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French elections: substance, style and the media
The last French presidential elections showed a
departure from politics as usual. The two final
candidates simultaneously used and were used by the
media, interweaving substantive issues, personalities,
and style in a way that may change the future of
political campaigning in France.
By Sophie Clavier
In
May 2007, after a passionate and heated campaign,
Nicholas Sarkozy was elected President of France. Why
such passion, such heated debates? Why such a big
turn-out of the electorate (85pc)? The elections had
important and tangible stakes for France, but another
element played out in galvanising the public to the
levels that we witnessed: the personalities and style of
the two main candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène
Royal. As a result this campaign was drastically
different from elections past and showed a departure
from politics as usual which may alter the French
political landscape indefinitely.
All electoral campaigns, in France or abroad, deal in
substance with economic and social issues, cultural
matters and foreign policy. However, each election tends
to favour only one or two of those themes. In May’s
elections, the dominant theme was clearly
“inward-looking” and centred on domestic issues.[1]
Looking inwards, not liking what they see
This campaign focused on what is often perceived,
rightly or not, as the binary opposition between
business interest and social policy. In addition, this
debate took place within the perennial context, dear to
French politics, of debating the nature of “Frenchness”
or French identity, both in its external aspect (the
role of France in the world, especially in relation to
the US) and in its internal dimension (the role that
immigrants play in this identity).
The campaign was run against the backdrop of an ailing
economy, racial tensions, and an overall moral funk.
France in 2007 is set to grow slower than the Euro
region average. It has not balanced its budget since
1979. Heavy public spending has increased the risk of
higher long-term interest rates, thus creating a burden
on investment and obstacles to economic growth.
Meanwhile, France has a large external debt, roughly 1.2
trillion Euros, or 66pc of GDP (significantly higher
than the convergence criteria for joining the Euro). [2]
This is made worse by a declining share of French
products among European exports. [3] Finally while it
has somewhat decreased, there is a high official rate of
unemployment (8.3pc), and the rate is much higher among
the youth and immigrant populations. In the meantime,
very strict labour regulations have steadily discouraged
the creation of new jobs.
Socially, there is a general feeling of discontent
amongst the population, aggravated by palpable and
explosive racial tensions, amidst frequent violent
outbursts of an increasingly disenfranchised youth of
foreign descent as we saw in last autumn’s riots.
As a result there is a great deal of “moral funk” and
bitterness in society. The French are seldom upbeat but
lately they have been frankly gloomy. The wealthiest
complain about crippling taxation, the less wealthy
complain about the skyrocketing cost of living, the
youth and the immigrants complain about lack of upward
mobility. Everyone complains about traffic and the
weather.
One election, two Frances
Two approaches emerged during the campaign. Royal’s
response and plan of action were in a fairly classic
socialist fashion: to favour the state’s intervention,
boost consumption, and pay more attention to social
protection. For example she suggested an increase in the
minimum wage from 1500 to 2000 Euros per month, higher
unemployment benefits, and the creation of 500,000
government subsidised jobs.[4]
By contrast Sarkozy adopted a modified neo-liberal
approach, favouring investments. His plan is to reduce
taxes, capping them at 50pc of income and bringing the
overall burden from 44pc to 40pc of GDP. [5] This is a
modified neo-liberal approach since he is keeping a
rather protectionist attitude toward trade.
Alongside economic and social issues, identity questions
did not recede. The French spend a great deal of time
figuring out what it means to be French in France’s
external relations as well as within the country itself.
Finding France’s place in the world
Externally, France wants to keep a position of moral
leadership in the world, a spot for which it often
competes with the United States. The Chirac/de Villepin
administration had been very vocal in their rejection of
Bush’s policies, and had appointed themselves the
spokespeople of the world’s opposition to Bush’s war
against Iraq. Their foreign policy actions received a
huge amount of approval from the French population
(including the Muslim population) even when their
overall rate of approval was at its lowest point. How
would this play out in the campaign?
Royal’s response was very much in line with French
public opinion. She actually embodied a “Gaullist”
attitude vis à vis the United States insisting on the
need for France to show independence from the United
States. She was consistently very critical of the US,
especially in its Middle East policy, and of the UK, for
being an “American vassal”.[6] Meanwhile, Sarkozy had a
very ambivalent discourse on the US, one which alarmed a
sizeable percentage of the French public. Departing from
Chirac’s strong stance against the US, Sarkozy vocally
announced that he was a friend of the US, and that
France – while accurate on substance – had been “too
arrogant” in style when opposing the war in Iraq.[7]
This deserves a bit of attention. To say that you are a
friend of the US carries a huge political risk in
France. To visit Bush as well as important Jewish
leaders in 2006 can be politically unwise. Why do it?
Politicians, contrary to what they say, seldom take any
risks. Furthermore, in that case, while Sarkozy was
saying that he was a friend of the US, he clearly made
statements showing that his policies were not much
different from those of his predecessor: he is still
against the war in Iraq, he talks about getting out of
Afghanistan at some point, he is so far against military
actions against Iran, he is very agitated on global
warming and the lack of leadership on this matter, and
he is quite protectionist on trade (for example
reiterating the need to exempt cultural products from
the rules of free trade – the so-called cultural
exception, a serious point of contention with the US).
So really what type of friend is he and why then say
that he is one, and take such a huge political risk?
There are many explanations and what follows is
speculative but seems compelling. It could be sincere
admiration for the US economy (he had made many
statements to that effect). It could be the desire to be
less anti-Israel than France has been (Sarkozy while
Minister of the Interior heavily cracked down on
anti-Semitism).
Or it could be that he is very forward thinking. The US
administration is going to change, and whoever ends up
in the White House will try to mend fences with the
Europeans. By taking the lead, Sarkozy (in the meantime
betting that he would be elected regardless of this
pro-American statement) appears as offering the olive
branch first, not as caving in to the US when they will
extend the olive branch. It is by the way interesting to
see that Al Gore (who cannot dispel rumours that he may
run for the US Presidency in 2008) called Sarkozy to
congratulate him on the day he was elected.
Constantly seeking Frenchness
Internally, the French also seem to debate continually
what it means to be a French citizen. Historically, the
sense of French identity had been shaped by the
Revolution and the Jacobin republican ideal favouring
assimilation of regional and ethnic differences within a
unitary ideal of Frenchness and citizenship. French
national identity should ideally take precedence over
other forms of ethnic, linguistic and religious
identifications.
In
other words, any group identification or allegiance had
to give way to an individual identification as a French
citizen. [8] This ideal has been greatly challenged by
the reality of a multicultural, multi-religious France
where, especially now, certain groups perceiving that
the State and the parens patriae model has failed them,
turn against it, and claim another identity.
This is not unique to France. Worldwide, we can witness
the State disappearing as a recipient of allegiance, to
the profit of either smaller entities like the clan, the
tribe, the gangs, or conversely much larger or even
transnational entities, for example a religious
community. This creates deep schisms, worsened by
international tensions often labelled as clashes of
civilizations. As a result, racial and religious
tensions abound in France and offer a true challenge for
any administration.
Royal offered, if not clearly stated solutions, a
conciliatory tone. Sarkozy on the other end has achieved
a reputation for toughness against youth violence and
illegal immigration. He is often demonized as anti-Arab
and anti-Muslim, a perception aggravated by his Jewish
origin and stated sympathy for Israel and the US. The
challenge during his campaign was to address the
concerns of the sizeable number of French people who
used to be supporters of the National Front, while
reassuring people of foreign descent.
The selection in the government of a woman of Arab
descent and the assurance that there will be more Arab
and African representation at Parliament may at least
temper some anxieties over his election.
The substantial role of style
Issues are important in any campaign but not enough to
generate this type of voter turn-out. Are the French so
much more politically engaged than their American
counterparts? I think not. This campaign was heated,
contested and controversial because the style of the
candidates was not politics as usual. Let’s first survey
what “politics as usual” is in France in order better to
understand the contrast with this time around.
With very few exceptions the French political landscape
has been male, white and the product of the same
educational mould. Most politicians are trained at the
Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA, a highly
selective elitist school of public administration),
often debating with each other as students before
debating with each other in ‘real’ life.
This
highly intellectual training creates a distance between
the politicians and the overall population. Most French
people believe that their politicians, regardless of
their political leaning, are elitist and disconnected
from reality. Attempts by politicians to appear more in
touch often feel contrived. Meanwhile one could not fail
to see the great appeal of someone like Jean-Marie Le
Pen, leader of the National Front, who had a
“say-it-like-it-is” tough guy’s discourse.
As far as her education is concerned, Ségolène Royal did
not depart from this mould. She is a graduate of ENA.[9]
However, she is a woman in a male-dominated landscape.
The exception was one of Mitterrand’s Prime Ministers,
Edith Cresson, who was often criticised for political
blunders and on overall ineptitude in presenting herself
as “lady-like”. By contrast, Royal is a very attractive
woman, with a good sense of flair and fashion,
undeniably a quality for the French population at large.
Sarkozy totally departed from the mould. He is not an
ENA graduate, and actually flunked out of the Political
Sciences Institute, but graduated with a Law degree from
the University of Nanterre. [10] He has a much more
populist, no-nonsense language (some would say abrasive)
than his predecessors.
Breaking from the mould would have not been sufficient,
however, were it not for the role of the media. The two
candidates simultaneously used, and were used by, the
media in quite a novel way in France, one that may
forever change the future of politics.
Media managed
Both candidates heavily pushed their image as modern
politicians and had done so for some time. For example,
in the mid 1990s Royal invited the media to the hospital
after the birth of her child. She has been named by
several tabloids as one the sexiest women in the
country. This clearly departs from the usual discomfort
of politicians in France vis à vis the press, especially
the tabloids. Meanwhile Sarkozy has the same Public
Relations agent as some famous popular artists. He is
constantly seen and readily photographed with the
“people”: an array of famous actors and pop stars. He
invited the semi-tabloid magazine “Paris Match” to
photograph and report his reconciliation with his wife.
None of this is new to an American audience but it is
for France.
Meanwhile, also departing from usual practice, the media
has entered their private lives without being invited.
It was surprising in France where there have been strong
laws against “atteinte a la vie privée”: intrusion into
private lives. Politicians’ extra-marital affairs and
even illegitimate children used to be off-limits. This
is no longer the case and has been turned upside down.
The French public has regaled itself with accounts of
Sarkozy’s wife’s infidelities, shots of Royal in a
bikini and so on and so on.
On a more serious level, the media have greatly
highlighted and fuelled any points of potential
controversies and misunderstanding. For example, when
Sarkozy used the term “racaille” (scum) while visiting
an immigrant populated and so-called “difficult” suburb,
the media instantly took it out of context. More
accurate accounts show that Sarkozy was repeating the
word used in a question asked by a woman asking him
“When will you help us getting rid of this scum?” in
regards not to the Arab population at large but to the
juvenile delinquents.[11] In a similar fashion, when
Royal said in an interview that regimes like the Taliban
should be eradicated, the media took it out of context
giving the impression that she did not know that the
Taliban had been overthrown.[12]
How it ended, how it began
In the second, head-to-head, round of voting, Sarkozy
won 52pc of the votes against 48pc for Royal. Sarkozy
obtained most of his votes from the 24 to 34 year old
age group as well as from the 60+ population. Ségolène
Royal was more popular among the 18 to 24 and the 45 to
59 year-olds (those who were in their twenties during
the late 1960s). Interestingly, Sarkozy, not Royal,
obtained the majority of the women’s vote. Ultimately
people voted for or against Sarkozy not necessarily for
Royal. His opponents’ main slogan was “Anyone for
Sarkozy”.[13] Consequently Sarkozy’s victory clearly
showed the population’s support for change. However,
only time will tell whether or not he will be able fully
to implement his policies in a country where
paradoxically everyone feels that change is needed, but
few are willing to alter their behaviour.
References
[1] Michael Moran, France Faces the Future, Council on
Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, April 17, 2007
[2] Kathrin Bennhold, Economic Aide Quits, Dealing Royal
a Blow, International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2007
[3] According to Eric Chaney, Morgan Stanley’s chief
European Economist, quoted in Francois de Beaupuy,
Borloo Named to Top Economy Post in Sarkozy Cabinet,
Bloomberg.com, June 01, 2007-
Available at http://www.bloomber.com/apps/news
[4] James Graff, Segolene’s New Tack: A Hard Left. Time,
February 12, 2007
[5] Kathrin Bennhold, Economic Aide Quits, Dealing Royal
a Blow, International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2007
[6] Quoted in Michael Moran, France Faces the Future,
Council on Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, April 17,
2007
[7] Roland Flamini, Sarkozy Wants to be France's
President -- and a Friend to the United States, World
Politics Review, April 07, 2007, Available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=690
[8] Silverman, M., Deconstructing the Nation:
Immigration, Race and Citizenship in Modern France,
(London Routledge: 1992)
[9] Segolene Royal was in the same class as Chirac’s
Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin
[10] http://syre1.weebly.com/the-french-economy-and-business-blog.html
[11]Luc Bronner. Les Jeunes des Cites Inquiets d’une
Possible Victoire de Nicolas Sarkozy, Le Monde, March
30, 2007
[12]Elaine Sciolino, No Defining Campaign Issues for
Sarkozy, Royal and Others, International Herald Tribune,
April 10, 2007
[13]See for example, Chance for France, Times-online,
April 16, 2007 Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/commnet/leading_article/article1657920.ece
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