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Post-Modernist and Realist Challenges to Wendt’s
Identity Formation
Theories of International Relations approach state
formation from various angles. However, this article
argues that Post-Modernists and Realists come to very
similar conclusions, despite their disparate starting
points.
By Sabina Pavlovska-Hilaiel
Theorists contest the emphasis that Wendt puts on the
importance of state-identity formation in understanding
international relations. Here I will explore some major
disagreements between Wendt’s Social Constructivism and
his critics from opposite ends of the theory spectrum.
To illustrate my argument I will extensively rely on
Zehfuss’s Post-Modernist and Copeland’s orthodox Realist
criticism.[1]
The article will show that although some of the
objections are relevant, there are major questions that
are not addressed. Most importantly I will begin to
uncover unexpected similarities between Post-Modern and
Realist approaches to IR in relation to their criticism
of Wendt’s theory. [2]
The ‘I’ in ‘anarchy’
Wendt bases his approach to understanding international
relations on the notion of identities [3]. While he
doesn’t deny that states are the main actors in an
anarchical system he claims that there are different
types of anarchy, which depend on states’ identities.
Those identities are formed primarily through
interaction and “social learning” [4], but Wendt also
acknowledges a formation of identities at the domestic
level.
Wendt
defines three types of state identities: Corporate,
Role, and Collective. Parts of Corporate identity are
the basic elements an organization needs in order to be
called a State. He claims Corporate identity consists of
“the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make
actors distinct entities” and consequently it is
“constitutionally exogenous to Otherness” [5]. The Role
identity increasingly relies on interaction with others,
and finally the Collective identity “takes the
relationship between Self and Other to its logical
conclusion, identification” [6]. Here the Other is
included in the perception of Self and thus it is highly
constitutive for the Self.
Identities are also related to three cultures of
anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In the
Hobbesian culture actors perceive themselves as enemies
and act driven by fear of death. In the Lockean culture
the immediate threat of death is removed and states can
interact as rivals rather than enemies. Kantian culture
is the next logical progression, where actors perceive
the others as friends. Thus each actor’s interest is
also a part of the other’s interest.
The constitutive effect of culture on identity is
crucial here. To illustrate it Wendt introduces three
levels of internalisation of identity: coercive,
interest-driven, and normative. On the first level,
internalisation is based on fear of punishment. On the
second level the actors realise their interest in
complying with the norm. Here the lack of the immediate
threat of death begins to create shared identity.
Finally, on the third level of internalisation, actors
believe in the norm and it becomes a part of them. Most
importantly the relationship between identity and
cultures of anarchy is not only constitutive but also
causal: culture depends on identities, while identity is
only possible in a systemic context.
Stuck in the middle with I
Both Realists and Post-Modernists argue that the
formation of identity domestically points to the lack of
a constitutive relationship between actors in the
international system and that the idea of identity
playing a role on a systemic level is problematic.
Post-Modernists challenge Wendt’s theory of identity
formation and claim “Wendt’s argument comes apart
because of its own assumptions” [7] regarding the
“given-ness of identity” [8]: identity must be
constructed for Wendt’s argument to be plausible.
However, Wendt presents his theory as “scientific”, so
identity should be given.[9]
Because of these seemingly contradictory assumptions
Zehfuss argues that the Constructivist approach cannot
encompass the complexity of the notion of identity.
Zehfuss as well as Campbell [10] claim that if an
identity can be constructed it can also be deconstructed
all the way down. Furthermore, the vagueness in identity
formation makes it impossible to differentiate identity
change from interest-driven behaviour. This difficulty
has been a prominent issue among Wendt’s critics.
Realists from the other side of the IR spectrum
challenge identity formation on the same principle: its
domestic formation. The criticism however takes a
slightly different direction to that of Zehfuss’s
argument. Copeland’s objection to Wendt’s theory
represents a mainstream Realist criticism. It suggests
that if formation of Corporate identity is exogenous to
other actors, then it cannot be ensured that future
states’ intentions won’t change. In other words even if
Ego can be positive about present security-seeking
intentions of Alter “it must worry that Alter might
become pathologically hostile later on” [11].
Moreover, the assumption that interaction between actors
is capable of bringing about structural changes through
social learning is a problematic one. The question of
“impression management” [12] is left open in Wendt’s
theory, leaving the possibility of manipulating
perceptions and therefore identities. If Wendt is right
about shared knowledge being in the core of identity
formation [13] then logically Copeland’s orthodox
Realist criticism is mainly concerned with the
possibility of conscious deception also.
Parallels between Zehfuss’s and Copeland’s criticisms
can also be drawn when it comes to differences between
identities and behaviour. Copeland, however, focuses
less on the structural similarities of behaviour and
identity, and attacks identity’s ability to explain
international relations more accurately than behaviour.
In
defence of Wendt
As I showed above, not identity per se, but its
formation as described by Wendt, is problematic. Zehfuss
questions the existence of essential elements in
identity and claims that it should be entirely
constructed. What she misses is that identity not only
can be, but should both be constructed and given.
Wendt makes a conscious effort to explain the necessity
of given identity by discussing the essential state,
which serves as a basis to build upon. [14] Theorising
about the international system requires accepting the
world as it is at least to a certain extent. The
Post-Modern criticism risks falling into the trap of
deconstructing everything, without an option for
constructing it back.
Of course one may always argue that a medieval empire is
fundamentally different from a contemporary sovereign
state, and therefore reject any essentialist endeavour.
However, similarities remain: both empire and modern
state are main actors on an international stage, which
presupposes basic needs and interests, which defines a
type of behaviour and therefore perpetuates an
understanding of state.
The question that Post-Modernists will probably find
most challenging is the lack of an essential state: how
can one theorise about something without having a basic
understanding of what this something is? This ontology
is even more problematic because it doesn’t provide a
base for building a state and therefore nothing can be
explained nor predicted. Along these lines Wendt’s
essential state fills a gap, which allows him to further
theorise.
Rejecting the essentialism of a state’s identity leads
to denial of the existence of the entire Wendtian
classification of identities. Consequently
Post-Modernists fail to differentiate between identity
and behaviour, demonstrated in Zehfuss’ example of the
Federal Republic of Germany. [15]
The case of Germany
According to Wendt the basic need to survive is
essential for each state and is a part of its corporate
identity, formed exogenously of interaction with other
actors on the systemic level. In the case of Germany it
translates into a commitment to peace. However the
problem that Zehfuss points to is related to Germany’s
engagement in military operations between 1992 and 1995.
For Zehfuss it should be either a change in the
Corporate identity or a behavioural change. She rejects
the former because its formation is “exogenously given”
[16] and the latter because it conflicts with the
Corporate identity, which she rightfully assumes to be
peaceful. Hence a difference between behaviour and
identity doesn’t exist.
Zehfuss fails to understand the multiple levels of
identity. Germany’s change is not behavioural: it has
occurred on the social level of identity (Role).
Consistent with Wendt, this change has occurred through
interaction and is firmly related to Germany’s Corporate
identity: while the internal peace commitment remains
firmly rooted to the way Germany’s Corporate identity is
translated to other actors, so it becomes shared
knowledge, knowledge attained through interaction, and
reflects the state’s Role identity.
The Lockean culture presupposes internalisation driven
by interest. In achieving the interest of “never again
war…never again dictatorship” [17], which shows
Germany’s peaceful Corporate identity, Germany has to
engage in interaction with other states and
organisations. If world peace is a prerequisite for
peace in Germany then amending the law regarding the use
of armed forces hasn’t changed the Corporate identity of
Germany. What has changed is its Role identity.
Real problems for Wendt?
Identity formation and identity impact on the state and
the international system are important issues for the
Realist critics as well.
Copeland emphasizes that it is impossible to base a
plausible systemic-level explanation on identities on
Wendt’s process of constructing identities [18].
Although Copeland too challenges the domestic formation
of identity he is primarily concerned with the
inevitable insecurity. The notion that identity is even
partially created exogenous of interaction with other
actors actually strengthens the Realists’ fundamental
concern about uncertainty [19].
Even though seemingly plausible, this criticism neglects
the idea that identity is not entirely domestic but
shaped by international interaction as well. Wendt gives
a logical response to this accusation, claiming that by
drawing on both idealism and realism he opens up a space
for a plausible understanding of international
relations: on the one hand he embraces the idealist’s
view that “the most fundamental fact about society is
the nature and structure of social consciousness”. [20]
On the other he doesn’t negate the Realists’ idea that
it is likely that states exhibit egoistic behaviour in
their initial stage of interaction. By doing so Wendt
makes it clear that the uncertainty emphasised by
Realists is possible and likely to occur. However he
explains that there are other possibilities that must
not be neglected.
Wendt wins out
Along
these lines Wendt’s response to both Zehfuss and
Copeland’s claim, that the domestic factor in forming
identities only confuses the explanation, is plausible
and logical. It is crucial that if states were merely a
product of interaction there would be nothing for
interaction to have its effects on. Therefore the
Post-Modern suggestion that state essentialism is
destructive for Wendt’s approach is irrelevant, and
forming state identity on a domestic level is not a
strong argument for uncertainty as Copeland understands
it to be.
Furthermore, Copeland and Zehfuss come from different
ends of the IR spectrum, yet they both misinterpret the
possibility of sending interest-driven signals that
don’t reflect the true identity of actors. Even though
it is theoretically possible successfully to deceive
other states and not be perceived as deceptive,
according to Wendt’s view this cannot be a long-term
strategy and eventually a deceptive state will be
recognised as such. Consequently no state consciously
aims at being perceived as deceptive and uncooperative.
Wendt argues, “impression management” [21] eventually
results in negative consequences for both the state
itself and the international system.
Along
these same lines, Copeland challenges the interpretation
of behaviour. His claim that an actor understands
signals through his own biases is relevant. Wendt
doesn’t give a plausible explanation of how one is to
proceed if the signals one sends are misunderstood in
the process of interaction [22] however he clarifies
that it is essential for actors to try to achieve shared
understanding.
All of
this criticism leads us to a more important issue, which
neither Copeland nor Zehfuss discuss. Copeland’s
criticism logically leads to the conclusion that if
cultures are described by internalisation of norms and
identities, and that the more internalised a norm the
more essential a part of one’s identity it becomes, then
moving from one culture to another is problematic.
Copeland doesn’t go this far, but his claim that it is
not possible for identities to explain cultural
transitions as well as perpetuate culture is fairly
accurate. Wendt doesn’t account for the process of
transition from Hobbesian to Lockean culture [23], nor
does he elaborate on how a transition to Kantian culture
will occur. In his approach the linkage between identity
and culture allows the argument that identity is more
likely to perpetuate culture rather than change it.
A
way between, a way forward
Neither Zehfuss nor Copeland reach the logical extension
of their arguments: the question of whether it is
necessary to move from one culture to another. Kantian
culture presupposes a deep internalization of the norms
in the collective identity of a State, which means
internalization of the Other in the Self to an extent
where the Other and the Self are one [24]. This can
seriously threaten to undermine the State itself and
creates a problem for forming Corporate identity and
make the essential state, which serves as a basis for
creating identity unnecessary.
Although this contradiction in Wendt’s approach exists
in the Kantian culture only it remains the logical
continuum of both Realist and Post-Modern criticism. It
also leads to an interesting theoretical challenge:
namely the unexpected similarities between Post-Modern
and Realist interpretation of a Constructivist approach.
Common
wisdom considers the Post-Modern and Realist ontology to
be at the very opposite sides of the theoretical
spectrum. However the criticism of Wendt’s process of
identity formation shows different. The similar
challenges that both approaches pose to Wendt are
crucial for the field of IR. They may serve as a base
for adopting a new and unusual interpretation of
international relations and thus provide more thorough
answers to existing questions and pose other pressing
enquiries [25].
References
[1] Maja Zehfuss; Constructivism and Identity: A
dangerous Liaison. University of Warwick, Coventry, UK;
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 7,
number 3, 2001, p. 315- 348
Dale C. Copeland; Review: The Constructivist Challenge
to Structural Realism: A Review Essay; International
Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Autumn, 2000), pp.187-212
[2] Mainstream realism suggests that states’ behaviour
is entirely driven by states’ interest of utility
maximizing. Identity issues are not discussed since
identity is considered to be given, e.i. not shaped by
exogenous factors. Therefore on a systemic level all
states (or “units” in the Realist rhetoric) have the
same characteristics. Thus realism is considered a
scientific approach, which relies on valid empirical
investigation. Post-Modernists on the contrary suggests
that the presence of contending interpretations and
observer bias render scientific investigation untenable
and therefore the idea of a state and international
relations can be deconstructed all the way down.
[3] Wendt, Alexander; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003)
[4] Wendt, Alexander; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003) p. 327–34, 125, 252
[5] Wendt, Alexander; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003) p. 224-225
[6] Wendt, Alexander; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003) p.229
[7] Zehfuss, Maja; Constructivism and Identity: A
dangerous Liaison; University of Warwick, Coventry, UK;
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 7,
number 3, 2001, p. 316
[8] ibid.
[9] Maya Zehfuss is right to assume that Identity should
be given in scientific theory. As Daniel Little argues:
science includes the epistemic criteria of “an
empirical-testability criterion, a logical coherence
criterion, and an institutional commitment to
intersubjective processes of belief evaluation and
criticism.” Therefore in a scientific theory, identity
and the Self are incapable of alteration through
interaction and social participation i.e. they are
given. The appropriate definition of causality here is
empirical
[10] Campbell, David; National Deconstruction, Violence,
Identity, and Justice in Bosnia; London, Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press; 1998
[11] Copeland, Dale; Review: The Constructivist
Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay;
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Autumn, 2000),
pp.187-212
[12] ibid.
[13] According to Wendt interaction with other states
creates shared ideas and knowledge, which in turn become
essential for the formation of state identity and
interest. See Wendt p. 124-125, chapter 4 and 6.
[14] Wendt argues that the essential state is a
necessary starting point for analyzing state identity.
His claim is that there are basic elements of the state,
which provide for calling an entity a state. It is
because of these characteristics that one differentiates
state from a football team, a multinational
organization, and anything else for that matter. The
essential state is thus necessary for better
understanding both state identity and the system. It is
largely accepted that states are the main actors in an
anarchical system; the essential states provides us with
the means to differentiate states from other actors, and
enables us to theorize about them. For more see Wendt,
Alexander; Social Construction of International Society;
Cambridge Studies in International Relations (2003)
[15] Maja Zehfuss exemplifies her main criticism through
the case of Germany. Her claim is that the fact that
Germany claims to be peaceful state and at the same time
participates in military operations is impossible to
explain with the Wendtian notion of identity and
cultures of anarchy. Form more on the case of Germany
see Zehfuss, Maja; Constructivism and Identity: A
dangerous Liaison. University of Warwich, Coventry, UK;
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 7,
number 3, 2001
[16] Wendt, Alexander; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003) p.328
[17] Deutscher Bungestag, 1990a: 18019
[18] Copeland, Dale; Review: The Constructivist
Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay;
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Autumn, 2000),
pp.187-212
[19] “Wendt’s building of a systemic constructivist
theory – and his bracketing off unit-level processes –
thus presents him with a ironic dilemma. It is the very
mutability of polities as emphasized by domestic-level
constructivists – that states may change because of
domestic processes independently of international
interaction – that makes prudent leaders so concerned
about the future” in Copeland, Review: The
Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,
International Security Vol.25, No 2, (Autumn, 2000) p.
188
[20] Wendt, Alexander; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003), p. 36-37
[21] Copeland, Dale; Review: The Constructivist
Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay;
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, (Autumn, 2000),
pp.187-212, p. 202
[22] “The only way for actors to accomplish their goal
is to try to bring their respective understandings into
line, to communicate” in Wendt; Social Construction of
International Society; Cambridge Studies in
International Relations (2003)
[23] Wendt claims the international system is now in a
Lockean culture of anarchy e.i. states act on the
presumption of being not enemies but rivals. The
immediate fear of destruction is removed, however states
haven’t internalized the Other in the definition of Self
yet.
[24] “International interests are now part of the
national interest; not just interests that states have
to advanced in order to advance their separate national
interests; friendship is a preference over an outcome,
not just preference over a strategy. In Wendt; Social
Construction of International Society; Cambridge Studies
in International Relations (2003) p.305 306
[25] Critical realism discusses this idea as well.
While critical realism attempts to incorporate both
realism and Post-Modernism in a particular way (See
Heikki Patomäki 2002 and López, Potter 2001) I attempt
to merely emphasize the observation that similarities
between the two theories exist.
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