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The Cosmopolitan Age: The need for some demarcation
The pace of this runaway world, with rapid and
ever-burgeoning globalisation, requires fast and fresh
thinking. The modernistic zeal of homogenising the world
is out-dated. We are seeing the arrival of a new era:
the cosmopolitan age.
By
Prabhat Krishna
Eric Hobsbawm, a renowned British historian, recently
highlighted the importance of ‘finding another way of
organising the globalised world of the 21st
century, as the age of empires no longer exists’.[2]
People all around the world, especially the
functionaries of governance, must understand the
burgeoning interdependence in the interconnected
post-9/11 world and its complex realities, rather than
being swayed by its incomprehensibility or acknowledging
it only in the distant future.
This article seeks to articulate a basis for global
progression within the manifold conditions prevailing at
present. Two main propositions are made: first, to
envisage the new era as a ‘Cosmopolitan Age’; and
second, to enshrine the basis of this age in the
principles of ‘rule of rights’.
These two propositions overlap with their preceding
counterparts – the modern age and the ‘rule of law’,
respectively. It is true that a precise time reference
or dividing line cannot be established to distinguish
any two given eras; the 21st century is
clearly the transitional century from the modern to the
cosmopolitan age, although the processes started mostly
in the second half of the 20th century. From
primitive, ancient, medieval and modern, it is the time
for an era which can be broadly demarcated as
‘Cosmopolitan’.
The distinction of the cosmopolitan age from the modern
age is quite evident in each and every domain – whether
political-economy, religion, or socio-cultural. The
modern-age characteristics vis-à-vis the cosmopolitan
traits are numerous: from the rise of nation-states to
the evolving sense of international community/society,
from aspirations of uniformity to the growing acceptance
of pluralism/particularities, from state controlled
economy to the market regulated or mixed economy, from
naïve national self-interest to global concerns as
enunciated in the United Nations mandates, along with
issues related to the environment, terrorism, trade and
population movements, regulations on information and
communication technologies, intellectual property
rights, and so forth. The internet is one of the most
obvious examples of the fact that the world has been
weaved into various irreversible webs.
Two important questions are involved here: why is there
any need for demarcation between the ages, and how can
this new age be governed? Governance in this context is
stipulated for regulation, and should not be seen as
similar to nation-state governments. A normative pattern
of governance can evolve based on the doctrine of the
‘rule of rights’.
New name, new realities
The need for demarcation entails the acknowledgement by
people all over the world that we all are interconnected
and interdependent. A clear demarcation can make people
aware of their evolving association and identity as a
cosmopolitan (world) citizen. It can generate a larger
coherent global public opinion which can lead to greater
accountability of respective authorities at all levels.
In most cases, a pen is mightier than the sword, and
such demarcation can gradually make the literature
cosmopolitan.
This does not mean that nations will cease to exist.
Rather, successively efficient multi-tier (local,
national, regional and global) governance can evolve, in
which nations will play an important role. A crude
glimpse of that process can be seen in the evolution of
the European Union. Many French people now identify
themselves as French European. The world would indeed be
a better place if one could find a fraternity between
Iranian Cosmopolite and American Cosmopolite.
The demarcation would also solve the problems of the
prefix ‘post’. Post-modernity is not
comprehensible to all peoples of the world as they are
facing varying levels of modernity. To those who are
still grappling with the medieval or early-modern levels
of development, such prefixes are irrelevant. The
demarcation can enable different countries/societies to
configure their respective roles and progression based
on a shared cosmopolitan vision.
Such understandings do exist among many people, but in
general cosmopolitan concerns are still peripheral. It
can wrap the complexities within its fold. Many people
do concede that they value both national as well as
cosmopolitan concerns, and a consensus about a new age
would reinforce those concerns in a robust way.
All for one and one for all
The point which reemerges here is that cosmopolitan
understanding should be based on the acceptance of
pluralism in which various strands of universalism and
cultural relativism can co-exist. The aim of the
cosmopolitan perspective is to “bridge” the gaps, and
not to fill the gaps.
One can find some good observations in the ‘Clash of
Civilizations’ and even in the ‘Clash of
Generalizations’; or in the clash between reason and
religion; or in the clash between Goodness and ‘Godness’.
The ‘grand war’ of 20th century between
democracy and communism is almost over. But we find a
pluralistic compromise in that victory. Some of the
communistic concerns do exist in the welfare
state/social security systems depending upon the
context, albeit in an altered form.
This demarcation of the new age and people’s attachment
with evolving cosmopolitan identity/meaning will garner
empathy from people all around the world. Such
development can resolve the issues which are lingering
on the pretext of national self-interest and which
undermine the peace, harmony, and security of the world.
For example, there is no sight of resolution in Iran’s
nuclear imbroglio, mainly because of the absence of
cosmopolitan consensus. Russia and China are fixed on
their oil-guzzling agendas; it is not the case that they
are unaware of the information that has made other
negotiating countries desperate.
The main problem is the lack of people’s participation
and their empathies. The negotiations undertaken by
diplomats can only be reinforced by active public
opinion and its representation in the media. Otherwise,
it resembles a situation in which bullfighters display
their skills without the presence of spectators. Greater
awareness of nuclear non-proliferation among the general
public, especially in developing countries, would
generate consensus that they are also part of the same
world, and that it is a vital concern for them.
The governments of other countries, who do not seem to
show any concern, would put pressure on Iran in the wake
of public opinion in their respective countries based on
a cosmopolitan consensus. For example, in India or
Japan, there is a lack of public opinion on this issue.
Cosmopolitanism would generate force to resolve most of
the contested issues related to the betterment of the
whole world.
All the people, living in harmony
Such empathy would invite the revision of international law and
regulations, which could be successively accomplished if
people all around the world were sensitized and showed
cosmopolitan zeal and consensus. It can only be delayed
or left unaccomplished by the diplomats and government
officials who most of the time sing the tune of
sovereignty. The songs of pride and prejudice of one’s
own sovereign should be replaced by cosmopolitan
orchestras which incorporate diverse ethno-musicology.
This critical departure from the modern age has the
potential to manifest the plural realities of this
present runaway world and can facilitate better
orchestration of the complex symphonies (of different
‘isms’) with so many players, instruments and composers.
Cosmopolitanism, or the actors of cosmopolitan
governance, is like the ‘conductor’ of the orchestras,
where individuals/societies are the players,
political-economy systems are the instruments, cultures
are the composers, and symphonies based on ‘rule of
rights’ are the celebrations of diversity.
This novel idea of ‘rule of rights’, as mentioned
here in allegorical form, serves very important
functions. In an orchestra, musicians play either
individually or collectively, so rights to play are
involved here, and musicians abide by the rule of those
rights. Symphonies are always the manifestation of the
rule of rights of the players, and the conductor merely
provides indications or regulations of those rights.
For example, the UN and the WTO are like the conductors,
and the governance they prescribe should be similar to
that which conductors do in an orchestra. The notion of
horizontality (in terms of a level playing field, and,
in the political sense, the people’s power) is quite
visible here, and cosmopolitanism provides the route in
that direction. Cosmopolitanism does not require the
establishment of any vertical power structure, which is
also unfeasible at the global level.
The right rule
There is a latent acceptance of plurality in
cosmopolitan thinking, but that does not mean the
non-existence of common core or minimum common
standards. Human rights provisions are found in the
constitutional law of almost all countries, with a
certain degree of interpretational variation. The
centrality of human rights is the core of
cosmopolitanism. As awareness of this core grows, and
plurality increases, the international human rights
regime will be further strengthened, which would
progressively pave the way for the ‘rule of rights’
as the bedrock of cosmopolitanism, whether political,
economic or moral.
The governance of this cosmopolitan world can be
regulated in the evolving framework of the international
human rights regime. Jack Donnelly (a well-known human
rights scholar) adduces that the “growing numbers of new
international issues, ranging from migration, to global
trade and finance, to access to pharmaceuticals are
being framed as issues of human rights”.[3]
As
human rights are widely recognised and adjudicated in
the national systems of almost every country, their
implementation does not require the establishment of a
cosmopolitan structure of adjudication all of a sudden.
First, people all around the world should be imbued to
assert the ‘rule of rights’, and this would
eventually bring about a coalition on the platform of
human rights standards.
The effective governance in the national system has been
achieved because of well-defined institutional
(Legislative, Executive and Judiciary) mechanisms and
the corresponding growth of media and civil society.
Somewhat similar counterparts of such institutions at
the international level were established under the aegis
of the United Nations. Texts were written with a similar
idea in mind, ignoring the manifold differences of the
contexts. The system of national governance simply can
not be imitated or transplanted in the international
context. One has to think outside of national
preoccupation. The absence of one body-politic at the
international level is quite obvious, and replication or
cloning of national system is not feasible.
The dawning of a new regime
The distinctive characteristic in the democratic
countries is the ‘rule of law’ which is more compatible
with the functions and design of a nation-state, and
provides competent mechanisms of governance. This
doctrine has a long historical lineage, and was
incorporated as the basic feature of constitutional law
of many countries, most notably of the United States and
France.
In
addition to the supremacy of law, sovereignty of
parliament, lawful means to attain social, political and
economic ends, and strengthening the power of judiciary,
the doctrine of rule of law also promoted the legal
rights of an individual.[4] The latent theme is to protect
the individual or in a collective sense the society from
the arbitrary power of the authorities/rulers.
If
one carefully examines this doctrine, one can see that
law is the means to enforce the objectives enshrined in
the rights of the people. The manifestation of this
observation is quite clear in the 1998 Human Rights Act
of the United Kingdom. This Act is phenomenal as it
demonstrates the idea of ‘rule of rights’. Under
the provisions of this Act, each and every law of the
land has to be compatible with principles of human
rights as enshrined in the European Convention. Thus,
the ‘rule’ is now of rights, and not of law.
What is the difference between the rule of law and the
‘rule of rights’? The difference is primarily
conceptual. The ‘rule of rights’ is quite evident
in many countries even at present, such as Great Britain
and France, and the concept is that the laws must not
fall short of human rights standards. It is not the
opposite case that rights have to form the bases of
laws. The considerations of rights now ‘regulate’ the
formulation of laws.
This can be clearly seen in the historical trajectory of
Great Britain. Great Britain has long been ruled by the
laws promulgated by the Parliament, and not by the
King’s orders in de facto terms, so the rule of
law was quite evident. In the major shifts from the
King’s prerogatives to parliamentary laws to the
people’s power as rights, one can see the sprouting of
the idea of ‘rule of rights’.
The doctrines are overlapping with each other to some
extent, and the rule of law can be easily shaped into
the ‘rule of rights’. There is no need for any
structural change in the United Kingdom, as the ‘rule
of rights’ is already manifested in the governance.
Rights for humanity
In
many countries, one finds some draconian laws based on
tradition, religion or formulated by the dictators which
result in the gross violation of human rights. How can
those injustices be reasonable on the basis of rule of
law? How can anyone justify that ‘rule’? The only
reasonable option is the ‘rule of rights’.
The doctrine of rule of law served its purpose during
the transition from the absolute vertical power of the
Monarch to consensual horizontal power of the people,
and allowed parliamentary democratic form of government
to progress. It gradually bent the verticality of power,
and now the nascent horizontality of people’s power
needs the understanding of the ‘rule of rights’.
In
the international arena, instead of the rule of law, the
‘rule of rights’ is more compatible. States are
generally seen as subjects of international law, and
individuals are largely secluded from adjudication,
except for the war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The ‘rule of rights’ doctrine would progressively
bring individuals within the purview of cosmopolitan
justice that can be adjudicated in national and/or
international systems.
Most of the international legal instruments emphasise a
rights-based approach which is complimentary with the
notion of the ‘rule of rights’. Moreover, the
laws of different countries vary greatly, and it does
not seem to be possible to find common ground for
justice on the basis of the rule of law. Human rights
have the ability to weave the entire world into a
framework whereby justice can be imparted to any
individual or group.
A
cosmopolitan world
In
sum, a coherent as well as multilateral thinking is
required in a holistic framework of cosmopolitanism. The
burgeoning complexities of this world need a critical
departure from modern age aspirations. National means
can never meet cosmopolitan ends, so some sort of fresh
envisioning is required to find cosmopolitan ‘means’.
The ‘lag time’, in the guise of post-modernity, is the
procrastination resulting from unfruitful nostalgia. It
is just a matter of acknowledgement of the arrival of
the cosmopolitan age with which people are already
acquainted. Such a development would create common
thinking all over the world. Cosmopolitanism is
inclusive of all cultures and is congruent with any
complexity. The quest of finding another way of
organising this globalised world requires the vision of
a ‘cosmopolitan age’ and the ‘rule of rights’.
References
[1] The enlarged version of the ideas will be published
in the forthcoming book entitled – ‘Cosmopolite’. The
author dedicates this article to his family and the
University of London.
[2]
Excerpts from the book by Hobsbawm, EJ, 2007,
Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism, published in The
Observer, 3rd June 2007, p.27.
[3]
Donnelly, Jack, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2,
May 2007, by The John Hopkins University Press, p. 289.
[4] Dicey, A. V., 1915, Introduction To The Study Of The
Law Of The Constitution, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd,
p. xxxvii. |
