talking shop created by the
occupiers. Many of the members of the council were
chosen at the will of the CPA and the latter retained
restrictions over it that were tantamount to a veto. The
council was perceived as nothing more than an extended
arm of the CPA and its legitimacy was in tatters.
The Iraqi Governing Council was further discredited by
the fact that it included many exile Iraqis and
contested personalities in key position, particularly
Ahmed Chalabi. The Iraqi Governing Council was meant to
represent Iraqi ‘demos,’ albeit with officials who were
not elected.
[35]
Subsequently, the most effective way to create national
authority would have been elections for a transitional
government.
[36]
This was far from easy to implement for the United
States without worsening violence and polarisation in a
country with poor communication networks, unreliable
electricity and a critical security situation,
[37]
not to mention the weak administrative apparatus for
ballots and the little time allowed for political
parties to emerge.
[38]
Nevertheless, efforts were made to set up municipal and
provincial political councils throughout the country
during the first year of the post-war period, but the
lack of resources and the high level of centralisation
by the CPA compromised their progress.
[39]
The CPA failed to cultivate economic and social
development at the local level and, as a result, the
occupation foundered to ameliorate its legitimacy.
[40]
In
all, the process of de-Baathification was detrimental
for the nation-building effort of the United States and
emanated in dire consequences on many levels. The de-Baatihfication
was too broad and tended to include people who could
have been key for Iraq’s future. People who held
important positions during the Ba’ath regime as well as
those who enjoyed some legitimacy were barred from
participation in future government.[41]
Furthermore, once the United States decided to disband
the army, it had blithely squandered the chance to
include officers and soldiers alike in the new order,
imprudently pushing them into the arms of the violent
insurgency.
[42]
Thus, the predicament that pervaded was that if you were
a member Saddam’s regime you were blemished because
Saddam did not tolerate opposition, but if that was not
the case you were discredited for scant political
experience and no political constituency.
[43]
Constitutional discontent
One of the chief priorities of the United States was to
provide Iraq with a constitutional framework that would
provide a strong backbone for democratic governance and
the rights of individuals in Iraq.
[44]
However, the virtues of the constitution have been
questioned, with critics expressing trepidations that
certain provisions sowed the seeds of discontent.
[45]
The constitution suffered from the fact that important
passages, such as those concerning decentralisation and
taxation, are nebulous and leave open the possibility of
conflict.
[46]
It follows that important aspects have been left for
future legislation, with many fearing that the
Constitution is likely to reflect and entrench Shiite
dominance.
Furthermore, the unremitting opposition of Sunnis
vis-à-vis the constitution is testimony to a deep divide
running through Iraqi society. Sunnis felt that the
hastened constitutional process failed to deliver an
appropriate role in a federal Iraq while others decried
the fact they were not included in the negotiation and
any objections were largely ignored.
[47]
The Sunnis refused to sign the constitution after the
negotiations on the draft started in a forum consisting
of Shiite and Kurdish leaders rather than the
Constitutional Committee.
[47]
They also resented the loss of their dominant position
and believed they would be outnumbered in the National
Assembly.
[48]
The Bush administration was in a haste to get things
done. The Americans desperately wanted to meet the
deadline for the draft of the constitution, even if that
meant sacrificing the inclusion of certain players in
the constitutional process, as it wanted to reduce troop
levels by 2006.
[49]
Furthermore, many Iraqis reacted with consternation that
no real public debate took place that could have
achieved some sort to lasting national consensus.
[50]
The constitutional process raised expectation that could
not be easily fulfilled within the given time.
Some of the objectives of the constitution included
national unity that would deprive the insurgency of its
legitimacy and cultivate the democratic system that
granted freedoms. It was to be completed by 15 August
2005.
[51]
The constitution: a spoil of war
The Bush administration came to the belated realisation
that in the nation-building scheme in Iraq the
constitution became part of the political struggle
rather than a panacea to it. Ironically, with the
conception of a constitution the prospects for unity
became increasingly distant, fuelling a berserk security
situation rather than allaying it.
Ultimately, the political failure was a catalyst for an
already very dire security situation. Security matters
more than anything else in a nation-building effort and
is the central pillar of it. It is essential for other
aspects of a nation-building venture to work. The
inability of the United States to bring security in the
immediate aftermath of the post-war situation in Iraq
meant that the situation quickly spiralled out of
control and deteriorated with the policies that
followed, sucking Iraq into a vortex of destruction.
References
[1]
R.C. Orr, The United States as a Nation Builder,
(Washington, 2004), p. 267.
[2]
B. N. Crocker, Going it Alone, Gone Wrong. In
Robert Orr (Ed.): An American
Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, (Washington,
2004) , p. 270.
[3]
G. Burnham, R. Lafta, S, Doocy, L. Roberts, Mortality
after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional
cluster sample survey. In The Lancet, October 2006, p.
1. Retrieved 5 December, 2007 from
http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf
[4]
D. L. Byman, and Pollack, K. M., Things Fall Apart,
(Washington, 2007), p. 18.
[5]
J.Cherian, The Race for Baghdad. In The Hindu,
January 13, 2007. Retrieved from
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2007/0113racebaghdad.hm
[6]
M.E. O'Hanlon, Iraq without a Plan, (Washington,
January 2005).
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
R.C. Orr, The United States as a Nation Builder,
(Washington, 2004) , p. 265.
[9]
J. Dobbins, Learning the Lessons of Iraq, In
Fukuyama (Ed.): Nation Building. Beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan, (Baltimore, 2006) , p. 222.
[10]
Pascual, C. and Pollack, K. M., The Critical Battles:
Political Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Iraq,
In Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007, p. 9. Retrieved 10
October, 2007 from http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/summer_iraq_pascual.aspx
[11]
M. A. Flournary, Nation-Building. Lesson
Learned and Unlearned. In Fukuyama (Ed.): Nation
Building. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, (Baltimore, 2006)
, p. 92.
[12]
J. Dobbins, Learning the Lessons of Iraq,
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 223.
[13]
S. Feil, Laying the Foundation for Peace. Enhancing
Security Capabilities. In Robert Orr (Ed.): An
American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
(Washington, 2004), p. 48.
[14]
S. Feil, Laying the Foundation for Peace. Enhancing
Security Capabilities. (Washington, 2004), p. 49.
[15]
Ibid., p. 49.
[16]
F. Fukuyama, Guidelines for Future Nation-Builder,
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 235.
[17]
L. Diamond, What went Right and Wrong in Iraq,
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 2.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]Feldman,
N., What we Owe Iraq. War and Ethics of Nation
Building, (Princeton, 2004), p. 81.
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
L. Diamond, What went Right and Wrong in Iraq,
(Baltimore, 2006) , p. 174.
[24]
International Crisis Group. The Next Iraqi War?
Sectarianism and Civil Conflict Middle East Report N°52
February 2006.
[25]
N. Feldman, What we Owe Iraq. War and Ethics of Nation
Building, (Princeton, 2004), p. 43.
[26]
Ibid., p. 46.
[27]
International Crisis Group, The Next Iraqi War?
Sectarianism and Civil Conflict
Middle East Report N°52, p 10. Retrieved 8 October from
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3980&l=
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
C. C. Crane and W. A. Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq,
(Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), p. 26.
[30]
Ibid., p. 26.
[31]
Ibid., p. 26.
[32]
International Crisis Group.
Iraq’s Muqtada Al-Sadr:
Spoiler or Stabiliser? Middle
East Report N°55. PDF Version,
2006, p 23. Retrieved 6 October from
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4210&l=1
[33]
Ibid.
[34]
N. Feldman, What we Owe Iraq. War and Ethics of
Nation Building, (Princeton, 2004), p. 114.
[35]
L. Diamond, What went Right and Wrong in Iraq,
(Baltimore, 2006) , p. 183.
[36]
N. Feldman, What we Owe Iraq. War and Ethics of
Nation Building, (Princeton, 2004), p. 114.
[37]
Ibid., p.184.
[38]
B. N. Crocker, Going it Alone, Gone Wrong,
(Washington, 2004), p. 275
[39]
L. Diamond, What went Right and Wrong in Iraq
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 184.
[40]
Ibid., p. 180.
[41]
Ibid., p. 180.
[42]
N. Feldman, What we Owe Iraq. War and Ethics of
Nation Building, (Princeton, 2004), p. 114.
[43]
L. Diamond, What went Right and Wrong in Iraq
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 189.
[44]
J. Marrow. Iraq’s Constitutional Process II. An
Opportunity Lost (United States Institute of Peace,
November 2005) p. 20.
[45]
International Crisis Group, Unmaking Iraq: A
Constitutional Process Gone Awry. Middle East
Briefing N°19, 26 September 2005, p.2. Retrieved 5
October, 2007 from
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3703&l=1[51]
Ibid., p.
2.
[46]
International Crisis Group, Unmaking Iraq: A
Constitutional Process Gone Awry. Middle East
Briefing N°19, 26 September 2005. Retrieved 5 October,
2007 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3703&l=1
[47]
J. Marrow, Iraq’s Constitutional Process II.
An Opportunity Lost, United States Institute of
Peace, November 2005, p. 22.
[48]
Ibid.
[49]
L. Diamond, What went Right and Wrong in Iraq
(Baltimore, 2006), p. 189.
[50]
Ibid. |
