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The
Security Council
at an Impasse
The
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), like any other institution, is
greatly affected by shifts in power. However, during recent years the
Council has been described as being at an impasse over important global
concerns. Due to divergent state interests and the difficulty of
establishing consensus and coalitions amongst divergent actors, the
UNSC seems to be increasingly incapable of discharging its Charter
functions. Apathy and undeniable negligence have resulted in a
narrowing of self-interest to the detriment of the common welfare.
Diana Díaz
The United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) has the ‘primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security’, which means that it is
the most important mechanism which acts on the behalf of the United
Nations (UN) to respond to both armed and humanitarian crisis, as well
as to potential threats.[1] However, since its creation – but especially
since the end of the Cold War – its mission has become increasingly
difficult as a result of the politics of the remaining superpower and
the emergence of new forms of authority on the global stage. During
recent decades it has become progressively more apparent that nations
pursue their own interest, rather than the collective one, making
difficult the creation of coalitions and the establishment of consensus.
The Security
Council has become the arena in which the divisions among its five
permanent members (the P-5: the Republic of China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America) and the rest of the
international community are manifested. Its paralysis is a reflection of
the gap between the ‘harmonious’ principles in which the UNSC was
created, and the reality of political division. In this sense,
international mechanisms such as the UNSC may be based on liberal
principles, but the reality is that their members behave with a
self-interested attitude which constrains or prevents the solution of
important global problems.
In every
international crisis the Council members exercise their power to ensure
that resolutions are favourable to their domestic interests. As a
consequence, on many occasions the Council has dramatically failed to
provide an optimal or timely solution. In this sense, every failed
effort in pursuing a common resolution has ended in paralysis, for
example over Cyprus, Kosovo, India-Pakistan, Iraq and Rwanda. This
record of failures and delays threatens not only the Council’s longevity
and authority, but also the image of a UN which may be functioning
correctly in other areas. Gradually and dangerously, the UN and its
Council have been considered unable to end disputes peacefully, and been
sidelined by other international organisations in conflict management.
The Causes of
Impasse
The policymaking
process involves patterns of influence, understood as a synonym of
power. The problem begins when different players wish to exercise or
demonstrate their influence (not only through the control of agendas,
but also by the capacity to constrain debates), causing paralysis. When
the drafters of the UN Charter placed the responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in the collective hands
of the members of the Security Council, they assumed that the Allies
would cooperate as the core of the UN. However, growing tensions amongst
‘the Inner Circle’ of permanent members soon fractured the alliance and
prevented the SC from discharging its Charter functions.
Increasingly, the
veto power became the mechanism by which the P-5 preserved both their
power and the pursuance of their interests, and by which two of the main
causes of the Council’s paralysis developed. Firstly, the veto protected
the interests of the remaining superpower (the U.S.) which attempted to
pursue its preferred policies; secondly, it raised discontent among many
states and international actors which attempted to counterbalance the
American power. When the UN’s founders insisted on providing individual
vetoes to the superpowers in order to avoid the conditions which led to
the downfall of the League of Nations, they did not imagine that it
would be this precise arrangement which would put the UN and its Council
at risk of suffering the same fate as its predecessor.
Washington has
played a primary role in shaping UNSC agendas according to its
interests, but also and more importantly in shaping and reshaping the
character of the Council itself. For many years Washington has viewed
the Council – rather than the General Assembly – as its forum of choice.
It has been well-known for being selective in the operations to which it
lends its support. On several occasions Washington has avoided being
involved in conflicts which are secondary to its interests, despite its
responsibility for providing international security as the sole
remaining superpower. This attitude has brought terrible consequences
for the UN and its Council, whose coercive capacity is closely linked to
the U.S.’ will to provide resources – the approval of military
operations only takes place when the U.S. signs on, because the
participation of other countries is mainly political or not
operationally meaningful.
However, the most
harmful attitude in political terms for the UN and its Security Council
has undoubtedly been American unilateralism, manifest in particular
since the mid-1990s and deepening during George W. Bush’s
administrations. The events following 11 September 2001 are a case in
point in terms of American selective engagement, when the U.S. seemed to
learn that the UNSC could be one of the best channels through which to
address its crisis of security. However, its preferred resolutions were
not always supported by all the members of the Council. When faced with
opposition in the UNSC the U.S. abandoned multilateral bargaining to
show an unashamed use of unilateral power.[2] With this attitude America
showed clearly once again that ‘acting through the Security Council is
always a policy option but should not be a road that Washington always
takes’, especially when Council resolutions are related to American
interests and concerns of national security.[3] This political advantage
can be explained through consideration of the power and hegemonic
position of the U.S. Historically, Washington has been able to choose
between unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral strategies and been able
to shop around for the institutions which fit best for its interests.
This American
enthusiasm for unilateral action has become the first cause of paralysis
and the source of painful reactions throughout the international
community. Some of the U.S.’ allies, for whom Washington’s selective
tactics have caused disquiet and anger, have added their complaints to
those from other leaders around the world. In response, countries have
been adopting resolutions to denounce the unilateralism of American
policies and dropping resolutions which may be supportive of U.S.
interests. Nonetheless, this political attitude has worsened the
paralysis of the Council and put world stability at risk. In this
political pattern, the more the U.S. acts against mutually accepted
rules and institutions, the more it will provoke resistance from the
international community.
In general terms,
states have increasingly expressed their opposition to the policies of
the U.S., and pursued their own interests when they diverge from the
those of America.[4] In this sense, there is a trend of nation states
seeking to find better and stronger mechanisms for banding together to
counterbalance American power, although divergences across countries in
relation to American policy vary in their extent and timing. As a
consequence, the UN and its SC often become the arena of confrontation
between America’s supporters and its critics. A good example of this was
the division shown during the race between Guatemala and Venezuela to
garner sufficient votes to become the Council's second representative
from the Caribbean and Latin America.
In addition, there
is another force which, since the beginning of the 1990’s, has
dramatically increased its contact with the UNSC: Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs). In recent years NGOs have successfully persuaded
the Security Council to consider human rights, humanitarian relief,
environmental issues, and women and children’s welfare in many of its
mandates and resolutions. At the same time, they have learned that they
can have influence also on ‘hard’ policy areas when they act in
coalitions with like-minded members, generally E-10 delegations.
However, the participation of these organisations has also raised
continual and considerable problems, worsening the paralysis of the
Council when their activities involve criticism of certain governments
and when they increase the pressure for consensus to be found among
Council members.
These developments
in attitude among international actors constitute a prelude to the
creation of counterbalancing coalitions where even the less powerful
countries cannot be ignored. In this sense, some small steps may not
look important today but will eventually either cause a new balance of
powers or worsen the impasse inside the UNSC. Through the construction
of alliances or individually, countries and international actors are
aiming to affect multilateralism in their race to have their say in the
Council’s policymaking. This political behaviour can be seen during the
long periods of disagreement on packages of incentives or sanctions.
The UNSC faces a
complex challenge as it seeks to build a consensus which can provide
optimal and timely solutions to several global concerns in need of
answer. However, the P-5 and other important international players are
divided, and far from consensus on most current concerns. Consider for
example the unfinished debate regarding Iran, and the clear divisions in
terms of power and interests among the members manifested inside the
UNSC. Shaping a diplomatic end to Iran's nuclear defiance seems to be an
impossible task, and as a consequence Iran continues to provide
ambiguous answers. What needs to be done is to pursue commitment upfront
by the P-5 and other relevant players (like Germany) to agree to present
a package of incentives or sanctions strong enough to either force or
persuade Teheran to give up its fuel cycle ambitions. It is essential to
prove that the Council is not paralysed and that it functions as a group
of like-minded nations. Contemporary international affairs need to be
tackled by the commitment and participation of the whole international
community. The impasse in which this mechanism of global governance
finds itself poses a serious problem in addressing important global
concerns and setting global standards of behaviour.
Adjusting to a New
World
Experience shows
that the abolition of institutions is a traumatic event which
international diplomacy should avoid at all costs. Accordingly, to avoid
its abolition, the Council – like any other institution of governance –
must continue an on-going process of transformation and adjustment in
order to be able to demonstrate its efficiency in performing its duties
and delivering on its authority. It is unquestionable that some "reform"
is necessary to improve the credibility and durability of the UNSC.
However, there will be little reform of the Council as long as it
remains dominated by self-interest. Any fundamental change or adjustment
will almost always be strongly resisted by the most powerful actors. The
P-5 will hardly support any call for equity, in particular by increasing
membership and eliminating the veto. The only significant reform of the
UNSC that has been approved was Resolution 1990 which proposed enlarging
the Council in 1995 from 11 to 15 members and required majority from 7
to 9 votes.
For many, one of
the main problems of the Council’s paralysis lies in the disparity
between its authority and its democratic representation. However,
paradoxically, in recent years the debates about the Council’s
enlargement and veto reform have moved the UNSC deeper into the impasse.
The wide range of proposals has become a painful process which has led
to further splits across the international community. At the same time,
it has been difficult to argue that some actions, for example to modify
veto rights or to change the number of seats on the Council, would
improve the Council’s effectiveness or overcome its core weaknesses. It
is impossible to escape the fact that these kinds of measures could lead
to a greater fragmentation inside the UNSC, or to the abolition of this
important mechanism of global governance.
Nevertheless there
are things that can be done, and among the most urgent challenges is the
need to correct the gap between the Council’s now-tired rhetoric and its
actual performance on peace and security. In this context, there are
severe deficiencies and problems, mostly related to self-interested
political behaviour, which must be corrected immediately. The next
Secretary-General (SG) will be heavily involved with this difficult
task. To encourage better use of the UNSC as well as to make it the
primary preferred policy forum for all its members is a huge and complex
responsibility. Accordingly, the role of the Secretary-General will be
unlike any other before: it will require an exceptional – and
exceptionally persuasive – diplomat.
On December 31,
2006 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an extremely active international
leader, will step down as SG and be replaced by the South Korean Ban Ki-moon.
To follow the line of his predecessor, Ban will need to base his
administration on a great deal of personal diplomacy and contact with
Security Council members. He will understand that confrontation inside
the Council needs to be resolved before diplomacy can succeed in a wide
range of important affairs, such as the war in the Middle East and the
conflict in Darfur. In this sense, his main task will be to engage all
Council members in seeking comprehensive resolutions that suit the
common interest and assure global peace and security.
Another key
challenge which Ban will face will be the delicate constraining of
American exceptionalism. For the moment no other state has the capacity
to surpass the U.S.’ role in global society: its economy is considerably
bigger than any other nation’s and its military power is unparalleled.
Ban should not acquiesce to American unilateralism, however, although
critical engagement with Washington’s policies on key issues is a
complex and delicate task. The key issue is to engage the U.S. in
multilateral consensus, moderate its exercise of power, and discipline
its impulses in order to gain the confidence of the rest of the
international community to participate in institutional bargaining.
Preventing the
abuse of power is a very serious challenge: it is unacceptable that the
global agenda is held to ransom by an elite of powerful nations.
Mechanisms that embody notions of shared responsibility in effectively
addressing international threats are required. Currently, nation-states
are enmeshed in interrelated relationships and patterns of
interconnectedness, and for this reason the delivery of any public good
- such as peace and security - requires coordinated multilateral action.
Combating terrorism is the best example of this. Furthermore, the
conception of political power needs to be re-positioned and
re-contextualised as multilateral. By multilateral action countries such
as the USA may lose some freedom of manoeuvre, but in the long-term they
may gain far more by hastening the processes of policymaking inside the
Security Council, and by turning other countries into reliable and
cooperative partners.
The UNSC faces a
difficult dilemma: on the one hand, the Council is expected to empower
transformations demanded by the contemporary world; whilst on the other
hand it is expected to preserve the interests of the most powerful
actors. Until now, the UNSC seems to have been at the heart of a
paralysis caused by self-interest and a failure to find a mechanism
strong enough to keep all the forces working together. The road beyond
the impasse is likely to be long and arduous.
References
[1] Charter of the United Nations:
Chapter V, Article 24.
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