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Utilizing Islamic Religious Education as a Peacebuilding Tool: A Case Study of Southern Thailand

 

From Washington to Islamabad, there has been renewed interest in the nexus between terrorism and Islamic religious education. Yet most articles, including a previous article in Global Politics, say little about how Islamic education can ameliorate conflict, rather than exacerbate or promote it. The Southern Thailand insurgency, one of Asia’s deadliest ongoing conflicts, offers a model of how religious education can be used as a peacebuilding tool.

 

By Prashanth Parameswaran

 


 

Missing lessons

 

Islamic religious education is fundamental to understanding the Southern Thailand insurgency, which is currently one of the most violent conflicts in the Asian continent. Far from mere educational conduits, Southern Islamic religious institutions have historically served as key markers of Malay-Muslim identity, breeders of future community leaders, and centres for separatist recruitment efforts. This makes education arguably the most crucial aspect of the ongoing insurgency.

 

Most scholarship regarding Islamic religious education in the world in general and Southern Thailand in particular focuses either on the peripheral nexus between radical Islam and terrorism, or the failed string of government initiatives that paved the way for frayed educational institutions. For the Southern insurgency, this trend has been true for various agents – from NGO reports, ‘terrorism scholar’ literature and journalism coverage. [1] Existing scholarship thus focuses on the conflictual aspects of Islamic religious education and sees it as part of the problem, rather than the solution to conflict.

 

This article challenges conventional wisdom by suggesting that Islamic religious education can be the solution by facilitating peace efforts or yielding cooperative outcomes. Using fieldwork, interviews and research conducted in Bangkok and the Southern provinces of Nakhorn Si Thammarat, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkla, it will begin by analysing the structure of Islamic religious education in the region.

 

Thereafter, it will examine the current problems with the education system, focusing on the government’s myopic “national security” paradigm and ethnopolitical disputes between Buddhists and Muslims. It will then look at how various local, national, and regional approaches that are often overlooked or ignored are helping to increase cooperation in the field of education in general and Islamic education in particular. 

 

The state of education today

 

From their historical status as the independent kingdom of Pattani to being annexed as Thailand’s peripheral provinces, the three southernmost provinces’ Islamic religious education system revolved around one major institution: the traditional pondok. After succumbing to government assimilationist policies, the traditional pondok underwent a forced transformation into private Islamic schools in the latter 20th century, and have since competed with government schools for the hearts and minds of the Malay Muslim populace.

 

The current structure of education in Southern Thailand is made up of four types of institutions: tadikas, traditional pondoks (Pusat Pendidikan Pondok), government or state schools, and private Islamic schools (Sekolah Agama Rakyat). A traditional pondok is an institute where students of all ages and abilities gather informally to study a mix of religious and secular education, choosing their specialisms and supervisors. [2] Of the 500 traditional pondoks that exist, only about half are registered and officially recognised by the government. A tadika is a pre-school attached to the local mosque where children can learn religious education at the elementary level.

 

Private Islamic schools, which are mostly (and oddly) financed by the government, are the result of an earlier government campaign to modernise traditional pondoks. These “modern pondoks” number more than 300, and are forced to offer a balanced religious and secular education that complies with government standards in order to continue receiving full federal funding.

 

Unlike traditional pondoks, the private Islamic schools have a stronger secular education and operate within a more formal and government-controlled framework. Although they were mostly confined to secondary education initially, many are now extending down to primary school to get more students – creating “extended” Islamic private schools. [3] The government schools previously taught entirely with a Thai ethnocentric curriculum, but have recently made allowances for Malay Muslims.

 

Government law requires every Thai citizen to complete nine years of compulsory education – six years in elementary (P1-P6), and three years in upper secondary (M1-M3). [4] The average Malay Muslim youth, from age 5-12, can attend a government school or an extended private Islamic school (a private Islamic school that has both elementary and secondary education), while spending his or her first few years at a tadika to enhance religious education.

 

Subsequently, from age 12-17, he or she can continue at a government school at the secondary level or choose a normal private Islamic school. Generally speaking, three quarters of Malay Muslims in the south attend private Islamic schools, while only a quarter attend government schools. [5] The reason has as much to do with the lack of focus on religious education in state schools as it does on the mentality of Malay Muslims which tends to view government institutions with suspicion and as an assault on their language and culture. [6]

 

From 18 years on, students have the option of going to university.  However, a 2001 survey found that only 3pc of Buddhists and Muslims in the deep South had a university education. [7] While pondok education can be taken at any point of a student’s life, interest in the pondok system is declining with time. One 1999 study in the South showed that only 25pc of parents wanted to send their children to a pondok, because of its weak secular curriculum that lowered their children’s job prospects. [8]

 

Not without its problems

 

The current primary problem with Southern Thailand in general and Islamic religious education in particular is that both are often viewed through the myopic lens of national security. Since it acquired the provinces, the Thai state has only been involved in Southern socioeconomic development when it feels the region constitutes a national security threat – resulting in alternating periods of neglect and heavy-handed crackdowns. Islamic religious education is only a concern when resistance movements flare up or “radical links” to the Middle East cement.

 

Every education expert, teacher, or local government official in the southern provinces contends that the government should try to win the goodwill of Southern people by basing development on academic achievement or genuine assistance, rather than basing aid on levels of violence. [9]

 

The second issue is that of identity politics and the politics of demonisation that has imperilled the Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim communities. The perception among a large majority of Buddhists seems to be that the Muslims in the South are backward and disloyal to the Thai state because of their relative economic deprivation and secessionist campaign.

 

Muslims are inclined to view Buddhists as immoral, contaminated colonisers because of their primacy in the secular realm and their infringement of Muslim cultural autonomy. [10]

 

The ethnopolitical disputes preclude cooperation in fields like education. Malay Muslim scholars contend that the Thai government will never understand Islamic religious education because of their inherent immorality: they view education solely as a way to prosperity, while Muslims see it as a source of morality and guidance. [11] Similarly, Buddhist teachers and scholars argue that Muslims have an irrational tendency to view all government educational handouts as instruments of colonialism, despite the government’s beneficent intentions.

 

The last problem is that related to resources and representation. For instance, although Malay Muslims constitute the majority in the three southernmost provinces, there is only one Muslim representative in the Thai Education Ministry for all three provinces, and Muslims only constitute 30pc of education subcommittees. The Office of Education does not even have any particular body to monitor private Islamic schools because no resources have been dedicated to training officials in Islamic affairs. The grave problem is summarised by government census figures that, in 2000, showed that 70pc of Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand had only a primary school education. [12]

 

A little less confrontation: the case of the Southern Thailand Peace Network

 

In response to the lack of national peace and inter-ethnic conflict management mechanisms and the prevalence of conflict-based worldviews in Southern Thailand, five universities in three Southern provinces founded the Southern Thailand Peace Network (STPN). [13] STPN aims to inject peace views through inter-university cooperation in curriculum development, research, peace advocacy and capacity building – using peace education as a means to bring together Buddhist and Muslim communities currently fraught with fractious identity politics.

 

At the centre of this admirable effort is a renowned Islamic higher education institution – Yala Islamic University (YIU). YIU has previously been accused by the Thai government of contributing to the insurgency with recruits and cash from the Middle East, but it is now an active STPN participant. Interestingly, YIU is working on an integrative educational curriculum, which all its 3,000 students will take beginning this year, and which combines Western and Islamic peace and conflict management.

 

The idea is to prove that Islam can be compatible with modernity without losing its morality, a main source of tension between Buddhists and Muslims. In addition to local efforts, YIU is looking to work with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United States Institute of Peace (UNIP) to promote cross-educational linkages in peace techniques, reconciliation and peace theory. [14]

 

Change of mindset

 

While the ‘national security mindset’ of the security forces and the Thai government persists and obstructs cooperative outcomes in fields like education, national efforts are beginning to turn this around. These initiatives are important since they will help create a more conducive environment where Islamic religious education can be used as a peace-building tool. One example of this is the recent “peace journalism” campaign mounted by government leaders, media groups and civil society leaders in southern Thailand. [15]

 

Before the peace journalism campaign, the Thai media focused mainly on the “cycle of violence with a sensational crime story-type approach”, widening distrust, perpetuating a climate of fear, and damaging ethnic relations. Most Thais thus believed that Malay Muslims were a national security threat, rebellious, and disloyal citizens which needed the most severe punishment. One alarming poll involving 1,154 Thais conducted in October 2005, for instance, showed that more than 60pc of respondents believed lack of patriotism was the motive for the insurgency, and more than 50pc agreed that perpetrators thus deserved extrajudicial execution. [16]

 

However, the Issra News Centre has substantially improved reporting on the conflict on the national level, because it has included more diverse local perspectives and less conflict-related stories. The Centre is now regarded as the prime source of “unbiased news” on Southern Thailand, and its location in Patani province, the centre of the insurgency, makes its reporting even more authoritative compared to many other news organizations who rely on one or two stringers.

 

The Centre’s website explores several dimensions of the conflict beyond national security, including economic development, education and social justice. While the jury is still out on Issra as a whole, accounts at the time of this publication argue that the peace journalism perspective has broadened the national security outlook of the government and citizenry alike. 

 

A Regional Pondok Fund: a source of relief?

 

A popular criticism of government policy with regard to the Thai insurgency is that it either invests too few resources or allocates them poorly. In order to get past the resource scarcity or poor funding-allocation in the southern provinces, future ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan has suggested that a regional or global fund be established for Islamic religious institutes in Southern Thailand. [17]

 

The funding initiative would be instrumental in increasing the quality of Islamic education in Southern Thailand, which would in turn boost employment and generate goodwill and eventual peace. Firstly, owners and students of traditional pondoks are bitter about why pondok graduates cannot even obtain a certificate equivalent to those accepted by the Thai general education system. The fund could be used to give financial aid and scholarship opportunities to graduates of registered, legal pondoks so they do not become jobless wanderers. A student’s choice of a home-schooled education should not deny him any opportunities.

 

But, from a wider perspective, the regional or global pondok fund would bankroll several innovative ASEAN or world initiatives that could boost Islamic education in Thailand’s restive south. For instance, Islamic organisations from Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, who have signalled their willingness to help train and teach in southern Thailand and offer Thai Muslim scholarships, will be happy to find capital for their endeavours. [18]

 

In addition, available funding will also provide exciting prospects for Thailand-Malaysia educational exchanges after the signing on 21st August 2007 of a Memorandum of Understanding between both education ministers. Potential initiatives include Malaysian assistance in Islamic subjects for improving government schools in the South – which are often criticised by Malay Muslims. [19] There is no doubt that other governments with their own Islamic issues might want a part in funding or promoting such exchanges, from China to Pakistan to the United States.

 

Reaching an educated resolution

 

Thus, despite the tendency to equate Islamic religious education with insurgency and violence, it would perhaps be wiser to look at various local, national and regional approaches that may create an environment conducive for, facilitate, or even adopt Islamic religious education as a peacebuilding tool. The case of Southern Thailand certainly shows that cooperative outcomes are enhanced through this process.

 


 

References

[1] For examples of each of the categories, see: (a) NGOs – online reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; (b) Terrorism Expert Literature – the book “Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand”, Marshall Cavendish Press, 2005, and articles by terrorism scholars like Zachary Abuza and India’s former intelligence officer B. Raman; (c) Journalism (online and print) – Wire services include Agence France Press (AFP), Reuters and Associated Press (AP), other news organizations such as but not limited to British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News Network (CNN) and International Herald Tribune (IHT).
[2] For a more detailed description of the pondoks, see: Madmarn, Hasan. The Pondok and the Madrasah in Patani. (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 1999).
[3] Interview with Ibrahim Naringraksakat, assistant professor and director of the College of Islamic Studies, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani. (June 2007).
[4] Interview with Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, former member of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), a Muslim academic and director of the Center for Muslim and Democratic Development in Southern Thailand. (July 2007)
[5] Interview, Srisompob Jitpiromsri, political science professor at Prince of Songkla University, Pattani. (June 2007).
[6] Gunaratna, Rohan, Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua. Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. (Marshall Cavendish Academic. 2005), pp. 46-53.
[7] Interview, Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, (July 2007).
[8]Janchitfah, Supara. Violence in the Mist: Reporting on the Presence of Pain in Southern Thailand. (Kobfai Publishing Project, 2004), p. 56.
[9]Various Interviews with local administration officials, teachers and scholars in Pattani (June-July 2007)
[10] These characterizations are based on interviews conducted in Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkla, Nakhon Sri Thammarat and Bangkok, and were confirmed by interviews with scholars (May-July 2007). For a taste of Buddhist characterizations of Muslims, see Marddent, Amporn. From Adek to Mo’ji: Identities and Social Realities of the Southern Thai People, (Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, 2006). Available Online: http://kyotoreviewsea.org/images/images/pdffiles/Amporn_final2.pdf . To get the Muslim perspective, look for Apornsuvan, Thanet, as seen in: Yusuf, Imtiyaz. Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand. (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006), pg. 101.
[11] Interviews with the principal of Darunsatwittaya School, a private Islamic school in Pattani, Dr. Worawit Baru, professor at Prince of Songkla University, Dr. Ahmad Somboon Bualuang, Dr. Ibrahim Naringraksakat (May-July 2007).
[12] Srisompob Jitpiromsri, as seen in: McCargo, Duncan (ed). Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence. (NUS Press, 2007), p. 98.
[13] STPN thus far includes Prince of Songkla University (Pattani), Prince of Songkla University (Hat Yai), Thaksin University (Songkla), Hat Yai University (Hat Yai), and Yala Islamic College (Pattani).
[14] Interview with Shukree Langputeh, dean of social science at Yala Islamic College, (July 2007); speech delivered by Shukree Langputeh at the International Seminar on Peacebuilding from Various Experiences, (7 July 2007), organized by the College of Islamic Studies, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani.
[15] For an idea of how the campaign started, see: Bangkok Post. “THAILAND: Senator says, media ‘must do more’. Asia Media. 6 December 2005. Available Online: http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=35008.
[16] Kanwerayotin, Supapohn. Peace Journalism in Thailand: Case Study of the Issara News Center of the Thai Journalists Association. (Chulalongkorn University, Masters Thesis 2006), Introduction.
[17] Interview with ASEAN Secretary General designate Surin Pitsuwan, see also: Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Equitable schooling vital for deep South”. The Nation. 1 June 2007. Available online: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/07/01/opinion/opinion_30038828.php.
[18] Khalik, Abbul and Slamet Susanto. “RI to help solve religious conflict in restive southern Thai provinces”. Jakarta Post. 14 August 2007. Available Online: http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20070814.B09.
[19]TNA News. “Thailand, Malaysia, sign agreement on educational exchanges”. TNA News. 21 Aug 2007. Available online: http://etna.mcot.net/query.php?nid=31179.
 

 

 

Prashanth Parameswaran is a Harrison undergraduate research scholar at the University of Virginia, focusing on the Southern Thailand insurgency. He is interested in South East Asian politics, global insurgency, and US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. He is editor of several undergraduate research journals at his University and enjoys basketball, soccer and poker.